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Procuring the Cross of Iron: 
The Effect of Congressional Approval on the U.S. Defense Budget 
 
By Chris Higginbotham 
 
 
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a 
theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in 
arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its 
scientists, and the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under 
the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper 





Understanding why we spend is an essential step in controlling and justifying the U.S. 
defense budget. This dissertation examines the impact of congressional approval on U.S. defense 
spending through time series analysis of the period 1970 - 2015. The interaction between public 
approval and congressional action is viewed through the lens of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.   
The defense budget represents over half of all discretionary spending, and produces 
economic impacts in every state and virtually every congressional district. The scale, salience 
and extensibility of the defense budget offer a tempting target for Congress to provide quick 
stimulus to the electorate on a scale impossible with any other single appropriation. Whether 
motivated by fear of potential foreign enemies, nationalistic pride, concern for service members, 
or economic advantage, the defense budget is as close to a bipartisan priority as can be found in 
U.S. society. The defense budget is a useful tool for Members of Congress to influence individual 
and institutional public approval and one that is regularly utilized both within and without time 
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This dissertation has been a labor of love to me, yet one not always fully requited to those 
who supported me in the process. I am grateful for my academic advisor, Professor Alesha Doan, 
and her unyielding confidence and steadfast belief that joy can be found in even the most 
disparaging circumstances. I would likely never have completed this work without the patient 
guidance in time series analysis received (most painfully on my part) from Professor Clayton 
Webb. The entire staff of professors and graduate students at the University of Kansas played a 
role in encouraging this old sailor to learn a new way of thinking about the world. To all of these 
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My personal experience with defense budgets is based upon a 26-year military career as 
an officer and aviator in the United States Navy. In addition to operational tours (including nine 
combat deployments), I spent considerable time in Washington DC. For three years, I had the 
honor of serving as the Commanding Officer of the Navy Presidential Honor Guard for both 
Presidents Bush and Obama (2006-2009). In this capacity I worked on a daily basis with (and 
observed) principals and staff at the White House, Congress and the Pentagon (as well as visiting 
foreign leaders) in a dizzying array of public and private settings. I served a further 3 years on 
the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Pentagon (2009-2012). During that time, I was 
assigned as both a Resource Sponsor and Requirements Officer for a portfolio of Navy and Joint 
weapon systems while participating in three budget cycles. My duties led me to work extensively 
with the Military Services, Joint Staff, Department of Defense (DoD), congressional and 
executive branch principals and staffs. In the performance of my duties, I was regularly called to 
provide requirement, program and budget briefs and testimony on a variety of topics to diverse 
military, White House and congressional audiences.    
 These experiences did not make me an expert on the defense budget. I am inclined to 
believe that there is no such thing, and that even those most wise in the ways of the Pentagon are, 
in the end, but journeyman-apprentices to the amorphous process. With the immense, complex 
and ever shifting requirements of defense budgeting, it seems doubtful that any one person could 
ever come to command a complete grasp of the whole. Whether that is by design or an 
evolutionary accident, I could not say for certain.   
However, I can say with conviction that my participation in the budgeting process left an 
indelible mark upon my personal life and professional career. It awakened in me a desire to 
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better understand the colossal pecuniary beast that drives both military and political agendas on a 
staggering scale. It is impossible to describe the mix of fatalistic terror and childish glee that 
takes hold when landing an aircraft on the heaving and twisting deck of an aircraft carrier at 
night in a high sea state. Similarly, I can hardly relate the intense incredulity experienced when 
blithely handed responsibility for a multibillion-dollar portfolio after a one-day turnover at the 
Pentagon. Both are sublime and yet sobering as the Shamal winds in the Al-Hajarah desert of 
Iraq. There are no civilian equivalencies (at least none that I have found).  
 The intent of this dissertation is not to unlock all the secrets of the U.S. defense budget, 
or even to clarify how it interacts with all facets of government and industrial power. Rather, this 
but the opening salvo in what I hope proves a long academic journey to better understand one of 
the most complex governmental systems in the history of the world. To this end, I hope the 
reader will grant indulgence for some exuberance on a topic that is less than stimulating to many. 
If, the reader gains even a little more visibility into the relationship between congressional 
actions and defense spending then I will have proven successful. Even a miniscule contribution 
to the academic study of defense budgeting is a prize worth pursuing.   
 In the course of this study I discovered much, but to my frequent surprise, not always 
what I expected to find. As J.R.R. Tolkien reminded us in the Hobbit, “There is nothing like 
looking, if you want to find something. You certainly usually find something, if you look, but it 
is not always quite the something you were after.” I hope the reader will consider the 





“War is a matter not so much of arms as of money.” 
– Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 
Defense spending has long been a priority of national government, and that is unlikely to 
change in the 21st century. The world, from an American perspective, has grown neither more 
peaceful nor unified over the last 40 years. What has changed is the scale of defense spending, 
the extensibility with which it permeates the American economy and the transparency with 
which citizens can now examine that spending. The staggering amounts of money spent. The 
decentralization of the defense industry into subcontractors in every state and congressional 
district. The sheer volume and detail of defense budget-related information accessible via social 
media, and the insistence by many politicians and pundits that defense spending is the only 
safeguard against a hostile world, have all led to increased salience of the defense budget with 
the American electorate.  
The U.S. Federal budget is composed of two general categories of expenditures. The 
mandatory spending budget is composed of those programs mandated by law and supported by 
congressionally established trust funds. Examples of these would be Social Security, Medicare 
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).1 These programs do not require annual 
authorization; the number of eligible participants, or changes to the laws that establish their 
respective funding formulas determines appropriation and expenditures. As such, these are not 
subject to the normal fiscal budget cycle, and cannot be easily altered.  
The second type is discretionary spending. Discretionary programs are funded through 12 
major annual authorization and appropriation bills that must be debated and passed (or not) for 
                                                 
1 TANF makes up one part of a series of income support programs commonly referred to as Welfare. 
4 
 
each new fiscal year. For example, Defense, Education, Transportation, Justice, Interior, Labor, 
Agriculture and Health and Human Services are departments largely funded by discretionary 
spending.2  
 
Figure I-1: Discretionary vs. Mandatory Spending 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
 
Over the last 40 years, the lion’s share of U.S. Federal spending has shifted from 
discretionary to mandatory budgets (see Figure I-1 above). As the number of people qualifying 
for mandatory programs has grown and services provided have increased, so has the overall 
mandatory budget. As mandatory spending increased, discretionary spending, as a portion of the 
total budget, has been squeezed. As the largest part of the shrinking discretionary pot of money, 
defense spending has necessarily garnered greater attention from Congress.   
                                                 
2 This list is not exhaustive, but merely meant to represent a sample of the largest discretionary budgets.  
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  In comparison to other discretionary budgets, even in time of relative peace, defense 
spending has maintained or exceed the growth rate of the majority of its competitors (see Figure 
I-2. below). Highly salient with the electorate, targeted toward the most popular U.S. institution 
(the U.S. Military)3 and consuming over 50% of the discretionary budget, the defense budget has 
evolved into the largest, most assessable and salient congressional lever for rapid change in 
government spending.  
 
Figure I-2: Growth within Discretionary Spending 





                                                 
3 Since 1975, Gallup polling has consistently shown the military as the most popular U.S. institution (by a wide 
margin).   
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Congress is constitutionally charged in Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 (Appropriations 
Clause),4 with providing appropriations for all money to be drawn from the treasury. The power 
to craft the final version of a $3.7 trillion-dollar budget (2015) is the power to set priorities and 
determine, in large part, the political and economic fortunes of the states and businesses 
operating within them (Janowitz, 1974; Hays et.al., 1997). However, this power was not granted 
without institutional constraint. 
By design Congress is a divisive and slow moving organ of government, answering to 
millions of masters in the form of the electorate. Never a popular institution, the requirement to 
reach at least a rough consensus in order to pass legislation has often led to gridlock and partisan 
division (Fenno, 1978). When compromise does occur on important legislation, it naturally 
pleases no one completely and thus sets the stage for the next confrontation. With the twin, and 
equally unpopular, options of gridlock or compromise, it is not surprising that Congress 
consistently suffers the lowest approval rate of any government institution.5   
How then is an endemically unpopular institution to obtain popular reelection of its 
members? One answer lies in finding a bipartisan lever large enough to give some common 
ground to members of the institution, regardless of party, state or district. The defense budget is 
that lever, and it is regularly, if not always successfully, employed by Congress. In this 
dissertation, I argue that the defense budget is used by Congress as a tool to address perceived 
negative public approval, and I will also examine how and why this tool is employed.   
 
 
                                                 
4 No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular 
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. 
5 As determined by Gallup and GSS polling.  
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A. The Problem with Defense Spending.   
In 2015, national defense accounted for over 55% of discretionary spending and 
approximately 19% of the U.S. federal budget.6 As President Eisenhower warned in his 1961 
speech about the dangers of the “Military Industrial Complex,” the political and industrial inertia 
that develops behind such huge expenditures can be enormously powerful and induce far-
reaching and often-unintended effects.7 Although the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) base 
budget has decreased since its wartime peak in 2010 of nearly $713 billion, total Defense 
expenditures in 2015, even after the implementation of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011,8 
still exceed $610 billion.9   
The staggering sum of $610 billion dollars would be sufficient to purchase over 500lbs of 
rice for every man woman and child in Africa, and surpasses the defense budgets of the ten next 
largest national militaries in the world combined.10 Given these figures, it is easy to see how 
other nations might stand in awe of the enormous expenditures of the United States Military, and 
why many Americans question the sustainability of such huge security investments (see Figure I-
3 below).  
                                                 
6 This includes DoD base budget ($610B), Veterans ($178.2B), Foreign Military Aid ($13.2B) and Foreign 
Economic Aid ($33.3B) for a total of $834.7B. 
7 President Eisenhower farewell address, January 17, 1961. From the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library 
collection.  
8 BCA did not take effect until 2013, and even then compromises were made to increase domestic and defense 
spending by equal amounts over the legally mandated caps. Enacted in 2011 to resolve the crisis that summer about 
raising the debt limit, P.L. 112-25, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) required annual reductions in 
discretionary spending (compared with a projected spending baseline) totaling about $2.1 trillion through FY2021, 
in return for raising the debt limit by the same amount. For each year in the decade FY2012-FY2021, the BCA caps 
require roughly equal reductions (from the projected baseline) in appropriations for defense agencies and non-
defense agencies. For any year for which appropriations for either category exceed the BCA cap, appropriations are 
reduced to the level of the cap by a process of sequestration (CRS Defense: FY2015 Authorization and 
Appropriations, January 28, 2015). 
9 FY15 budget figures were retrieved from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and includes $530B base budget 
and $79.4B Overseas Contingency Operations funding. 




Figure I-3: Defense Spending Growth 
Source: Comparative Agenda Project 
 
Today, as in 2015, over 25% of American income tax dollars go toward paying for 
National Defense.11 As an example, in 2015 the average American household earned roughly 
$55,000 dollars and paid somewhere in the neighborhood of $5,000 in taxes, with $1,000 being 
income tax.12 Twenty-five percent of that income tax, or roughly $250 went toward defense, or 
over seven times more than was directed to support education.    
If we accept that quantity has a quality all of its own, a simple look at the number of 
people involved with DoD is instructive. In 2015 there were over 1.4 million active duty, 1.1 
million reserve members, 861,000 DoD civil servants and over 22 million veterans (over 2 
million receiving benefits).13 DoD is the single largest employer in the country, beating out even 
                                                 
11 This does not include Social Security Taxes which are separate from income tax.  
12 According to the American Community Survey (ACS) and IRS estimates. These numbers are rounded for ease of 
use in this example, but are accurate in order of magnitude. 
13 Veteran’s benefits are included in discretionary funds but are not part of the baseline defense budget.  
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retail giant Walmart in scope and scale. Nor is DoD’s influence confined to government 
employees. Conservative estimates place over 4 million Americans working directly or indirectly 
in the defense industry.14  
Couple these numbers with the relative ease of manipulating defense appropriations and 
it becomes apparent why the defense budget promises potentially great rewards in relation to the 
political effort required to obtain them. Anecdotally, in 2013 when sequestration enactment 
forced baseline defense spending to hit its lowest point since 2006, congressional approval rates 
similarly hit their lowest point in modern history (11% as an aggregate of national polls).15 Since 
then, defense spending and subsequent congressional approval have both slowly been rising.16   
 
B. Hypotheses. 
Much has been written about the mixed economic impacts of defense spending (Bobrow 
and Hill Barro, 1991; Ross, 1991; Rundquist, 2002; Fordham, 2003; Carroll, 2006; Borch, Casey 
and Wallace, 2010; Heo, 2010; Wallace and de Rugy, 2013; Whitten and Williams, 2015). 
Similarly, a much smaller body of work has engaged the impact of public opinion on the 
sufficiency of defense spending on congressional action (Russet and Hartley, 1992; Higgs and 
Kilduff, 1993; Hartley, 1994; Rundquist and Carsey, 1999; 2002; Eichenberg and Stoll, 2003; 
Cox and Duffin, 2008). However, no real rigor has been applied to the relationship between 
defense spending and congressional approval.    
                                                 
14 Figure is an estimation based upon the publicly reported workforce and defense related revenues of the top 20 
U.S. defense firms. However, the number of jobs depending upon the defense industry estimated by the Pentagon in 
2011, was reported at over 7 million. The budget numbers are based upon self-reporting and DOD Comptroller 
public documents. 
15 Interestingly, this number fluctuates depending upon how the question is asked. Job approval rating was 11%, 
while trust in Congress was recorded in the single digits (as low as 6%).  
16 Although total defense spending has decreased since 2010, the baseline defense budget has steadily increased. 
Decrease in Overseas Contingency Operations spending (OCO) has masked base budget increases. 
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My thesis is that significant increases in negative congressional approval induce members 
of Congress (MoC) to increase discretionary spending on defense. Defense spending provides 
the quickest and least electorally risky way to stimulate the economy across all states, and the 
majority of districts, while providing a “quick win” with constituencies, industry and interest 
group supporters of the largely bipartisan defense appropriation (McCaffery and Jones, 2004).   
In support this of thesis, four hypotheses are tested: 
H1:  Negative approval rates of congress are inversely related to military budget growth. 
I expect to see Congress increase defense spending quickly, operating outside the normal 
parameters of the defense budgeting cycle and interfering with the Pentagon budget planning 
process. A lag of less than two years from change in approval rating to change in defense 
spending would indicate disruptive change.17 This decision to take immediate and potentially 
disruptive action is driven by the perception of loss of electoral support and the desire to mitigate 
this through a quick increase in discretionary spending. 
H2:  Public opinion on the level of military spending is positively related to military budget 
growth. I expect to see Congress manipulate defense spending in response to significant and 
consistent public opinion supporting increased or decreased spending. However, without a 
perceived direct electoral threat, I expect this to take place within the normal budgeting cycle 
(two to three-year lag) with no disruption to the DoD budget preparation process.  
H3:  The strength of the U.S. economy is positively related to military budget growth. 
I expect to see defense spending increase when GDP growth is strong. When GDP growth is 
weak, I expect defense spending to become sluggish, unless prompted by a significant increase in 
                                                 
17 Any action taken to increase defense spending within two years from the FY start would interrupt the DoD 
defense budget planning cycle of 18 months to two years.   
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unemployment. I expect unemployment to stimulate defense growth as a perceived form of 
economic stimulant.  
 
C. Summary. 
Since the end of the Cold War, little has been written exploring the causal drivers of U.S. 
Defense Spending. Without a better understanding of the causal drivers of U.S. Defense Budgets, 
we cannot determine appropriate levels of funding, nor justify the resultant impacts to the U.S. 
and world economies. It is long past time to renew the study of the causal drivers in defense 
spending. My dissertation contributes to the existing body of research by investigating the 
connection between congressional approval and defense spending.  
Understanding why we spend, is an essential step in controlling and justifying the U.S. 
defense budget. Renewed study may grant perspective on the journey U.S. defense spending has 
taken over the last 40 years and provide clues to what lies ahead. This dissertation examines the 
impact of congressional approval on U.S. defense spending through time series analysis of the 
period 1970 - 2015. The interaction between public approval and congressional action is viewed 
through the lens of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Jones, 2001) and is a departure from 
classical incrementalism (Key, 1940; Wildavsky, 1964, 1975, 2004) traditionally associated with 
budgets. Other key drivers, such as public opinion on the sufficiency of the defense budget, the 
presence of war and economic health are included in the model to isolate causation and 
interaction, but the focus is on the significant impact of congressional approval to punctuations 
in defense spending both during and outside periods of war and severe economic turmoil. 
The defense budget produces economic impacts in every state and virtually every 
congressional district. The scale, salience and extensibility of the defense budget offers a 
12 
 
tempting target for Congress to provide swift stimulus to the electorate on a scale impossible 
with any other single appropriation. Whether motivated by fear of potential foreign enemies, 
nationalistic pride, concern for service members or economic advantage, the defense budget is as 
close to a bipartisan priority as can be found in U.S. society. I contend that the defense budget is 
an indispensable tool through which Congress can influence individual and institutional approval 






















II. Literature Review and Critique 
 
Desultory reading is delightful, but to be beneficial, our reading must be carefully directed. 
– Lucius Annaeus Seneca 
 
This literature review and critique will perform five specific functions:  First, it will seek 
to identify how the contemporary literature has addressed defense spending and how some subtle 
perception problems have led to gaps in the extant research. Second, a brief review will be made 
of a set of five general scholarly approaches regarding the drivers of defense spending. Each 
approach will be viewed through the lens of how they have influenced the overall understanding 
of defense budgeting, and specifically how they have guided my research. Third, specific gaps in 
the literature will be addressed in the context of how this research will help in our understanding 
of defense spending, with a particular focus on the effect of congressional approval. Fourth, I 
will examine the theoretical foundation for this research with a review of what the literature on 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) has to say about budgeting. Specifically, it will 
demonstrate where my research augments the existing framework. Fifth and finally, it will 
conclude with a brief summary of the contemporary research and what remains to be done.  
 
A. Lack of Pluralism. 
Political scientists have traditionally taken a back seat to economists and public policy 
scholars in attempting to explain defense budgeting. Economists aptly calculate the metrics of 
defense budgeting, while policy scholars describe the tangible effects of defense policy. Political 
scientists, when they do enter the fray, tend to give brief lip service to these contributions and 
focus on individual or groups of political drivers of the budget process. Each of these approaches 
14 
 
has value. However, to borrow loosely from the Aristotelian concept of the “four causes,”18 they 
provide us with only the practical mimeses (imperfect images) of the whole process of defense 
budgeting. In Aristotle’s langue, economists give us insight into the second cause (material), 
which describes the basic components of the process, while policy scholars provide us with the 
fourth cause, (telos), which explores what is produced. By bridging the gap between these two 
with the third cause (agency), we gain appreciation for the hidden catalysts in the process. Only 
through a pluralistic approach can we can reveal the first (formal) or true cause and gain an 
actual blue print of the “tooth to tail” defense budget process. What follows is a discussion of 
what the contemporary literature has provided and what still remains to be determined.  
 
B. Contemporary Approaches. 
  There are two principal themes in defense spending addressed in the literature. The first 
relates to the primary drivers identified by authors to explain expansion and contraction of 
defense budgets. To better synthesize the existing literature on drivers, I have grouped them into 
five distinct categories based upon the approach authors took to defense spending, or closely 
related phenomenon.19 From these I have derived five simple explanatory models of inquiry. 
There seems little doubt in the literature (or anecdotally) that the presence of war (threat) is a 
powerful driver of defense spending; therefore, the primary focus of this review will be upon the 
other significant drivers.20 The categories I will examine in more detail are: Elite interpretation 
                                                 
18 In his work, “Poetics,” Aristotle advanced Platonic ideas relating to the imitation of objects or concepts through 
art, literature, etc., in the natural world.   
19 Generalized research into the influence upon public opinion or the motivations of Congress not specifically 
related to defense. 
20 I do consider the presence of war in relation to other drivers. In other words, to what degree does the presence of 
war impact or mitigate other drivers. It is possible war obscures other underlying processes, or makes them appear 
more impactful than they might actually be. To address this, the presence of war was included as an independent 
variable in the time series models to test for interaction effects.   
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of need (Leadership Model); Public opinion (Follower Model); Perceived military threat (Threat 
Model), Economic stimulus (Military Keynesian Model); and a combination of these factors, 
with the critical driver determined by changing relative opportunities and stimuli (Relativity 
Model).   
The second important theme in the literature involves whether defense spending is 
incremental or punctuated. From a theoretical perspective, this is an important distinction in fully 
understanding the influence of public opinion on defense budgets. If budgets were strictly 
incremental, there would be very little room for public opinion effects to register, and even less 
evidence of their impact. Fortunately, the general consensus is that although defense spending 
displays incremental characteristics, in practice it behaves in a punctuated manner.21 A 
punctuated response related to changes in public opinion would track with observations of 
significant changes to defense outlays when other drivers appear absent or marginal. To this end, 
we will briefly explore what the literature has to say about Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) 
and military budgets (Baumgartner and Jones, 1995). 
Threat Model 
This is perhaps the simplest and most generally accepted driver of defense budget 
change.22 Adherents to this conceptual approach assume that when a perceived military threat 
comes to dominate the public imagination, no amount of cueing or ideological persuasion is 
necessary to push leaders (elites) and followers (public) toward agreement on the need to alter 
defense spending.23 Accepting the absolute threat of war as a prime driver, this model also 
                                                 
21 At least in budget literature from roughly 2000 onward.  
22 There is effectively no argument in the literature that obvious threat does not drive defense spending. The 
argument is only that it does not explain all the variance when an obvious threat is not apparent.  
23 This model also accepts a reaction to economic threats as well. For example, if the country faces a severe 
economic downturn, then resources would be withdrawn from the defense budget to address the economic threat (a 
bank bailout for instance). This is separate from the Keynesian Military Economic model discussed later, in that 
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addresses less severe foreign policy events (short of war), such as the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 
1979, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, or the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
(1993-1999). The basic logic follows that in times of perceived threat, aggregate public opinion 
forms quickly and decisions in defense spending are made in reaction, rather than in calculation.   
Some scholars believe that the U.S. simply adjusts its defense spending in relation to 
international tension (Ward, 1984). Jeffrey Knopf wrote that public opinion on defense spending 
was driven by response to significant events and was both measured and prompt. He claimed 
there was no disconnect between politician and electorate, and significant budgeting decisions 
were typically timely and relatively bipartisan (Knopf, 1998). Larry Bartels similarly suggested 
that public reaction to significant events led to the 1981 defense spending increase, and that 
Congress responded to the public’s recognition of the threat of the Soviet Union, regardless of 
any potential electoral threat to themselves. Members of Congress, regardless of whether their 
districts directly profited, tended to vote in support of increased defense spending (Bartels, 
1991). Nurcan Metin reached a similar conclusion when examining significant threats from 1945 
to 2007. He found that the defense budget reacted to perceived threats and war, irrespective of 
other mitigating factors (Metin, 2012).    
Although appealing as a concept, the threat model by itself can only explain a relatively 
small portion of defense spending changes. It has been observed that political and economic 
factors often induce higher levels of defense spending than are necessary for national security 
(Mintz, 1985 and 1988; Mintz and Ward, 1989). For instance, the threat model is useful in 
understanding initial reactions to horrific situations such as the Japanese naval attack on Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941, or the terrorist actions on September 11, 2001. However, 
                                                 
there is no attempt to use the defense budget and deficit spending to prime the economic pump, but rather it is a 
simple question of shifting resources to the greatest threat (military or economic).  
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thankfully, history produces few events so innately dramatic and unifying. In short, it does not 
explain the fluctuation in defense spending when there is no obvious threat, or continued high 
levels of spending once a threat has passed. In conjunction with other models, the threat-based 
approach has utility, but as a lone causal driver it is incomplete.   
Leadership Model 
Elites, or leaders, in this model are not seen as operating outside of democratic 
government, but rather as a necessary part of maintaining a healthy democracy. For our purposes 
elites are defined as persons (or organizations of persons) who are politically, materially or 
economically invested in the outcomes of defense budgets and have direct means (either through 
formal position or communication access) to influence the budget (Bachrach, 1962). There are 
many flavors of elites depending upon your classification criteria (Mills, 1956; Truman, 1959) 
and for our purposes we will group them into three categories: political, material, and economic 
elites.24 We will briefly discuss each group, but the focus of this paper will be congressional 
(political) elites and the effect of public opinion on their actions.   
Political elites include professional politicians,25 academics, the media and political 
leadership interest groups (533 political leadership PACs provided nearly $48M to political 
candidates during the 2016 election cycle alone).26 These elites may be motivated by the desire 
to further a political career, a policy, or issue related to defense (or funded by the defense 
budget).27 Relevant actors include those directly involved in defense funding or the foreign and 
                                                 
24 There are many variations that could be used. For my purposes these three should be sufficient to group elite types 
from the literature by rimary motivation related to defense (those who seek political or issue furtherance, physical 
practitioners of defense, and those who profit economically from defense spending).   
25 We are concerned with national level politicians; however, there is some interaction with state level legislatures 
and executive branches.  
26 Political leadership interest groups are defined as those championing political issues, rather than specific 
populations or industries.  
27 The defense budget funds billions of dollars toward programs not directly tied to the DoD (i.e., $1,067,115,000 
for 27 earmarks for health and disease research under the Defense Health Program in FY2015 DoD Budget).   
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domestic politics which drive defense budgets, such as formal alliances, international 
interventions, critical industry support,28 or base realignment decisions. The common ground 
among these elites is that defense related policy is the primary vehicle of debate and discussion; 
and defense funding, which benefits partisan or ideological preference, may be of greater 
concern than procuring warfighting capabilities aimed at deterring or defeating a specific 
threat.29 
Material elites include military service members and civil servants (active and retired) 
working in defense or foreign and domestic policy areas affected by defense budgets.30 These 
elites are materially impacted by defense budget decisions either in carrying out their missions or 
in procuring support and services for themselves and their families. Their influence derives from 
practical experience in the military or civil service. The common denominator is that successful 
execution of the military mission (in terms of capability, sustainability and support) is the chief 
vehicle of debate and discussion. In other words, the concern is with the ends (greater capability 
and sustainability) rather than the means (policy) of achieving their goals. Examples include 
players such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, individual service chiefs, civilian Pentagon 
leaders and retired members serving as consultants for defense (or foreign policy) think tanks or 
military associations and federal service unions.   
Economic elites are business leaders and industry interest groups that have direct (or 
indirect) economic ties to the defense budget. These elites depend (at least in part) on defense 
funding for their business or economic success. They include defense related industries and their 
                                                 
28 DoD supports what it perceives as critical defense industries through minimum order quotas and by allowing 
defense companies to factor pension costs into procurement contracts (GAO-13-158).  
29 This has been proposed as one explanation for “pork barrel” spending that adds specific programs or platforms 
which are not requested by DoD, but benefit a particular partisan, economic (district or industry) or ideological 
position.  
30 Defense budgets, as a function of National Security, provide funds to many government agencies outside of the 
Department of Defense (Energy, Homeland Security, State Department, Education, etc.) 
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interest groups (Lockheed, Boeing, Northrup Grumman, Raytheon, and 53 other defense industry 
PACs provided nearly $17M to political candidates during the 2016 election cycle),31 as well as 
community organizations concerned with the economic stimulus provided by military bases or 
facilities. These elites may demonstrate a preference toward the specific weapon system 
produced by their industry or base supported by their community, rather than a particular 
partisan policy or general military capability.   
The belief that elite preference is the most important factor in defense budgeting growth 
or decline is not a new concept. In fact, it is in line with the views of many authors (Converse, 
2000; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000; Chong and Druckman, 2010). In 
essence, the elite model predicts that the public requires help to understand complex issues and 
that elite cueing is the mechanism to both guide and transform public opinion. It presupposes that 
elites attempt to lead opinion; however, when public approval is lacking they are often prepared 
to make defense funding decisions in defiance of electorate preference. The motivations for elite 
cueing may derive from desired influence, electoral gain, ideological underpinnings, or perceived 
economic benefits. Unlike the Keynesian approach (discussed below), the leadership model does 
not imply that defense spending provides any large-scale benefit (or detriment) to the economy 
as a whole. The economic effects of defense spending are viewed more as locally collateral or 
additional factors, 32 rather than those of national design. The only stipulation in this approach is 
that the primary decision motor is elite interest and cueing rather than threat, Keynesian or 
follower drivers.   
                                                 
31 According to publicly accessible FEC filings. 
32 Here we are using the military definitions of:  collateral = unintended and negative, and additional = unintended 
and positive.  
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James Morrow introduced the idea that defense budgets could also be used by elites as a 
foreign policy tool, wielded by Congress to influence opponents and allies. His primary example 
was in using defense budgets to force the Soviet Union to the bargaining table (Morrow, 1991). 
In such cases, the public did not need to understand why they were being cued to support defense 
spending. In fact, it was often better that they not know, leading to a justification (of sorts) to 
exaggerate the threat in order to amplify the public response.    
Davis Barrow and Stephen Hill continued the approach from the standpoint of 
international alliances and the multitude of political and economic ties involved in defense 
spending. They viewed such issues as only understood by the elite, who, for good reason, most 
often leave the details out of public discourse. Such details may be confidential and are almost 
inevitably beyond the interest or comprehension of the general public (Borrow and Hill, 1991). 
Charles Ostrom and Robin Marra looked at defense spending during the Reagan years 
and concluded that elite opinion and intentional overestimation of Soviet strength were the key 
drivers in the dramatic military buildup in 1981 (Ostrom and Marra, 1986). Christopher Witko, 
similarly commenting upon the Cold War, described the complexity of defense issues as beyond 
the keen of the average citizen. How could a layperson possibly understand how much spending 
was required, unless the rationale for investment was quantified by knowledgeable elites (Witko, 
2003)? Benjamin Fordham took a similar approach in describing the average voter as having 
little understanding or interest in the details of defense spending. These matters were best left to 
the elite to expound upon in their ceaseless competition for electoral attention (Fordham, 2002). 
In other words, congressional elites play their own shell game in committee and on the floor of 
Congress, dividing the spoils, rather than being concerned about the aggregate opinion of the 
masses (Stockton, 1995).   
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Some scholars have argued that Congress provides little strategic oversight and focuses 
primarily on using the defense budget as a form of social welfare to promote projects in their 
own districts (Art, 1985; Lindsay, 1990; Mayer, 1993 and Lee, 2010). Paul Stockton proposed 
that most congressmen care little for the greater strategy or concerns of the public at large, but 
rather are motivated to garner constituent support for defense programs and spending that 
benefits their own districts (Stockton, 1995). Micky Tripathi took this into the realm of defense 
PAC contributions. In flush times funds were freely distributed, but during lean budgets PACs 
tended to focus more on committee chairmen (Tripathi, 2000).33  He noted that business and 
political elites acquired similar spending preferences when constituency funding was threatened.   
Other scholars have (Kriesburg, Louis, and Klein, 1980; Lee, 2010) looked to the effects 
of ideology and the long-standing debate between “hawks and doves.” Russett (1991) found that 
most people share mixed opinions and that spending shifts based solely upon elite ideology were 
neither great nor prolonged. John Zaller, echoing these views, argued that the effects of values 
and awareness on political attitudes are not automatic but depend on elite cues for motivation. 
Zaller believed that only the most aware citizens could have a consistent ideology or belief 
system (Zaller, 1992).   
These research findings have led several scholars to question whether defense issue 
categories such as defense “hawk” and “dove” still apply to elite motivations to changes in the 
defense budget. Some scholars are particularly skeptical about the ability of elite driven issue 
based ideology to breach partisan divides (Cox and McCubbins, 2004). In an era of increasing 
polarization, the idea of “us against them” often encourages specific issue ideology to be bundled 
together under more simplistic partisan ideology umbrellas. In other words, if the average citizen 
                                                 
33 It would be interesting to note if this has changed with the decline of committee power. 
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accepts that their party’s ideology will include most of the issues they care about, they no longer 
have to devote energy to understanding specific issues and can trust the party to represent their 
beliefs by proxy (Fiorina, 1981).   
Such partisan-driven issue apathy should be of considerable interest to students of 
defense spending, as it upsets the traditional perception of defense spending as a bipartisan issue 
not overwhelmingly dominated by either party.34 Extreme polarization, where each party must 
dispute the position of the opposition party threatens this long-standing common ground. On one 
hand, a belief that the opposition party could not possibly represent any common policy areas 
leaves partisan elites with near electoral impunity to challenge the other party; but on the other, it 
provides little electoral allowance for compromise, even when it is advantageous to both sides. 
Such developments potentially call into question current understandings of elite ideological 
direction driving defense spending (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). In other words, even 
when changes to defense spending might be advantageous to both parties, partisan voter 
expectations to block opposition legislation, under the belief that anything the other side wants 
must be bad, could lead to failure to enact legislation deemed necessary by bipartisan elites.  
Taken on whole, the leadership model has merit. Although undeniably un-democratic in 
tenor, defense matters are highly complex, in terms of not only military strategy and technical 
detail, but in the byzantine nature of the government budgeting process itself. In addition to 
promising a simple solution to the potentially irrational whims of the public, this model has 
limitations. However, the model is not without merit; it could serve as a powerful driver for 
                                                 
34 Neither party has a statistical advantage when it comes to approving defense spending. It has depended entirely 
upon the conditions existing when a given party was in power. Critics point to defense drawdowns in the late 1970s 
and early 1990s under Democratic presidents and increases in the early 1980s and 2000s under Republican 
presidents. However, this overlooks the events that were occurring at these times (drawdown from end of Vietnam 
and Cold war and the heating up of the cold war and the war on terror). Democratic and Republican majorities in 
Congress alternatively increased and decreased defense budgets. 
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defense spending, particularly when potential threats to national security are unknown to the 
public, or technical foreign policy issues are complex. Gaining a better understanding of the 
inner workings and interactions of elite cueing with other drivers is important to understanding 
the whole defense spending process. 
Military Keynesian Model 
Named after the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes,35 this model explores the 
relationship between military spending and economic stimulus. In essence, it argues that defense 
budgets can be used along with deficit spending to prime a failing economy, and from time to 
time, defense spending should be increased to create both impact and multiplier effects.36 Falling 
in and out of favor since the 1930s, this theory has long been used to justify, what some would 
call, the ‘perpetual war footing’ maintained by the U.S. since WWII (Custers, 2010).37  
Unfortunately, most scholarly work on this theory has remained in the world of economics, and a 
more extensive cross-discipline review is long overdue.38    
Casey Borch and Michael Wallace provide a recent and relatively comprehensive 
synopsis of scholarship in this vein. The authors point to the reality that many lawmakers 
subscribe to Keynesian theory and that it has been in practice (to varying degrees) for over 70 
years. Although they concede some proof that states with high levels of military spending are 
                                                 
35 Keynes himself never directly endorsed defense spending as an economic catalyst. Author Peter Custers claims 
that Polish Economist Michal Kalecki first formulated the idea behind the model in 1935 while looking at Nazi 
Germany’s spending on armaments (two years prior to Keynes).  
36 Multiplier effects traditionally refer to the propensity of the working class to spend more when they make more. 
Thus, when government pumps money into the economy to increase worker wages and employment, there is an 
impact effect of the jobs created, but there is also a multiplier effect when workers turn around and spend the 
majority of their new earnings in the economy. He estimated that labor would spend 5/6 of their extra earnings and 
save 1/6 (John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money). Multiplier effect is also 
considered in crossover technology invented for the military, but appropriated for civilian use. Such as the invention 
of the flat screen monitors (precursor to flat screen TV’s and Computer screens) as part of a DoD display system 
program in the 1980s. 
37 Drawing influence from Thomas Hobbes’ Bellum omnium contra omnes in “Leviathan.”  
38 This is also the topic of political theory, but it is long overdue for greater inclusion into current American and 
policy theories.  
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better suited to survive economic downturn, they conclude that the utility of a Military 
Keynesian approach may be diminishing (Borch and Wallace, 2010). With the shift from 
industrial to digital production, fewer and fewer jobs are required to produce and employ modern 
weapons. Claims by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1983 that every billion-dollar 
increase in defense spending was equivalent to 25,000 to 55,000 jobs can no longer be sustained 
(Mintz, 1992).39 The reduction in labor footprint diminishes the impact of military priming on 
the greater economy.40 However, Borch and Wallace warn that the powerful combinations of 
governmental and industrial forces involved in military production are far easier to coax into 
action than to restrain (Borch and Wallace, 2010).   
Many recent scholars echo these sentiments (Fordham, 2003; Fordham and Walker, 
2005; Carrol, 2006; Foster, Holleman and McChesney, 2009). Using a mix of new modeling 
techniques, Heo and Bohte (2012) found no evidence that defense spending affects the economy 
positively or negatively. Going even further, Barro and de Rugy (2010) argued with the basic 
logic of Keynes on multiplier effects when examining defense-spending drawdowns. Their study 
determined that in actuality every $1 cut in defense spending was equivalent to an increase in 
private spending by $1.30 (Barro and de Rugy, 2010).  
However, not all agree. Several authors claim that although macro-economic effects may 
be overestimated, the micro-economic effects on targeted states and congressional districts can 
be considerable (Brace, 1993; Rundquist, 1999; Levitt and Snyder, 1997; Schmit, 2000). Luca 
Pieroni in an aptly named paper, “Can we declare Military Keynesianism Dead?” argued that 
                                                 
39 The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, 1992 edited by Alex Mintz. Chapter 2 
“Elections, business cycles, and the timing of defense contract awards in the United States,” by Kenneth R. Mayer, 
p, 17. 




there is a positive economic impact from defense spending; however, not always in clear 
macroeconomic terms (Pieroni, d’Agostino and Lorusso, 2008). Some scholars suggest that 
members of Congress are keenly aware of the impacts to their state or district, even if the effect 
were somewhat muted to the country at large (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002 and 2009). Todd 
Sadler and Keith Hartley looked at profit margin among different businesses and determined that 
defense firms returned higher profit margins than non-defense related industries, thus providing 
greater economic stimulus on the state level. This in turn incentivized MoC to fight for greater 
general defense spending with the understanding that even if they could not control specific 
contracts, the geographic proximity of large defense companies or bases within their districts or 
states would mean potential increased tax revenue and potential job growth for their constituents 
(Sadler and Hartley, 1995).41  
The Military Keynesian model offers an enticing explanation for continued high levels of 
military spending in peacetime, as well as a rationale for military spending fluctuations during 
economic downturns. In the end, as Custers (2010) suggests, it may matter less if Military 
Keynesian theory actually works, than if politicians believe it does. On the district and state level 
there is little doubt that defense spending is significant, and as this is the area of greatest 
attention to MoC, it is reasonable to see why they would subscribe to Keynesian theories even if 
they have little macroeconomic impact.42 Alone, the Keynesian model may be flawed, but in 
conjunction with the leadership and follower models, its explanation of macro and micro-
                                                 
41 The type of defense spending desired by a particular MoC (Procurement, R & D, manpower or construction) 
depends upon the infrastructure (Defense related industry, R & D Universities or bases) located within the district or 
state. This will be discussed more in depth in the chapter on the defense budget process.  
42 Macro-economic prosperity is as much a matter of normative faith as it is empirical fact. A nation that believes 
itself to be in a recession may stop spending money and soon find itself in one (whether it began that way or not). 
This is not to ignore real economic disaster brought on by poor investment, national infrastructure failure or natural 
disaster. Merely, it accepts the reality that self-fulfilling prophecies are particularly dangerous in economics (Felin 
and Foss, 2009).   
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economic (local district and state economic impacts) drivers could help explain much of the flux 
in defense spending.  
Follower Model 
The follower model holds that, in the absence of war, public opinion is the most 
significant driver of congressional action on defense, and that MoC react to significant and 
sustained public opinion by raising or lowering defense expenditures. Although there is a 
tentative consensus in the literature that public opinion matters to MoC, there is a general lack of 
fidelity as to how it works in practice on particular budgets or policies. In other words, some 
authors have found that defense spending (along with other policies) is affected by public 
opinion, but few have ventured to detail exactly how and when it functions as a primary driver in 
defense budgets.   
Several scholars stand by the claim that the will of the people is the single most important 
factor in defense spending behavior (Parker, 1981; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan, 1992; Gilens 
and Page, 2014). Whether out of respect for the will of the governed or out of fear of electoral 
repercussions, public opinion is critical in the decisions of MoC. Put differently, even if elite 
cueing and coaching is present, national leadership makes defense spending decisions based 
upon public opinion when the electorate has a strong and persistent view on the issue.43    
Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett argued that in the 1980s, defense spending increases 
were directly attributable to public opinion, and that there was no evidence of any other 
significant variables factors at work. They claimed the Soviet threat was clear and that the public 
and Congress responded in unison, without the need for cueing or coaching (Hartley and Russett, 
1992). Echoing these findings, Robert Higgs and Anthony Kilduff performed a statistical 
                                                 
43 When the public does not have a strong opinion, MoC are free to act as they see fit.  
27 
 
analysis of a large number of public opinion polls during the 1980s and determined that public 
opinion and defense spending tracked well in most cases. They further observed that MoC are 
reliant upon constituent support for reelection and partisan dominance, and once public opinion 
has crystalized in one direction or another, there is no recourse but to follow suit. In the end, they 
concluded that public opinion alone was the most powerful predictor of change in defense 
spending (Higgs and Kilduff, 1993). These conclusions have largely been upheld in subsequent 
studies (Mangi, 1995; Derouen and Heo, 2000; Torres-Reyna and Shapiro, 2002; Eichenberg and 
Stoll, 2003; and Duffin, 2008; and Simon and Lovrich, 2010), even though most acknowledged 
at least some role for elite cueing.   
Robert Durr, on the other hand, speculated that public opinion was primarily influenced 
by a general sense of economic wellbeing. In other words, threats become less salient and elite 
cueing less important if the public is sufficiently worried about the economy (Durr, 1993). This 
dovetailed somewhat with Mordecai Lee’s supposition that, in the 1950s, the Pentagon leveraged 
a time of relative prosperity to control the public relations war and encouraged defense spending 
while exaggerating the threat of the Soviet Union (Lee, 2012). However, Jonathan Nagler argued 
that public opinion typically only responds to reinforcement of previously held ideas. Barring 
irreconcilable evidence to the contrary, if one is predisposed to oppose defense spending, they 
will always do so, regardless of the economic conditions or elite cueing (Nagler, 1990).44   
Despite the passionate defense of many authors, several empirical holes remain in the 
claims that public opinion is the most powerful driver of defense budgets. One galling problem is 
the non-uniform time lag in defense spending as a reaction to public opinion. For example, 
although defense spending increased in accordance with public opinion in 1981, it continued 
                                                 
44 Although this may be generally true, it suggests that people are simplistic and unable to hold complex and often 
contradictory ideas subject to situational change (i.e. threat, economy, etc.).   
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(and accelerated) to rise long after public opinion reversed.45 If public opinion about the 
adequacy of spending is the strongest driver, why was the defense budget so slow to react (to 
both increase and decrease)? Are there circumstances when reactions will be faster, either in 
conjunction with or in the absence of correlating public opinion? Does public opinion on the 
competence of Congress affect defense budgets? The existing literature is mostly silent on the 
subject.  
Relativity Model  
Perhaps the most interesting, and least documented, approach is the relativity model. In 
essence, it assumes that all the aforementioned models are potential drivers in defense spending, 
but that each takes precedence at differing times and under relative (rather than absolute) 
conditions. This allows for a confluence of causal factors to provide direction to defense 
spending under those circumstances that are most conducive to particular stimuli. Of course, the 
drawback to this approach is that it lacks predictive power. With complex combinations of 
factors reacting to various exogenous and endogenous inputs, under situationally independent 
conditions, how can a definitive model be established?  
In 1980, Louis Kriesberg and Ross Klein proposed a list of external, societal and personal 
factors that could influence preference for defense spending. They found that in differing 
circumstances, a large number of stimuli could affect both individual and aggregate public 
opinion. They concluded that the presence of a credible military threat, perception of national 
power, economic health, ideology, confidence in the military and reaction to world events could 
all increase or decrease both public and elite opinion on defense budgets (Kriesberg and Klein, 
1980). Their work was fascinating, but it never evolved to provide a more extensive framework 
                                                 
45 See Gallop polling  
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to describe scenarios where particular factors might prove dominant. Thomas Hartley took up the 
challenge in examining the factors effecting defense spending during the Cold War, and he 
concluded that at various times different factors drove increases or declines in defense spending, 
but that no one overarching factor was always dominant (Hartley, 1994).   
David Gold when looking at the post-Cold War and Pre-9/11 period from 1989 – 1998 
generally supported these conclusions (Gold, 2008). Guy Whitten and Laron Williams (Whitten 
and Williams, 2011) expanded the argument to 19 democracies using a time-series analysis 
beginning at the end of WWII. They concluded that economic, threat, elite cueing and public 
opinion factors were all situationally responsible for driving defense budgets at different periods 
and under varying stimuli.   
 A drawback to the relativity model is that it is decidedly untidy. Without a clear set of 
conditions under which particular drivers would be favored over others, the approach can be 
descriptive at best. However, what it lacks in parsimony it makes up for in explanatory power 
and it offers a promising pluralistic model from which to continue research. Much more work is 
needed, but for now, it provides a somewhat convenient ‘catch all’ when other models fail.   
 
C. Gaps in the Literature. 
 In order to pull their weight in the pluralistic study of defense budgets, political scientists 
must take a deeper look at the underlying political drivers that influence defense budgets. If 
“war” and economic health were the only drivers, then our problem would be simple. The 
defense budget could be seen as a simple supply and demand relationship. However, such a 
facile explanation would constitute a fundamental mischaracterization of the defense budget 
process, resulting in a dangerous ignorance of the underlying politics of defense spending.   
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As Carl von Clausewitz expressed in his famous work, “On War,” the competing forces 
of emotion, chance and reason dictate that war is a natural and omni-present reality of our 
world.46 This threat requires some level of national self-defense, and thus the defense budget 
should simply be a product of the perceived threat and the resources reasonably available to 
mitigate the threat. If that were all there was to it, we could stop right now. Unfortunately, there 
is more to the story.  
Defense budgeting is more complicated than the simple supply-demand threat perspective 
suggests. The reality is that states spend on defense for a number of reasons, resulting in 
punctuated, non-incremental defense budgets even in times of relative peace. These investments 
often reflect a public willingness to support defense budgets out of proportion to apparent need. 
The current literature is not sufficient to explain why this occurs.  
Since the end of the cold war, little political science scholarship has been produced on the 
causal drivers of U.S. Defense Budgets. Many scholars of the time were attempting to 
understand the budgetary implications of transition from major wars of survival (WWI and 
WWII) to a cold war defined by regional conflicts such as Korea and Vietnam. The Reagan era 
military buildup was seen as a funding anomaly predicated on political strategy, rather than 
military necessity (Ostrom and Marra, 1986; Fordham, 2002; Metin, 2012). Much of the research 
was directed toward explaining the drivers of Reagan’s massive defense expenditures and 
attempting to predict the direction budgets might take with the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
ostensible end of the Cold War. Although valuable in the greater historical perspective, few 
followed up to validate their predictions and prescriptions.   
                                                 
46 “Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit or “Fascinating Trinity.” … Composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, 
which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative 
spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to 
reason....” (Section #28 in Book 1, Chapter 1, of Clausewitz's On War). 
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The rather sporadic and disjointed nature of research on defense spending over the last 15 
years may have been influenced by the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent shift in 
attention to the Global War on Terror. The emergence of a significant new military conflict 
likely could have rendered questions of politically or economically motivated defense spending 
moot. For example, few academics devoted time to examining the effects of public opinion on 
war spending during WWII.47 The U.S. spent what was necessary to win. People were concerned 
with spending wisely, but few at the time questioned the underlying motivation behind increased 
defense expenditures during a perceived war of survival.48 Given that the Global War on Terror 
began with the first successful large-scale mass casualties attacks to be perpetrated on U.S. soil 
(state or territory) since Pearl Harbor, it is reasonable to expect a similar pubic and elite 
acceptance of the perceived costs associated with the need to retaliate and ensure public safety. 
However, as direct U.S. involvement has waned and the perceived direct threat to the public has 
declined,49 public and elite critiques of defense spending have resumed more historically normal 
levels.50 
Sadly, there is effectively no body of literature examining the relationship of 
congressional approval on the defense budget beyond establishing that public approval matters to 
MoC.51 In fact, the entire notion of representative democracy is based on the presumption of the 
legitimacy of its institutions and the approval of the electorate (Parker, 1981). Unless Congress 
                                                 
47 WWII was the last war of national survival fought by the United States and began (from the perspective of direct 
large scale us involvement), only after the attack by the Empire of Japan on U.S. naval forces and facilities in Pearl 
Harbor HI on December 7, 1941.  
48 See explanation of war variable methods section for definition of war.    
49 Although concern over terrorist attacks did rise during the run up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, overall 
public concerns have declined since 2001 (Gallup poll 23 Mar, 2016). 
50 As evidenced by Gallup polling of public opinion on the adequacy of defense spending and the increased 
acrimony in congressional debate on defense spending levels (Gallup poll 2 March 2017). 
51 For our purposes, congressional approval is the rate at which the electorate (when scientifically surveyed) 
expresses support or frustration with the integrity of the institution of Congress or its ability to meet popular job 
expectations.   
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represents the desires of the people, representative democracy is at best a form of biased 
pluralism (Gilens and Page, 2014).52    
If this sounds like empty hyperbole to the contemporary political scientist, it was 
apparently serious to the founding fathers. In formulating the U.S. Constitution, popular support 
of the legislature was a critical concern. James Madison wrote, “The House of Representatives is 
so constituted as to support in the members a habitual recollection of their dependence on the 
people.”53  Without popular support, the legislative process risks both rejection by the electorate 
and a lack of incentives for legislators to be productive (Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan, 1992).   
One of the normative foundations of representative Democracy is that those who are 
chosen to create our laws should be responsive to the public’s expectations 
(Schattschneider, 1960; Dahl, 1971; Grant and Rudolph, 2004). However, this neglects the 
reality that much of the electorate carries an imperfect understanding of how the U.S. political 
system works. The self-selection of information in accordance to partisan or ideological 
preference can form biased and unfounded expectations about the ability of Congress, or 
individual MoC, to bring about desired legislation or change (Kimball and Patterson, 1997).   
The Constitution envisioned regular elections as the people’s lever for ensuring a 
responsive Congress. Federalist Paper #57 explained it as,  
“Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be 
effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when 
their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must 
                                                 
52 ”Theories of biased pluralism generally argue that both the thrust of interest-group conflict and the public policies 
that result tend to tilt toward the wishes of corporations and business and professional associations. Characterized by 
E.E. Schattschneider as a heavenly chorus with an “upper-class accent.” 




descend to the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful 
discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.”54  
To put it more simply, the threat of being held accountable for their actions (or inactions) and the 
dependency upon electoral support to be reelected drives congressional behavior. Of course, in 
order for the people’s electoral lever to function citizens must be able to accurately attribute 
blame for failure and credit for success.    
Congress is much more complex than either the Executive or Judicial Branch. Unlike the 
Presidency, where blame (or accolades) can easily be focused on an individual (or a small group 
of individuals in the case of the Judiciary), it is more difficult to apportion responsibility between 
535 disparate MoC. The difference in scale alone necessitates compromise and deal making by 
MoC in drafting legislative actions (and reactions to world events) rather than quick unitary 
movements of the body as a whole.   
Public approval of Congress is a reflection of how voters understand the role and 
activities of the intuition. It also reflects their perception of the institution’s success or failure in 
achieving desired outcomes such as a prospering economy or national security (Ramirez, 2013). 
The electorate judges the sitting Congress against the record of its predecessors (retrospective) 
and the expectation (prospective) of future success (Fiorina, 1981; Rudolph, 2002). Additionally, 
voters are aware of the party in control and tend to blame (fairly or not) that party for any 
perceived failure to deliver a desired outcome. Outcomes are more tangible to the average citizen 
than specific legislation (Lebo, 2008), and hence, Congress is judged more for the quality of 
conditions rather than on the quantity of laws produced.55  
                                                 
54 Federalist Paper #57 
55 A starving person is more concerned with feeling full than with the mechanics of bread making.  
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Congressional approval appears to be heavily influenced by the public’s perceptions of 
economic conditions. However, rather than holding individual MoC accountable for the national 
economy, congressional responsibility tends to take a more personal tenor due to the association 
of a specific MoC with a district or state (Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson 2000; Chanley, 
Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Rudolph 2002). There are a 
number of individual strategies available in computing the arithmetic of responsibility and 
assigning blame in personal voting behavior. These are impacted upon the scale of worldview 
(local, regional or societal) and a preference for inductive or deductive reasoning. A voter may 
infer that their personal situation reflects what must be happening to the rest of the country 
(egotropic or personal centered voting). For example, if I am out of work I may perceive that 
unemployment is high, even if the national rate of unemployment is falling (Singer and Carlin, 
2013).The voter can also assign regional bias (communotropic or regional community centered 
voting), sharing a widespread opinion based upon events believed to be unique to the specific 
community or region. For example, if I live in the U.S. “rust belt,”56  I may subscribe to a 
regionally prevalent belief that manufacturing jobs were eliminated due to globalization-
encouraging policies of government rather than by automation and profit optimization measures 
of industry (Rodgers, 2014). Alternately, a voter may perceive the state of the nation, as reported 
by a trusted source of information,57 as being more important than personal or regional 
conditions (sociotropic or society centered voting). For example, the candidate that my social 
group (political party, ideological association, or religious denomination) favors claims that the 
                                                 
56 Parts of the northeastern and Midwestern U.S. that are characterized by declining industry, aging factories, and a 
falling population. Steel-producing cities in Pennsylvania and Ohio are at its center. 
57 It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into biased sources of information. Cultural changes, such as 
polarization within the media and the technological ability of social media to provide self-selection of idea 
reinforcing (biased or fake) information, are complicating factors in providing for balanced public opinion. 
However, they do not change the importance of public opinion to politicians. If anything, they provide tools (though 
not always precise) to shift public opinion rapidly on an issue or policy.  
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national economy is failing (or thriving), therefore I accept that economic change is necessary 
despite any personal or local experience to the contrary (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Kiewiet, 
1983).58 
Individual citizens may rely on overall congressional approval when voting in 
congressional elections. A particularly negative pubic opinion of Congress may not be enough to 
result in a switch from one party to the other in a particularly partisan district or state. However, 
it may very well mean the undoing of an incumbent to a more conservative or liberal member of 
their own party in a primary election (Hibbing and Tiritilli 2000; Jones and McDermott 2004). If 
the primary motivation of a MoC is staying in office (Mayhew, 1974), then electoral survival 
should outweigh partisan loyalty.59 Congressional constituencies evolve over time and MoC 
must evolve with them to remain relevant because failing to remain relevant to issues of interest 
to constituencies (district or state) leaves voters with disincentives for personal or partisan 
loyalty to a particular MoC (Fenno, 1978). The challenge for a MoC is therefore both their image 
within the district and the perception of them as an agent of successful partisan change (or 
resistance to change) in the institution of Congress.  
Fenno pointed out that each Congressman answers to a different electorate,60 and what is 
good for one constituency is not always favorable to another (Fenno, 1978). A MoC cannot 
always afford grand legislative gestures that appeal to a national majority, since the district or 
state electorate they depend upon may be in the minority on any given issue. Instead, they must 
                                                 
58 For the purposes of this paper, I am adapting the terms egotropic, communotropic and sociotropic to show how 
they relate to public opinion in general, rather than specific voting motivation.   
59 Of course, it has also been argued that party support may be essential to be reelected because it provides 
politicians with benefits such as financing, messaging, or campaign speakers. 
60 As well as constituencies within each electorate (geographic, reelection, primary, and personal constituencies) 
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tread a fine line of careful messaging, which is informed by public opinion, particularly from 
those constituents most likely to notice and vote.  
MoC have admitted that their approval ratings matter (Lipinski, 2004; Dancey 2010; 
Cooper 1999; Parker 1981) and are more likely to retire when public esteem for the institution is 
low (Wolak, 2007; Maestas et al., 2006; Fowler and McClure 1990). Low approval implies a 
potential threat to incumbency and the ability to pass personally desirable legislation. 
Incumbency is imperiled for the reasons stated above, but legislative impetus is also limited by 
lack of social capital (Hetherington, 1998). Unpopular but necessary legislation can only be 
undertaken safely (electorally speaking) when MoC feel they have sufficient support from 
constituents to allow a momentary deviation from their preferred outcomes, including either 
ideological or economic agendas (Putnam, 1993). A record of success on the behalf of 
constituents creates positive social capital. Building trust takes work, and negative approval rates 
can make such work harder and more exhaustive. As with Fenno’s discussion of rebuilding core 
constituencies, for some MoC the effort required to rebuild social capital or political trust is 
simply too great, particularly late in a career (Fenno, 1978). Therefore, the ability to achieve 
desired policy outcomes can be compromised and the attraction of continued service as a MoC 
may be lessened.   
Of course, if individual MoC seek only to establish public approval in their own 
constituency, why worry about the reputation of the institution as a whole? One clue to this lies 
in an examination of incumbency rates in relation to congressional approval rates. Although 
there is no question of the magnitude difference between the low approval of Congress and the 
high rate of incumbent reelection, it is significant to note that in all but one year (2004) between 
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1970 and 2015, a negative vector in approval rates was reflected in a negative shift in either 
House or Senate incumbency rates (Born, 1990; Jones, 2010).61   
Congress is not a homogeneous body with a uniform desire to be more popular (Mayhew, 
1974; Durr, Gilmour and Wolbrecht, 1997); however, they do need at least localized popular 
support to achieve reelection goals. Low levels of institutional support decrease the reelection 
rates of incumbents and members of the majority party (Jones and McDermott 2009, 2011; 
Hibbing and Tiritilli 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Mann and Ornstein 1994; Born, 
1990). Lower approval rates also tend to attract higher-quality challengers and reduce the 
chances for successful re-election (Fowler and McClure 1990).  
There are many reasons why changes in approval could be of more or less importance to 
individual MoC. Electoral vulnerability or the perception of a serious challenge in the next 
election can drive more concern about the overall approval of Congress. This is particularly true 
if economic conditions, scandal or unpopular legislation can be tied (fairly or not) to the 
incumbent (Gordon, Huber, and Landa, 2007; Cox and Katz 1996; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; 
Fiorina, 1981; Kramer, 1971). Proximity to reelection is also of continuing concern. For 
representatives, with election always looming within two years, it is a continuous factor of 
concern. For Senators with six-year terms, the proximity of a reelection bid should add urgency 
to such considerations (Bender and Lot, 1996). Redistricting may also be a significant factor. 
The loss of core constituencies and the need to rebuild the “personal vote” adds pressure and 
expense, regarding both personal time and money to reelection efforts. With a new electorate, the 
challenge to distinguish the incumbent from the typically unpopular institution starts over from 
                                                 
61 The shifts were not always of the same magnitude as public opinion changes, but they were significant enough to 
warrant notice. After all, within an institution composed of 535 individuals competing individually for reelection, 
every election is significant to the officeholder in question.  
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scratch (Born, 2016; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2000). Finally, local or regional 
economic conditions can have a significant impact if the electorate blames the incumbent’s party 
for a lack of economic success (Rudolph, 2003). Although not an exhaustive list, the above 
factors briefly highlight how many factors could situationally contribute to the importance of 
approval ratings of the institution of Congress to individual MoC.   
Despite the supposed self-evidentiary relationship between representative government 
and public support, some academics have struggled to find definitive evidence connecting 
congressional approval with meaningful action by the Congress (Stokes and Miller, 1962). There 
are many reasons why this may be the case, but most are rooted in the structure of Congress. A 
number of authors suggest that this lack of support, particularly in comparison to the high marks 
given to individual representatives by their constituents, results from the nature of the legislative 
process. The painfully slow and combative nature of congressional action can lead to the 
perception that it is inefficient and unproductive (Durr, Gilmour and Wolbrecht, 1997). Thus, the 
core of the popularity problem of Congress may lie within its very institutional design. It must 
necessarily produce a compromise out of the competing demands that are inevitably voiced; the 
more far-reaching the legislation, the greater the conflict. Rarely (if ever) are both sides 
completely satisfied with the outcome. The passage of most major, and impactful, legislation 
produces winners and losers. The inherent compromises required to achieve passage inevitably 
mean that many constituents will be unhappy with the outcome and may blame their MoC for a 
failure to fight for their perspective (Davidson and Parker, 1972; Fenno, 1975). If Congress does 
nothing, it is seen as lazy. If it passes compromise legislation, it is unfaithful to its base. As such, 




Another aspect of the problem lies in the overall low esteem in which most people tend to 
hold Congress as an institution. Since its inception, and perhaps by design, Congress is 
demonstratively the most unpopular of the three branches of U.S. government (Parker 1981; 
Patterson and Magleby 1992). Public approval is influenced by the widespread belief that 
Congress is corrupt, lazy, unresponsive and out of touch with the electorate (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 1995, 96-100; Patterson and Barr 1995; Gallop, 2015). John Adams is said to have once 
famously remarked, "In my many years I have come to a conclusion that one useless man is a 
shame, two is a law firm, and three or more is a congress,"62 a sentiment reflected in the words of 
House Speaker, Nicholas Longworth in 1925 when he stated, "We (Congress) have always been 
unpopular." Similarly, Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire in 1987 offered, 
"No one and I mean nobody ever defends the Congress. In more than 30 years in 
Congress, and in literally tens of thousands of conversations back in my State with people 
of every political persuasion I have yet to hear one kind word, one whisper of praise, one 
word of sympathy for the Congress as a whole." 63  
Even Mark Twain, well known for interpreting with humor the prevailing temper of the country, 
took a dim view of Congress. In his words, “Suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a 
member of Congress. But I repeat myself.”64 Alternatively, it may be as simple as Gary Jacobson 
described when he claimed that the public resents backroom politics and public argument. They 
want the “sausage” that is democratic compromise without having to see how it is made 
(Jacobson, 2004). As long as Congress is an institution that argues with itself, the public will not 
                                                 
62 Attributed to President John Adams, but not specifically sourced.  
63 Cited in Patterson, Samuel C. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1990. Standing Up for Congress: 
Variations in Public Esteem since the 1960s." Legislative Studies Quarterly 15(1):25-47. 
64 Mark Twain, a Biography. 
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have much respect for it. If all this is true, and everyone dislikes Congress, what difference could 
a few percentage points in approval ratings in either direction really make?  
Rationales for this assumed ambivalence or distain range from the difficulty in holding 
any single member of Congress responsible for governmental failures as compared to a unitary 
target like the President (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995; 
Jones and McDermott, 2002; Kimball and Patterson, 1997; Parker, 1977; Patterson and Caldeira, 
1990; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan, 1992). As Fenno observed long ago, many MoC run for 
office by running against Congress’ dismal approval (Lipinski 2004; Farnsworth 2003; Patterson 
and Magleby 1992; Parker 1981; Cook 1979; Fenno 1978). Consequently, if Congress’ own 
members are constantly criticizing the institution, who would possibly defend it (Mayer and 
Canon 1999)? Perhaps the most damning argument is the simple observation that although 
congressional approval has averaged 30% over the last 40 years (with notably much lower 
approval ratings in recent years),65 the incumbency rate for the same period has averaged an 
impressive 85% (combined Senate and House).66 With six out of seven MoC reelected regardless 
of the popular standing of Congress, it is easy to see their point. It is difficult to justify how 
Congressmen could be concerned about congressional approval when at best it might help 
reelection (Fenno 1975; Parker and Davidson 1979), and at worst it appears to make little 
difference. However, this would be too simplistic a view. 
Although on the surface congressional ratings may not seem to have had much dramatic 
effect, this ignores evidence that public appraisals of individual MoC are, in some cases, 
influenced by public approval or Congress (Born, 1990). MoC who are vulnerable in reelection, 
                                                 
65 Average of Gallop polling from 1974 – 2015. 
66 This is a conservative estimate, based upon the total number of senators and representatives, who ran for 
reelection (from 1970 – 2014) and were returned to office. Some estimates only look at those who survived primary 
elections, or do not account for those who chose not to run again.  
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either in the primary or general election, due to changing demographics in their district/state, 
significant economic or political events in their district or state, divisive legislation or political 
missteps (in word or deed) are all susceptible to being painted with the broad brush of 
congressional ineptitude. It is perhaps a testament to the survival instincts of most MoC that they 
avoid such pitfalls. However, what of the 15% who do not succeed in reelection? Did 
congressional approval ratings negatively affect them?  
David Jones has argued that the overall approval rate of Congress does significantly 
affect the incumbency advantage, particularly in the majority party (Jones and McDermott, 
2009). Congressional competence (scandal, public feuds), congressional processes (gridlock), 
congressional policy orientation (partisanship), and national conditions (economic, war, and 
cultural unrest) all contribute to the public’s perception of Congress (Jones, 2014). Further, the 
public seems to expect the majority party to be successful in creating outcomes favorable to its 
partisan preference, and when it fails to do so it is held accountable. Heightened polarization 
exacerbates this by providing clearer distinctions between parties and positions and makes it 
easier for the public to assess blame (Abramowitz, 2010). As such, congressional approval 
affects incumbency as well as the brand or the favorable image of the party in power (Jones, 
2015). In the end, as with most things in political life, it may be less important that these efforts 
are successful than that MoC believe them to be. As the philosopher Epictetus cautioned long 
ago, “It's not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters.”67 The fact that 
incumbents seem to be reelected by an overwhelming majority regardless of the overall approval 
of Congress does not preclude the possibility that MoC may be altering their behavior in 
response to those approval ratings to increase their odds of being reelected.  
                                                 
67 Enchiridion or Manual of Epictetus.  
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This is where my research fills a critical gap in two ways. First, by providing new 
insights into the effect of public opinion on defense budgets. In most cases, public opinion 
interacts situationally with other drivers to produce significant change in defense spending. 
However, even at times when elite opinion is split, imminent threat is low and economic 
resources are questionable, significant and sustained public opinion provides a convincing 
rationale for defense budget changes. I suggest that negative congressional approval rates 
provoke a more significant and immediate response in defense spending than general public 
opinion on overall spending levels alone. When these distinct prongs of public opinion align, the 
congressional reaction can be even more responsive.   
Second, this study furthers the general study of PET as a descriptive and proscriptive 
framework of budget behavior. Specifically, it directly contributes to the work of Jones, Zalanyi 
and Erdi (2014) and their Disrupted Exponential Incrementalism (PET based) general theory of 
budgetary allocations. Congressional approval consistently contributes to budget punctuations in 
the defense budget even within periods of relative stasis. This result provides some relief for 
Disrupted Exponential Incrementalism theory’s current weakness in explaining small 
punctuations occurring both inside and outside of major external events.  
 
D. Theory of budgeting: Incrementalism vs. Punctuated Equilibrium. 
We have dealt in some detail with the potential drivers of defense spending, but we have 
not considered the overarching theoretical budget system within which those drivers operate. It is 
not my intent to rehash the entire history of budget theory, but a limited discussion of budget 
theory is essential to understanding how public opinion and defense budgets interact within the 
budget process.  
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At least since 1940, when V. O. Key complained that no budget theory existed, scholars 
have struggled to define an empirical theory of budgeting (Key, 1940). The main reason for this 
is that budgets simply do not behave as they should. As briefly discussed before, in a perfect 
world any budget process would be a rational application of supply and demand. The demand 
reflects a specific problem and an identified solution, or set of solutions, requiring specific 
funding to implement. The supply would represent all financial resources available to address the 
problem and fund the solution.   
Of course government has to deal with more than one problem. Each problem and its 
associated solutions and funding must be ranked against each other and then a rational 
apportionment made of available resources to address each in order of severity. Each year the list 
of problems is reexamined, some problems are fixed and dropped from the list and new ones 
added. Subsequent rankings occur and funding is reapportioned in response to the severity of the 
remaining legacy and new problems. Sounds simple…only in practice this isn’t what happens, at 
least not exactly. The breakdown occurs when the reality of imperfect information, limited 
attention and political friction points are introduced, which will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
Arguably, the first concerted effort at a theory was incrementalism.68 Charles Lindblom, 
was frustrated by rational actor theories of administrative decision-making that assumed 
complete information and disregarded cognitive limitations and the time available to make the 
decision. He argued that this was not realistic, and that actual decisions are made by “successive 
                                                 
68 Some would content that rational choice models of administrative decision making were the first attempt at a 
theory of budgeting. Typified in V.O. Key’s discussion of marginal utility being unrealistic to how budgets actually 
work. According to rational choice, a budget should always prioritize items with the highest marginal utility; 
however, in public spending choices involve value judgements without a common denominator (Key, V.O. (1940) 
‘The Lack of a Budgetary Theory’, American Political Science Review, p. 1143)    
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limited comparisons” (Lindblom, 1959). Lindblom believed that searches for information on 
alternative solutions are costly in time and resources, thus most decision makers limit themselves 
to a small number of considerations. Administrative decision making based upon these small 
limited comparisons mitigates large change and results in incremental decisions (Braybrooke and 
Lindblom, 1963).   
Aaron Wildavsky took Lindblom’s idea and applied it to the budgeting process. 
Specifically, he proposed that since most budgets are too large to be reviewed in their entirety 
each budget cycle, they are only incrementally adjusted. In other words, an incremental budget 
always considers the previous year’s budget as a baseline, and all changes are incrementally 
made from that baseline (Wildavsky, 1964, 1992).  
Utilizing this logic, some scholars concluded that defense budgets in particular were far 
too large to be anything but incremental (Crecine, 1971; Stromberg, 1970). Wildavsky expected 
that budgets would fluctuate, but he theorized that incremental changes prevented decision 
makers from having to fight the last year’s battles every year. If political conflict was high on a 
particular issue, then there would be increased pressure to avoid making significant changes in 
the spending level, since greatly lowering or raising the amount would almost certainly trigger 
political conflict. He further felt that bureaucratization reinforced tendencies for incremental 
budgets. As the process became more routine, the path of least resistance would be to make 
budget decisions around the accepted baseline year to year, rather than starting from scratch 
(Wildavsky, 1992).   
One of the major problems in this literature was conceptual; scholars could not quite 
decide what level of change constituted incrementalism. In fact, William Berry identified 12 
different quantitative definitions of incremental change (Berry, 1990). Although researchers the 
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literature indulged in fierce debates over what constituted “small” or “large” changes, the theory 
progressed little (Robinson, 2007). 
What was lacking in the literature was an overarching theoretical framework to tie 
together the appearance of long periods of incremental change punctuated by radical departures 
from the baseline. Although not originally intended for this purpose, Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory (PET) provided some promise to explain how both are complementary and necessary 
conditions within the budget process.   
PET, as originally envisioned, was intended to explain a problem found in the study of 
fossil records. Paleontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould created PET in 1972 as a 
way to explain how the evolutionary growth of species is best represented by long periods of 
stasis interrupted by dynamic spasms of change brought on by the combination of internal 
genetic pressures and significant changes in environmental conditions (Eldredge and Gould, 
1972).69 The idea, and biological metaphor, of PET was appropriated by Frank Baumgartner and 
Bryan Jones in 1993. They saw it as a way out of the incongruity of incrementalism and 
punctuation (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). If decision, or budget, changes were random then 
they should describe a normal distribution with an equal number of small, medium and large 
changes in accordance with the Central Limit Theorem (True, Baumgartner and Jones, 1999). 
PET, however, predicts a greater frequency of small and large changes, and a lesser frequency of 
                                                 
69 In Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, species spend most of the time in a period of stasis. In stasis, small genetic 
differences are present but these changes do not greatly affect the structural characteristics of the organism. There 
are constant forces for change in these periods of stasis represented by genetic variation, but these forces do not 
overcome natural barriers to large changes, representing the difficulty of change. These periods of stasis are 
interrupted by rare episodes in which the forces for change override the barriers to change. This generally happens 
when pressures from the environment combine with internal genetic pressures for change. A punctuation may occur 
when changes in the environment make change necessary and the genetic variation randomly creates a competitive 




moderate change, since small incremental changes should be interrupted by sudden large 
changes at non-standard intervals (Robinson, 2007).   
Baumgartner and Jones determined to test the falsifiability of PET by looking at budget 
decisions over time and plotting the distribution of annual change. By examining the level of 
kurtosis (peakedness of the distribution curve), they could determine if budget changes followed 
a normal or Pareto-Levy distribution (heavy tailed) distribution (True, 2000). For incrementalism 
to hold, the distribution of budget changes across time would have to be normally distributed. 
The results showed that empirical budget distributions were almost never normally distributed 
defense budgets in particular, but rather exhibited extreme leptokurtic distributions (Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005).   
Two of the central features of PET are disproportionate attention and bounded rationality. 
With limited physical ability to study all problems, policy makers tend to spend a great deal of 
time and attention on some problems and de-prioritized others. This goes hand in hand with 
bounded rationality. Since policy makers can’t possibly look at all problems and all solutions 
simultaneously, they have to pick and choose what problems are important to them, and what 
solution sets they will entertain (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). In budgets this sometimes leads 
to large funding increases or decreases on some programs and little change in others. These were 
also considerations in incrementalism, but as Lindblom saw limited attention and cognitive 
ability as drivers of incremental change, they can also be drivers of punctuated change in the 
areas that garner the most time and attention.   
Thus, policy is characterized by long periods of stability, punctuated by large—though 
less frequent—changes due to large shifts in society or government. PET works in part by 
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incorporating various restraints into the policy making model.70 It assumes that policy changes 
will become punctuated only when there are significant pressures to overcome these restraints to 
policy change. These environmental changes can be related to evens such as war, deteriorating 
economic conditions, changes in elite leadership or significant public opinion shifts. Thus, in our 
case long periods of relative stability can be punctuated by sudden and abrupt budget changes 
when resistance to policy restraints are overcome by changing conditions.71 Without a measured 
way to release the pressures induced by these changes, policy outputs can resemble the tectonic 
plate in a fault line, slowing grinding against its restraints until eventually slippage occurs along 
with a resultant earthquake (Baumgartner and Jones, 1995).72   
Jones and Baumgartner theorized that policy and budget punctuations would be more 
pronounced in organizations with complex decision processes involving many friction points 
produced by the interaction of internal and external stakeholders (Jones et al, 2003). This led to 
the creation of the General Punctuation Hypothesis. In its most basic form it states: “As all 
government institutions impose costs, we expect all outputs to show positive kurtosis. As 
decision-making costs increase – that is, as it is more difficult to translate informational inputs 
into policy outputs – the more leptokurtic the corresponding output distributions” (Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005, p. 347). This would certainly seem to explain why DoD, as the largest 
department with the most expansive budget in the U.S. government, tends to produce much 
punctuated budgets.  
                                                 
70 Institutional cultures, vested interests and the bounded rationality of decision makers. 
71 Much like in our discussion of incrementalism there are information costs, but also cognitive costs to process 
information, decision costs representing difficulty in arriving at group consensus and transaction costs involving 
compliance and oversight (Jones, et al., 2003, 154). 
72 This has also been described as positive and negative feedback. Positive: political, economic, environmental, etc. 
force for change (works against the status quo). Negative:  Maintains equilibrium in a system (resists change in the 




A fascinating offshoot of PET has been the recent introduction of Disrupted Exponential 
Incrementalism Theory (DEIT). It draws heavily on its PET roots, but purports itself as a general 
theory of budgetary allocations (Jones, Zalanyi and Erdi, 2014). To test DEIT, Jones, et al. 
(2014) looked at all U.S. government expenditures from 1791 to 2010. They separated defense 
and non-defense budgets for study, as they expected defense budgets to be more susceptible to 
external influences. They determined that although budgets are not strictly incremental, they are 
exponentially incremental. That is to say they are influenced by previous budgets (path 
dependent) unless impacted by significant events. They describe these events as major wars or 
economic disruptions and test their premise by dividing the time span into periods of equilibrium 
(outside of major war or economic disruptions) and critical moments (periods where war or 
economic disruption exist). Jones et al. (2014) expected to find less extreme disruptions during 
periods of equilibrium (as measured by kurtosis) compared to the aggregate of the entire time 
period or during critical moments.   
Their conclusions reflected three takeaways with particular relevance to this study. First, 
Jones et al. found that outside of critical moments, general budgets follow a path dependency 
trajectory in order to meet program expectations. Second, they determined significant and 
instantaneous shifts in the budget path are caused by wars or economic disruptions. Third, they 
concluded that local policy dynamics can cause minor shifts in the budget path that may appear 
significant at the time, but are small in comparison to the major budgetary shifts seen in critical 
moments (Jones, et al, 2014, p. 576).   
 DEIT is interesting as a theory of macro-budgeting, but it is also very useful from the 
perspective of public opinion-based defense budget drivers. There is little doubt in the literature 
that war and disruptive economic events can drive defense spending, but there is little agreement 
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about what happens in-between such extreme events. This study will provide at least a partial 
answer to what kind of local policy dynamics can lead to punctuated change within and between 
critical moments (Jones, et al, 2014, p. 577).   
 
E. Summary 
The power of military spending to shape society is hardly a modern phenomenon. 
Thucydides cautioned us nearly 2500 years ago, “war is a matter not so much of arms as of 
money.” If we accept a premise of the primacy of funding in defense politics, then we must also 
accept that in a modern democratic state, the support of the people is necessary to provide the 
revenue (taxes) and bodies (soldiers) required to procure a military force and wage war.   
Whether garnered through elite cueing or popular consensus, popular support is a 
precursor to any significant growth in defense expenditure or extended engagement.73 The extant 
literature has provided a sturdy foundation upon which to build. The next step is to determine the 
political dynamics that affect defense spending both during and between significant military and 
economic events. Based on the body of literature and my findings, it is clear that MoC are 
reacting to public approval ratings, both as individuals and as an institution, in ways they find 
situationally most beneficial.   
An analysis involving every model discussed in this literature review is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, variables from each of the models are be included in the statistical 
analysis to provide a representation of the effects each model could produce over the timespan in 
question. The Threat Model is represented by the presence of war; the Military Keynesian Model 
                                                 
73 Gallop polling shows that military conflict tends to become less popular overtime, particularly as costs rise with 
little sign of progress and no perceived direct threat to the population. 
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by changes in inflation and GDP; the Leader Model by public approval of Congress;74 and the 
Follower Model by the public’s perception of the adequacy of defense spending. 
The shortcoming with the existing literature on defense budgets is that it relies too 
heavily on over-simplified drivers, without continuing to explore the wide range of effects 
which, both individually and in concert with one another, act upon the dynamic process. This 
paper address the overlooked factor of congressional approval and re-focuses attention on the 
need for a more holistic and multi-discipline approach to the defense budget process. As Seneca 
cautioned us to, “beware the man of one book,” so must we avoid the temptation to accept the 
seemingly obvious or overly parsimonious explanation of defense budgeting. This study offers a 
new branch to the literature by demonstrating that in addition to other factors such as economic 
health and war, congressional reaction to public approval is a powerful motivator for 











                                                 
74 If the Elite Model is correct, Congress will make not react to public perception of its actions, but rather make 
changes to defense spending based upon its own calculation of institutional benefit and need. 
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III. Defense Budget Process  
 
"The defense budget is more than a piggy bank for folks who want to get busy beating swords 
into pork barrels."  
 – President H.W. Bush, in a speech to defense workers in California on 6 AUG 1992. 
  
 The U.S. defense budget is the single largest discretionary budget and falls behind only 
social security as the largest program for overall government spending (see Figure III-1 below). 
In the scope of resources devoted and the degree of planning required, there is no comparison to 
be found in government. The defense budget process involves every DoD service member and 
civilian in some way. All DoD commands at every echelon are required to prepare and defend 
their own annual budget estimate (known as a Program Objective Memorandum or POM), which 
are carefully validated and aggregated into the total DoD budget. Over 25,000 people are 
primarily dedicated to the process in the Pentagon alone.   
With so many moving parts and literally thousands of programs requiring precisely 
sequencing technical and training solutions in order to achieve interoperability with each other, 
the budgeting process begins years before the President’s Defense Budget is proposed to 
Congress. Every politically motivated change introduced by Congress outside this carefully 
orchestrated planning cycle creates reverberations throughout DoD and the defense industry.75 
                                                 
75 A very real hypothetical example would be a DoD weapon system program which coordinates all sensors, 
weapons and data links on a warship. That weapon system would have to be interoperable with hundreds of other 
Joint and Navy programs (able to process data and electronically communicate). A delay or change in requirements 
to any system which has to operate with that weapon system would change the technical requirements and timeline 
for integration and technology upgrade efforts. Since ships are only available for upgrades during specific windows 
(between deployments), such changes could lead to multiple versions of the weapon system being fielded at the 
same time. This would create a situation where only certain ships, airplanes, communication systems, etc. would be 
interoperable with the weapon system on a given ship. Neither industry nor the military could adapt to this 
disruption of the sequence of upgrades. In time of war, tracking each ship and version of software of each weapon 
system would create an impossible logistical task.    
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The later into the planning cycle a change is initiated, the greater the potential damage to long 
range strategic planning and defense weapon systems capability and continuity.  
 
 
Figure III-1: Budget Comparison 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
 
 The Defense budget process is unique in the U.S. government. Although every agency 
has a budget process and some (such as NASA) use parts of the DoD process, there is no 
comparison in scale or congressional salience (see Figure III-1 above).76 With a budget of over 
$600 billion and 2.1 million employees (military and civilian), DoD is effectively the largest 
business on earth. By comparison, it dwarfs even global giant Walmart with its $485 billion in 
annual sales and 1.5 million U.S. employees.77 Figure III-2 below details just how substantial 
DoD is as a function of total government and the economy at large.  
                                                 
76 NASA uses the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) portion of the DoD budget system, but 
its budget is approximately 1/35th that of DoD and has a workforce of around 18,000 people. 




Figure III-2: DoD Statistics 
Source: DoD Greenbook 2017 
 
 The defense budget is not only huge, but it is seen by Congress and the President as a 
“must pass” annual bill. Since 1961, the President has vetoed the defense authorization bill only 
five times (FY79, FY89, FY96, FY08, with the last time in FY16), and no president has vetoed 
the defense appropriations bill since 1970. Although appropriations were late 34 out of the last 
45 years, defense has been funded in some form or fashion every year, prompting some in 
government and industry to refer to the defense budget as a “Christmas Tree” appropriation, 
since everyone is guaranteed to get something (Jones, Candreva and DeVore, 2012).  
 In order to grasp the implications of the use of the defense budget by MoC as a lever to 
affect public approval, it is necessary to appreciate the complexity of the process. My 
understanding of the defense processes is aided by substantial anecdotal experience. For three 
years I served as a Requirements Officer (RO) for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
assigned to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Resources, Requirements and 
Assessments (N-8). As an RO, I was responsible for the linkage between OPNAV, Naval Fleet 
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Commands, Joint Combatant Commands, Systems Commands, and the Secretary of the Navy 
(SECNAV). I was expected to determine the Navy and Joint position on programs within my 
portfolio,78 and to identify how those programs (or associated weapons systems) met Joint 
Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) requirements. I was also responsible for 
establishing the individual program requirements that would be utilized by the Acquisition 
Management System to procure systems or modifications to those systems.   
In addition to my role as an RO, I was also assigned as the Resource Sponsor (RS) for the 
same portfolio of programs. This meant that I coordinated the Navy (and Joint) acquisition plan 
for the programs under my charge, and I was responsible for obtaining (and defending) annual 
funding for those programs in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) 
process. This required me to champion my programs both within the Pentagon and in testimony 
to congressional budget and defense committees. These experiences allowed me to be active in 
every phase of the defense budget process and granted me an insider’s view of the defense 
budgeting process, and at least a participant’s perspective of the congressional budget process.  
 
A. DoD Budget Process 
The DoD Budget process is composed of three parts: The Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System (JCIDS), the Acquisition Management System, and the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting; and Execution (PPBE) System. JCIDS supports the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in determining and prioritizing military training, manpower and equipment 
requirements.79 The Acquisition Management System develops and procures the requirements 
                                                 
78 I was responsible for a $5 billion portfolio of aviation and command and control systems.  
79 JCIDS is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff process to identify, assess, and prioritize joint military capability 
needs. It is a collaborative effort that uses joint concepts and integrated architectures to identify prioritized capability 
gaps and integrated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities 
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identified by JCIDS and funded by PPBE.80 The PPBE is the internal process by which DoD 
allocates resources to requirements produced by JCIDS in order to support the Acquisition 
Management System in procuring the necessary capabilities to support the President’s Defense 
Budget (PB) (see Figure III-3 below).  
 
Figure III-3: Components of the Defense Budget Process 
Source: Defense Acquisition University 
 
       
 Although a rudimentary understanding of the linkage between requirements, acquisition 
and budgeting is necessary to grasp the complexity of the defense budget, for the purpose of this 
dissertation I will deal primarily with the PPBE process. My focus is on the U.S. defense 
budgetary process, and the PPBE is the core of that process and one unique to DoD. The other 
components of the defense budget process will only be discussed as they impact the PPBE.  
                                                 
(DOTMLPF) solutions (materiel and non-materiel) to resolve those gaps (Source: CJCSI 6212.01F- Interoperability 
and Supportability of Information Technology and National Security Systems, 21 March 20012). 




The end result of the defense budget process is a construct known as the Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is a computerized database that captures both past, current 
and future (projected) defense expenditures. It prioritizes defense planning around the last budget 
year, the current year (year executing now), the next budget year (being currently planned and 
approved) and the following four years known as “out-years.” 
Twice during the PPBE cycle the FYDP is updated. The first point is when the 
Combatant Commanders (COCOMS) and services (Navy, Army, Marine Corps and Air Force) 
submit their Program Objective Memorandum (POM), usually at the end of July. The cost and 
capability specifications in the POM are reflected in the update to the FYDP. The second time 
the FYDP is updated is in January (typically), the month prior to the submission of the 
President’s Budget (PB) to Congress. The President’s Budget is a final version of the Pentagon’s 
estimate of need for the next fiscal year.   
The FYDP is closely held within DoD and is not released to any outside agency without 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) permission. However, the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1987 (10 U.S.C. 2216), required DoD to provide congressional oversight 
committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)81 with a modified version of the FYDP 
within 120 days of the submission of the PB.82 This means that congressional committees and the 
CBO have visibility into DoD programming plans beyond the fiscal year under consideration, 
and they can and do often question these decisions. For example, a common term in the Pentagon 
is the “swizzle.” This means in effect to take funds from a program in the upcoming execution 
                                                 
81 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) supports the Budget Committees, the Appropriations Committees, and the 
Revenue Committees with fiscal and economic analyses to enable them to establish national priorities and to make 
informed decisions about budget policy. The CBO serves the legislative branch in much the same way as the 
executive branch's Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
82 This was enacted by Congress as a way to track cost inflation of defense programs (Report GAO/NSIAD-88-79). 
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year and add them back to the program in an out-year. The advantage is that it appears that a 
program is being fully funded, although delayed, when in effect the program has been defunded. 
Since out-years are only estimates of future funding, no contracts can be obligated and industry 
cannot (realistically) count on those funds. The ripple effect to industry is that people are pulled 
off of the “swizzled” program, and restart costs are added to any future attempt to continue the 
effort. These new costs are not included in POM or FYDP estimates, since they are unknown. 
This is a concern to MoC who represent industries effected by such decisions. Visibility into the 
FYDP planning, allows “swizzles” to be identified early and challenged by committee, usually 
by threatened puts or takes in a future budget.83  
The PPBE process is a calendar-driven process; however, since many appropriations 
cover multiple years and decisions overlap with calendar (1 Jan – 31 Dec) and fiscal (1 OCT – 
30 Sep) years, the process can be very confusing. Figure III-4 below shows that at any given 
time the Pentagon is conducting planning, programming, budgeting or execution on three or four 
budget cycles simultaneously.   
 
                                                 




Figure III-4: DoD Budget Timeline 
Source: Defense Acquisition University 
 
The PPBE was derived from a budgeting system introduced into DoD by Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara in the early 1960s. The goal was to provide a decision making tool 
that could react to current military and economic challenges while projecting realistic cost 
estimates well out into the future. The process today is divided into four stages: Planning, 




Figure III-5: DoD PPBE Process 
Source: acqnotes.com 
 
The PPBE begins with the Planning Phase. Planning starts at least three years prior to the 
fiscal year that funding will begin (i.e., Planning for POM 15 began in FY 12) and ends with the 
publishing of the Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG) by SECDEF. The 
DDPG requires a review of all previous guidance84 and constitutes the DoD’s long term view of 
the capabilities needed in response to the anticipated threat environment and establishes fiscal 
controls and program actions for each service and defense agency.85 The Chairman of the Joint 
                                                 
84 The DDPG is also sometimes referred to as the Defense Planning Guide (DPG) or the Joint Planning Guide (JPG).  
85 This review is composed of a set of high level strategic documents which includes: The National Security Strategy 
(NSS); the National Defense Strategy; the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR); and the National Military Strategy. 
The NSS is an annual document from the President which establishes the high level priorities of U.S. security 
strategy. The NDS is produced every four years by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and amplifies what is in the 
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Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides input into the DDPG through the Chairman’s Program 
Recommendation (CPR). The CPR is the output of the JCIDS process and identifies the joint 
service priorities for readiness, doctrine, training and capabilities.86 The planning phase 
establishes DoD priorities for funding current programs and establishing new programs of 
record.   
The next phase of the PPBE is the Programming Phase, and it allocates resources in 
accordance with the DDPG. Previous programming decisions, SECDEF and congressional 
guidance are considered in a systematic review of programs and required capabilities. The intent 
is to "cost out" resource allocation options required for the next five years and give the President 
and SECDEF an idea of the tradeoffs and long term implications of funding one program or 
capability option over another.   
In late July or early August, each military component and service submits a Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) to SECDEF. The POM is the statement from each service of 
precisely what each believe they need in terms of training, technology, equipment and manning 
for the next fiscal year to satisfy the DDPG. The POM is a detailed document covering a five-
year period, the next fiscal year and the four years following. 
To support the component and service POM, all lower echelon commands are required to 
compile their own POMs which are then compiled to create the aggregate component or service 
POM. This process starts roughly 10 months prior to the July/August due date for the component 
                                                 
NSS in conjunction with the results of the QDR. The QDR is an end to end review of current DoD strategy and 
attempts to predict threats 20 years into the future. It is produced every four years (out of sequence with the NDS) 
and is produced by SECDEF. Lastly, the NMS is produced every two years (or as needed) by CJCS and amplifies 
what is stated in each of the previous documents. These documents are distilled into the Defense Planning Guidance 
(also known as the Joint Planning Guidance), which is released by SECDEF each year to start the planning process.  
86 CJCS Instruction 3100.01, and CJCSI 8501.01 addresses participation by the CJCS, the COCOMs, and the Joint 




and service POM, and there are multiple programming ripples up and down the echelon 
command structure with each change or iteration at the component or service POM level. 
Guidance is usually published by component or service one year prior to POM due date. In other 
words, the entire process starts approximately four years prior to POM due date (five years out 
from year of execution). 
After submission of the combined POM, CJCS conducts a review to assess how the 
component commands and services have conformed to the priorities and resource constraints 
addressed in the DPPG. The results of this review are provided to SECDEF as the Chairman's 
Program Assessment (CPA) in September or October. Following the CPA, SECDEF conducts an 
internal review during which the services and components are allowed a series of reclama 
(opportunity to challenge CPA conclusions) events. The final outcome is the issuance of one or 
more Resource Management Decisions (RMDs) in October or November, which summarize final 
SECDEF programing decisions. The services and components respond by adjusting their POMs 
in accordance to the RMDs.  
The next phase of the PPBE is the Budgeting Phase, although in practice the Budgeting 
and Programming phases occur concurrently. Following the submission of service and 
component POMs, SECDEF and the President’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
conduct a joint review of the POM.87 DoD is unique in its relationship with the President’s 
Office of Budget and Management (OMB). Every other federal agency is required to send OMB 
                                                 
87 This review is concerned with four primary areas: Program pricing -that the budget was prepared on the basis of 
“most likely cost” of the work to be done and that the proper escalation index has been applied to the constant-year 
budget estimate to determine the then-year funding requirement; Program phasing - have Procurement funds been 
phased properly to coincide with program plans for contract awards; Funding policies - examines the compliance of 
the budget request with the proper funding policy for each appropriation category being requested; 
Budget execution – the efficiency with which the organization has executed (i.e., obligated and expended) currently 




the final draft of their budget for review and revision and in all cases OMB has the final word on 
the budget submitted to the President. In the defense budget, OMB representatives physically 
come to the Pentagon and review drafts of the budget along with SECDEF staff as it progresses 
through the PPBE process. The final product is an iteration that both SECDEF and OMB agree 
upon before submission to the President. In most cases SECDEF has the final say on the version 
sent to the President. The output of this review process is the defense portion of the President’s 
Budget (PB). The completion of the PB ends the Budgeting Phase of PPBE and begin the 
Congressional Enactment process. 
 
Figure III-6: PPBE Program and Budget Review 




Figure III-6 above illustrates the complex PPBE process. From a PET perspective, each 
box contains multiple friction points. Lines of input and communication move in back and forth 
throughout the process. With so many concurrent and overlapping sub-processes interacting, the 
end product is a non-linear and recursive process which bends back upon itself every time there 
is push back at any of the many decision points.88 Negative pressure builds up quickly in the 
PPBE and the default strategy is to maintain the status quo or attempt incremental change. 
However, this is not what tends to happen.  
Incrementalism is alive and well in the adage that no program every truly dies in the 
Pentagon, it is merely “rebranded” with a new name and sponsor (and usually less money). 
However, the perpetual reinvention of old programs does not explain the punctuated growth in 
defense budgets.89 This is largely accounted for by the addition of new start programs every year, 
and the exponential growth in the costs of Major Acquisition Programs (MAPs). In 2015 MAPs 
had accumulated $469 billion in cost growth. These are all large programs with influential 
defense, political, and industry sponsors (several were in my portfolio), and they are essentially 
immune from significant threat of cancelation.90 Unfortunately, a closer examination of how 
these programs operate is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to recognize that the 
                                                 
88 No fight is ever truly won or lost. There is always a reclama or appeal and this contributes to significant delays 
and institutional exhaustion in pursuing any major system decision. The short duration of military tours of duty 
(normally three years of less) contributes to this, as military officers often leave before any major decision can be 
completed and the relief starts over without the benefit of institutional knowledge.   
89 Although it certainly adds pressure to the system to maintain legacy programs, often long after they have outlived 
their tactical usefulness. Many items are procured each year for which there are no requirements, but which ensure a 
particular factory or assembly line remains open. This extends far beyond measures necessary to secure the 
industrial base, as has been identified repeatedly in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
90 GAO-16-329SP report March 2016. 
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mechanisms of cost growth and the deathless life cycle of most programs makes them very 
attractive as a source of economic manna for states, districts and industry.91     
The defense budget is not created in a vacuum within the Pentagon; Congress provides 
“fiscal guidance” early and often during the process through informal channels with DoD 
leadership. This usually relates to bottom line spending totals, and not program spending 
specifics, but it does explain why the PB and Congress’s defense authorization and appropriation 
bills are usually very close in total dollar spent.92 The far more important difference lies in how 
money is moved from one program of interest to another. We will discuss this more in the 
following section on the congressional defense budget process.  
Looking back on the process, it is difficult to imagine how anything is accomplished. 
However, what is missing from the above diagram are the external pressures. Even at this stage, 
industry and Congress are informally involved. OMB provides pressure for the President’s 
interests, congressional inquiries occur daily and visits from defense industry consultants and 
CEO’s are frequent. I spent a great deal of my time responding to and meeting with all of the 
above, and I was not a major decision maker. In other words, the system is permeated with 
influence at all levels. These influences constitute a surprisingly93 regulated political pneumatic 
system that provides, as required, the positive pressure to push new programs and the negative 
pressure to preserve obsolete programs. This often leads to coalitions of governmental and 
industrial forces that are far easier to create than to control (Borch and Wallace, 2010). The 
                                                 
91 Even after development and production runs, most major programs maintain healthy sustainment, upgrade and 
attrition costs. These programs also continually require local contract support and permanent DoD personnel 
commitments to train, maintain and deploy them at locations in various states and districts. 
92 Of course DoD is aware of the major program interests of MoC from the previous year’s briefings to Congress.  
93 Considering the scope and scale of the system and the numerous internal and external factions promoting or 
opposing every decision. 
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motivations and mechanics of this influence into the defense budget process will be discussed in 
more detail below.  
 
B. Appropriation Categories 
The single most important factor in defense spending utility is not necessarily the total 
amount available, but rather the category of appropriation. There are five main categories of 
defense appropriation, and each has characteristics that make it more or less useful to a particular 
industry or state/local government. Not all MoC are benefited equally by defense spending, or 
even the same category of appropriation. It depends largely upon the makeup of their 
constituency and the local economy (Stein and Bickers, 1994).   
 
Figure III-7: Appropriation Categories 




The five defense appropriation categories are referred to in the Pentagon as the “color of 
money,” and include: Military Personnel (MILPERS); Operation and Maintenance (O&M); 
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E); Procurement; and Military 
Construction (MILCON). Over the last 30 years the largest slice of the pie (see Figure III-7 
above) has been O&M, followed in descending order by MILPERS, Procurement, RDT&E, and 
MILCON. Each of these has a different burn rate (how much of the funds are obligated per year) 
and a different availability (the number of years available in which to obligate the funds). This is 
relevant, as the color of money determines what funds makes the biggest impact, the soonest, and 
for whom (Jones, Candreva and DeVore, p. 83, 2012). We will discuss each type in more detail 




Figure III-8: Availability and Burn Rate of Appropriations 
Source: DoD Greenbook 2017 
 
Military Personnel (MILPERS) has a significant impact on state and local economies as it 
can add significantly to the payroll and tax base of an area. It is the second largest annual 
military appropriation and is used to pay the cost of salaries and other compensation for active 
and retired military personnel and reserve forces based on end strength.94 MILPERS directly 
benefits areas that host large bases and cities where large populations of military retirees live.  
There is a multiplier effect in MILPERS for state and local economies. Not only does 
DoD pay salaries and pensions to service members and retirees, which in most cases can be 
                                                 
94 Defense Acquisition University definition. The actual funding of military retirement is complex, but for our 
purposes it can be effectively assumed to be part of MILPERS. 
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taxed, but the income of dependent family members who accompany the service member is also 
taxable.95 Additionally, property and sales taxes from DoD populations contribute to state coffers 
as well as to local business profits. With very few DoD schools in the continental United States, 
DoD also pays a set amount per student to local school districts to supplement property taxes that 
would have been collected if the service member’s family did not live in base housing.96 All of 
this makes DoD members and retirees with their guaranteed income fiscally attractive to states 
and localities.97  
The effect of MILPERS is amplified in that it is available solely in the year of 
appropriation, so it must be expended quickly. This leads to a burn rate of nearly 95% (see 
Figure III-8 above) per year. The only exceptions are bonuses, which are appropriated, but not 
always claimed for various reasons or funds revoked as disciplinary fines. Unlike most other 
appropriations, the state and local government sees the full value of the appropriation (taxes and 
retail) immediately. This allows MILPERS to provide a quick boost to state and local economies 
where service members are stationed or retirees live (Jones, Candreva and DeVore, 2012). 
The characteristics of MILPERS that make it appealing for boosting economic interests 
also make it desirable as a tool for reducing DoD expenditures. When DoD needs to make quick 
cuts to its budget, a reduction in MILPERS is a preferred method. By law DoD is allowed 
considerable leeway in reducing personnel numbers without congressional approval, and with the 
availability and burn rates so short and high, the funds not appropriated to MILPERS are 
                                                 
95 DoD member are allowed to maintain a home of record when they move from duty station to duty station, but this 
typically does not apply to spouses who work in the state where their service member is stationed. Although some 
states do not require service members to pay state income tax, this is the exception and not the rule. 
96 DoD base housing has been privatized, but it is currently still exempt from property tax for service members. 
97 Military members have guaranteed employment for the term of their enlistment or commissioned service unless 
discharged for disciplinary reasons.  
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recouped immediately.98 There are also no contract concerns, as with every other appropriation 
category. As an example, when I was a student at the Navy War College, the CNO at the time 
(ADM Vern Clark) informed us that for every 10,000 sailors he eliminated we could reprogram 
$1.3 billion dollars toward procurement.99 The drawback to this course of action is that personnel 
take time to train, and only on paper can you reconstitute the military force quickly by simply 
recruiting in a given year.100 Despite this, he was aggressive in pursuing his approach to 
recapitalizing the Navy, and during his tenure he cut over 33,000 sailors from the active force.101 
The next category of appropriation is Operations and Maintenance (O&M). O&M funds 
everyday expenses such as civilian salaries, military health care, travel, minor construction 
projects, operating military forces, training and education, depot maintenance, stock funds, and 
base operations support.102 It is the largest annual category of military appropriation and provides 
all day-to-day consumables from pens and paper to furniture and fuel. Its biggest economic 
impact is the payroll of DoD civilians, healthcare expenses and the large and small contracts with 
local businesses and venders that support military bases and DoD facilities.   
Similar to MILPERS, O&M has a one-year availability although a significantly lower 
burn rate of around 75% per year (see Figure III-8 above). The burn rate for the civilian payroll 
component is essentially the same as with MILPERS; however, the lower overall burn rate 
results from the variability in contract execution for consumables. These do not always result in 
                                                 
98 The NDAA sets an authorized max number, not a minimum.  
99 This is technically not reprogramming in the budgetary sense (which is subject to congressional constraints), but 
for practical purposes, the money previously devoted to MILPERS would be requested in the POM adjustment as 
Procurement.  
100 Time to train depends upon the skill set required. In the case of pilots, basic proficiency is obtained in around two 
years, but tactical proficiency takes on average six years. With the increase in high technology weapon system the 
time to train is trending toward increases in every military rating and operational specialty.   
101 2017 DoD Green Book reference tables on Navy end strength. 
102 Defense Acquisition University definition.  
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outlays in the year of appropriation. In practice, the actual outlay of funds can come later, as long 
as the money is obligated within the appropriation year.103  
These characteristics lead to similar budget pressures on O&M as seen with MILPERS. 
O&M provides significant benefits to state and local governments as well as small business in 
areas near major bases or DoD civilian facilities. It is also typically the first appropriation 
category to be raided when fiscal pressures are great, due to its relatively low visibility with the 
general public and Congress. This renders the appropriation and the services it procures 
particularly inconsistent.   
O&M funds a mixed bag of services. Roughly 44% of costs in the O&M budget relate to 
health care, civilian compensation and fuel purchases.104 These have reasonable salience with 
MoC and the public, but the other 56% of O&M costs are harder to quantify and mostly invisible 
to all but those who rely directly upon the services they purchase. Training, equipment 
maintenance and travel and consumables constitute the majority of the remainder, but are far less 
obvious to those outside of DoD. Reductions in training days, flight hours, deferred maintenance, 
limiting office heating and cooling systems, and reducing administrative consumables (i.e., 
furniture, paper, ink, and pens) are all common practices to reduce O&M costs; however, lack of 
training leads to accidents and low readiness, while only so much maintenance can be safely 
deferred until the systems cease to function.  
The diversity of O&M makes it somewhat easier to affect in the short term than 
MILPERS. However, even though it is the largest overall annual defense appropriation, the fact 
                                                 
103 One way to think of the various measures of defense spending is as follows: Budget Authority is what you put in 
the bank this year. TOA is this year’s money plus any leftover in your account from before. Obligations are you 
writing a check, outlays are when the check is cashed and the bank transfers your money (Jones, Candreva and 
DeVore, 2012). 
104 CBO Trends in Spending by the Department of Defense for Operation and Maintenance, Jan 2017. 
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that over half of it is tied up in contracts and DoD civilian end strength, which cannot be adjusted 
as easily as that of the active duty force, renders it less politically palatable for long term or large 
scale reductions in military spending. By providing nearly $100 billion to the private sector each 
year, O&M is a significant economic provider for states and local economies.105 This makes it a 
valuable resource to be cultivated particularly by MoC whose districts contain large military 
bases or civilian DoD facilities.  
Perhaps the best known appropriation category is Procurement. It funds those acquisition 
programs that have been approved for production and all costs necessary to deliver a fully 
operational item intended for operational use or inventory.106 All major defense programs are 
funded by procurement dollars, making it easily the most visible of the acquisition categories 
even though it only constitutes the third largest share of funds. Nonetheless, when we think of 
the defense industry, we are generally thinking of procurement.  
Procurement is vital to state economies in that defense industries and their subcontractors 
operate in every state and nearly every congressional district in the country. However, 
procurement dollars are tricky. Due to the complexity and length of time required to produce 
most major weapon systems they are available for three years after appropriation and have a burn 
rate of only slightly more than 22% per year (see Figure III-8 above). Consequently, the defense 
industry has a rather unpredictable revenue stream, and state and local government taxing those 
revenues do not garner the full benefit in the year of appropriation. All of this leads to a rather 
complicated relationship between defense industries and DoD.   
Since procurement contracts have the largest cost growth rate and delivery schedules are 
typically prone to slippage without penalty to industry, the defense industry is in effect 
                                                 
105 CBO Trends in Spending by the Department of Defense for Operation and Maintenance, Jan 2017. 
106 Defense Acquisition University definition. 
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incentivized to over-promise and under-deliver. As major programs rarely die, and almost 
inevitably increase in cost over time, there is no mechanism to prevent industry from continuing 
to market the next system or upgrade, even before delivering functional versions of the systems 
for which they have already contracted.   
Procurement contracts are of primary interest to MoC whose states or districts have large 
defense industries. With the size of contracts available, there is intense political pressure to seek 
new procurement contracts and to accommodate discrepancy in those that already exist. This 
pressure often becomes quite personal. For example, I was once replaced on a contract incentive 
review board, for refusing to authorize a large performance bonus award to a contractor who was 
months behind schedule and over budget. The rational for my removal was that by refusing the 
bonus I would get “Bob” fired, and he was a good ex-military guy who had a wife and kids to 
feed. I was also informed by the staff of a MoC who was a senior member of the HASC that if I 
ever had any issues with getting a particular program additional funds to call the congressman 
directly.107 Such instances are neither rare nor unusual in an appropriation as politically charged 
as procurement.  
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds the efforts performed by 
contractors and government activities required for the research, development test and evaluation 
of equipment, material, computer application software.108 RDT&E has a two-year availability 
and a burn rate of approximately 51% per year. It provides primary economic benefits to both 
industry and civilian academic institutions, as well as funding internal DoD research facilities.  
RDT&E is important to the state and districts that contain civilian or military research 
facilities, and for the multi-use R&D that is provided to industry as a byproduct of development 
                                                 
107 Pseudonyms have been used for the names of individuals in these examples.   
108 Defense Acquisition University definition. 
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and production contract. Since industry is typically allowed to retain the intellectual property 
rights to technology discovered in the process of executing its DoD contract, there are often spill-
over benefits that provide downstream profits to the company.109 These factors make RDT&E a 
useful appropriation, and one in which many congressional research priorities, such as medical 
and agricultural research, are embedded each year.    
Military Construction (MILCON) is the last category of appropriation we will discuss. It 
funds major projects such as bases, schools, missile storage facilities, maintenance facilities, 
medical/dental clinics, libraries, and military family housing.110 MILCON has the longest 
availability and smallest burn rate at five-year and 13%, respectively. This is due to the long lead 
time required on construction projects and the relative unpredictability of environmental factors 
involved in defense construction.111 MILCON is a valuable economic resource for states and 
districts with large military bases and DoD facilities, as it provides local construction 
employment, potential for larger military populations, protection against future base closure, and 
often land use revenues.112  
MoC are well aware of the variations in utility provided by the various appropriation 
categories. Separate from any discussion of the macro-effects of defense spending (Military 
Keynesian approach from the literature review) to the national economy, there are definite 
micro-effects taking place on state and district level economies. These impacts influence the 
relationship of MoC with their electorate and, therefore, the personal level of interest and activity 
in defense budget process.   
                                                 
109 For instance, the technology used for commercial flat screen televisions was paid for as part of a DoD program.  
110 Defense Acquisition University definition. 
111 These range from traditional construction issues such as weather and foundational adequacy of soil, to DoD 
specific problems such as 100% U.S. citizen requirement for construction works (with some form of security 
clearance), and lengthy administrative processes for environmental impact studies and hazmat abatement protocols.  
112 DoD often rents or purchases land from local government for construction projects.  
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C. Congressional Budget Process 
There is no need to rehash in minute detail how the overall congressional budget works. 
It has been dissected and described many times by scholars from Madison to Mayhew and 
Schattschneider to Schickler. This paper does not seek to uncover new insights into the 
institutional or party structure of Congress as a whole, but rather to highlight the motivation of 
MoC to manipulate the defense budget in times of falling electoral approval. As such, I will 
refrain from describing congressional processes or procedures except where they are particularly 
relevant to the congressional defense budget process.   
That said, it would be foolish to conclude that Congress’ handling of the defense budget 
is not unique. In terms of scale, extensibility and salience there is no comparison. As Figure III-1 
showed at the start of this chapter, a simple comparison of FY15 budgets highlights the sheer 
magnitude of U.S. defense spending. With so much capital at stake, it is no wonder that many 
entities both within and outside of Congress compete in the congressional budget process for a 
share.    
 Aaron Wildavsky was one of the first authors to note that defense spending is different. 
In particular, he noted its growing dominance of the discretionary budget (Wildavsky, 1964, 
1975 and 1986). This phenomenon has been driven by the rapid increase of mandatory spending 
and the consequential diminishing of discretionary spending as a portion of overall federal 
spending. Figure III-9 below illustrates that as the total budget has grown (surpassing collected 
revenue in all but a few years), both discretionary and mandatory budgets have increased in 
dollar amount. However, as a share of the total budget discretionary spending has decreased by 
over 30% since 1970. This mismatch has resulted in a continually decreasing portion of the 
75 
 
federal budget available for congressional authorization and appropriation each year.113 With 
diminishing resources available, defense spending has assumed an even greater proportional 
importance to congressional authorizers and appropriators.   
 
 
Figure III-9: U.S. Budget Trends 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
 
As a function of the exponential growth in mandatory budgets over the last 40 years, 
discretionary spending has been continually squeezed. This has left MoC competing for 
appropriation priorities in a smaller and smaller piece of the budgetary pie. Since much of the 
budget is frozen in entitlements, Defense is one of the few pots of money available where a MoC 
can seek to get money to fund local projects (Jones, Candreva and DeVore, 2012).  
                                                 
113 Mandatory programs do not need to be authorized or appropriated each year. They are enacted by statutory law 
and funded (in most cases) by trust funds established by law.  
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Although defense spending has fluctuated as a percentage over this span, since 1970 it 
has accounted for an average of 54% of all discretionary spending, making it by far the single 
largest appropriation in the federal budget.114 Figure III-10 below tracks changes in the defense 
share of the discretionary budget from the Vietnam War drawdown, through the Reagan defense 
buildup in the early 1980s, the Cold War demobilization, the Global War on Terror and the 
introduction of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (budget caps enacted in 2013). What is apparent 
in this chart is that even in times of relative peace, defense spending retains the lion’s share of 
the available budget. This is not lost on MoC, as evidenced by the composition of defense budget 
committees.  
 
Figure III-10: Discretionary Spending 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
                                                 
114 Of the 12 appropriation bills provided in the federal budget each year, defense is the largest. This does not 
include mandatory spending which does not require appropriation. The 12 appropriations bills are: Agriculture, 
Rural Development, Food & Drug Administration & Related Agencies; Commerce, Justice, Science & Related 
Agencies; Energy & Water Development; Defense; Homeland Security; Labor, Health & Human Services, 
Education & Related Agencies; State, Foreign Operations & Related Agencies; Military Construction, Veterans 
Affairs & Related Agencies; Interior, Environment & related Agencies; Transportation, Housing & Urban 




The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (and its amendments) 
largely establishes the timeline and process for the U.S. Budget in Congress (see Figure III-11 
below) and produces three outputs. The first is the Concurrent Budget Resolution (CBR),115 
which establishes a mutually agreed upon ceiling on spending for the budget.116 The second is 
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which reauthorizes established programs, 
authorizes new start programs, delineates quantities of weapon systems, and sets troop end-
strength limits for the services. Its primary role is to designate what programs are to be funded 
and set the cost ceilings for those programs.117 The third output is the Defense Appropriations 
Act. This determines how much money is actually allotted to programs and sets conditions for its 
use. Only the Defense Appropriations Act is required by the U.S. Constitution, but all 
discretionary programs require authorization by law before funds can be appropriated.118 
Although these logically seem to flow in order, in practice they are not required to do so. The 
budget can continue with or without the CBR, and appropriations can lead authorizations, so 
long as they balance in the final bills.  
Figure III-11 below describes the congressional budget process flow as intended. The 
President’s budget (PB), in our case the defense budget, is due to Congress the first Monday in 
                                                 
115 Concurrent Budget Resolution Major Functional Categories 050 - National Defense 150 - International Affairs 
250 - General Science, Space, and Technology 270 - Energy 300 - Natural Resources and Environment 350 - 
Agriculture 370 - Commerce and Housing Credit 400 - Transportation 450 - Community and Regional Development 
500 - Education, Training, Employment and Social Services 550 - Health 570 - Medicare 600 - Income Security 650 
- Social Security 700 - Veterans Benefits and Services 750 - Administration of Justice 800 - General Government 
900 - Net Interest 920 - Allowances 950 - Undistributed Offsetting Receipts 970 - Overseas Contingency Operation 
(OCO) and Related Activities 
116 Violations of the CBR in the budget process may be challenged by raising a point of order. In that case, 60% of 
the membership must vote to pass the measure. 
117 Originated in 1946 as a means of providing assistance to the Appropriations Committees in considering the 
increasingly complex defense budget request. 
118 Technically, all programs require authorization, but mandatory programs are considered to be permanently 
authorized and do not require re-authorization in the annual budget.   
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February. It is immediately taken up concurrently by the House and Senate Budget Committees 
(HBC and SBC), Armed Service Committees (HASC and SASC), and Appropriations Defense 
Subcommittees (HAC-D and SAC-D). By 1 April, the HBC and SBC should report their 
concurrent budget resolution to the floor of their respective chambers. By 15 April the 
Concurrent Budget Resolution should move from conference (to resolve any discrepancies 
between chambers) to the floor of each chamber for a vote and the HASC and SASC begin 
markup of the PB. By 15 May, HAC-D and SAC-D start markup, even if the Concurrent Budget 
Resolution has not been passed. From this point on, the HASC and SASC should lead the HAC-
D and SAC-D process, with communication of significant actions passed back and forth between 
committees. By mid to late June, the HASC, SASC, HAC-D and SAC-D report final 
appropriations bills to their respective chambers, and by mid-July to early August both bills 
should have cleared conference. By mid-September the House and Senate should complete 
action on the annual authorization and appropriations bills. Prior to 1 October, the President 





Figure III-11: Congressional Budget Process 
Source: OPNAV Briefing Slide119 
 
The entire sequence described above is of course the ideal, and seldom – if ever – occurs 
as designed. In reality, the defense budget moves by fits and starts through the year and is more 
often than not delivered late.120 The process is never smooth, but whether late or temporarily 




                                                 
119 This slide was taken from one of my OPNAV briefing slides. It is UNCLASS and for information only.  
120 34 out of the last 45 years.  
121 Concurrent resolution funds a budget typically at the level of either its last approved budget or the lowest 
congressional mark of that budget. However, exceptions written into the concurrent resolution to increase or 
decrease funding for specific programs.   
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D. Congressional Committees  
The congressional defense budget process is facilitated by the Defense Committees.  
 
Some scholars have claimed that with the changes in the power of committee chairs in the 1960s, 
defense has gone from being an insider’s to an outsider’s game (Lindsay, 1987; Wildavsky, 
1988; Jones and Bixler, 1992). While it is true that in the 1950s only six committees oversaw the 
defense budget, whereas today some 28 committees and subcommittees have some measure of 
input to the process (Jones, Candreva and DeVore, 2012),122 prior to 1959, most authorizations 
were permanent and did not require annual reauthorization. Over time, additional defense 
program categories were added until nearly every program required annual reauthorization 
(Tyszkiewicz, 1998). The defense budget has always attracted both internal and external 
stakeholders, but as the rules have changed and the share of defense has grown in respect to other 
available budgets, new opportunities have appeared for additional committees and interests to 
seek a voice in the process. Despite these changes, the HASC and HAC-D in the House and the 
SASC and SAC-D in the Senate have remained the most influential committees in the defense 
budget process. Other committees have situational input to the defense budget, but the 
HASC/SASC and HAC-D/SAC-D have the final word before the defense bills reach the floor for 
a vote.  
 The HASC123 and SASC124 are the authorization committees created in 1946 to guide the 
appropriations committees (Stephens, 1971).125 The HAC-D and SAC-D are the appropriations 
                                                 
122 The full appropriations committees and five subcommittees. The budget committees and the committees on 
Armed Services, Commerce, Energy, Government Affairs, Select Intelligence, Small business and Veterans Affairs.  
123 HASC Subcommittees: Emerging Threats and Capabilities; Military Personnel; Oversight and Investigations; 
Readiness; Seapower and Projection Forces; Strategic Forces; and Tactical Air and Land Forces. 
124 SASC Subcommittees: Subcommittee on Air-Land; Subcommittee on Cybersecurity; Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities; Subcommittee on Personnel; Subcommittee on Readiness and Management 
Support; Subcommittee on Seapower; and Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. 
125 Established by the Congressional Reorganization Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812. 
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sub-committees responsible for matching funding to the programs and force structure provided 
by the authorization committees. In conjunction (and often in competition) with each other, these 
four committees construct the congressional defense budget that goes to the floor of both 
chambers for amendment and final approval.    
 The number of MoC on each committee changes with House and Senate rules; however, 
membership is typically larger on full committees and on House committees in general. 
Members request assignment to a committee and are either approved or rejected by their party 
leadership. The chairman and the largest number of committee members are from the majority 
party, although the ratio used can change with the rules of each new Congress.   
Although committee distributive theory studies show mixed results that members will 
self-select to committees which align with constituent needs (Frisch and Kelly, 2004), most 
scholars agree that membership on defense committees is both in response to electorate interest 
and a way to attract special interest funding (Carsey and Rundquist, 1999). Typically, 
membership represent districts with predominately large military populations or defense industry 
interests (Ray, 1981). By comparing Figures III-12 and III-13 below you can see that the 
allocation of seats to defense committees corresponds well to each state’s share of defense 
spending.126    
 
 
                                                 
126 Figures III-12 and III-13 display the 114th Congress, but the comparison holds for most congresses. Membership 




Figure III-12: Defense Committee Seats 
Source: Congressional Record 
 
 
Figure III-13: Defense Spending by State 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment 
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The defense committees are supported by personal and professional staffs. The personal 
staffs work directly for the MoC and support the member in all their activities. Professional staffs 
are employed by the committee itself and are usually experts on some aspect of the committee’s 
work. Professional staffers provide continuity as committee members come and go over time, 
and they can act as political entrepreneurs in their own right. DoD staff often maintain dossiers 
on prominent and long-serving professional staffers, as each tend to develop their own policy 
and program preferences which are often passed on to the MoC on the committees.  
 DoD also maintains liaison with each committee. For the HASC and SASC, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs and the Offices of Legislative Affairs for each 
service interface directly with the committees. For the HAC-D and SAC-D this is accomplished 
through the Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller and the senior Financial Management 
Officer (FMO) for each service. For both sets of committees DoD utilizes dedicated liaison 
officers to track all committee actions, coordinate information flow between the committees and 
DoD leadership and set the briefing schedule of subject matter experts to defend DoD budget 
submissions.127   
In practice both sets of committees work very similarly. Political Science professor, nine-
time congressman from Virginia and former member of the HASC, George William 
Whitehurst128 aptly described the committee as a lesson in horse trading (Whitehurst, 1983). 
Members often barter increases for programs in exchange for current or future reciprocation, and 
                                                 
127 These liaison officers prepared me for briefings to the HASC, SASC, HAC-D and SAC-D. They would typically 
provide a schedule as well as a dossier on the individuals I would be briefing and a history of their questions/issues 
from the past (what to say and what to avoid).  
128 George William Whitehurst served as a Virginia Congressman for the Hampton Roads area from 1968 – 1987. 
Prior to this he taught political science at Old Dominion University.  
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most House and Senate budget rules are enforced by points of order. In other words, if no one 
objects, then there are few limits on what can be done.  
Congress often differs greatly in their defense priorities with the President’s Budget (PB). 
Although the final congressional budget bills are usually not far off in total expenditures, where 
those funds are allocated within the budget can change significantly (Jones, Candreva and 
DeVore, 2012). The mark-up process involves a line-by-line review of the PB, with puts (added 
funds) or takes (subtracted funds) amplified with descriptive language of how the modification 
was to be implemented. This process is initiated by the committee professional staff, who 
conduct interviews with DoD subject matter experts to allow rebuttal. It is then elevated to the 
committee principals (MoC) with the professional staff’s recommendation.  
 If the marks stand in the committee, DoD is given an opportunity to challenge. These 
appeals can be to dollar amounts, quantities, manpower totals or specific language introduced by 
the committee. Appeals can only be sent to the next committee to consider the bill, not the 
committee marking the budget. This means that if the HASC marked the budget, DoD’s appeal 
would be to the SASC (or to the House and Senate conference). By agreement between DoD and 
Congress, appeals to authorization committee marks are only made within the authorization 
process. The same is true with appropriation marks.   
The rules are somewhat complicated, but basically, when DoD appeals a mark, it can 
only appeal to the amount of the PB, or if there is more than one mark against a program, then to 
the mark that is closest but does not exceed the original amount specified in the PB. If multiple 
marks have been made that exceed the PB, then the amount appealed can only be the original 
amount of the PB. This system ensures that DoD cannot appeal for more than the original PB, 
nor more than both committees marked (if appealed in conference).  
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There are cases where, even after they become law, the Authorization and Appropriations 
Acts are in conflict on the amount provided for a particular program. In these cases, the 
Appropriations Act generally takes precedence. When the amount appropriated exceeds the 
amount authorized, DoD can legally obligate the funds; however, SECDEF will usually ask the 
Armed Services Committees for permission prior to applying those funds toward the program in 
question (Defense Acquisition University, 2017). 
 
 
Figure III-14: President’s Budget vs. Congressional Appropriation 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
 
 The end results of all this work is a final budget that appears very similar to the PB, but 
can be very different in allocation (see Figure III-14 above). As discussed earlier, during the 
defense budget process, the total amount Congress is willing to spend is communicated to DoD 
(and the President) in terms of fiscal guidance repeatedly during the process of generating the 




E. Earmarks or “Pork” 
Earmarks are in effect the most tangible product of the fight over allocation of defense 
dollars. These are a special kind of “mark.” Marks typically refer to changes made in committee 
to the amount allotted to a program. Earmarks refer to wholesale additions of programs, usually 
created by marking funds from another program. For example, the Senate version of the 
supplemental appropriation in 2003 to cover costs of the war in Iraq also contained funding for 
fisheries management in Lake Champlain, subsidies for catfish farmers, research facilities in 
Iowa and the South Pole, repair of a dam in Vermont, money to designate Alaskan salmon as 
“organic” and an increase in postage allowances (Franking) for Senators to communicate with 
their constituents (Jones, Candreva and DeVore, 2012, p.74). These are obviously not related to 
military requirements, but MoC are mindful of the political benefits of constituency services, and 
the defense budget is one way to meet constituent needs (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987). This 
is not to say that economic advantage to constituents is the only motivation, but it is certainly one 
factor in the marks made in committee (Lindsay, 1990). 
There is a problem of definition to consider. Earmarks and “pork” are usually considered 
to be one and the same. However, that is probably unfair. The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) defines earmarks as “specified funds for projects, activities, or institutions not requested 
by the executive, or add-ons to requested funds which Congress directs for specific activities” 
(OMB, 2015). This does not necessarily imply that the earmark was unnecessary or wasteful, but 
rather simply not included in the President’s Budget (PB).  
 The organization, Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW), uses seven criteria in 
evaluating earmarks. To be considered “pork,” it need only satisfy two. The criteria are requested 
by only one chamber of Congress; not specifically authorized; not competitively awarded; not 
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requested by the President; greatly exceeds the President’s budget request or the previous year’s 
funding; not the subject of congressional hearings; or serves only a local or special interest (2015 
Pig Book). By this metric, nearly any earmark could be considered pork. Academics also have 
also established their own definitions. For example, earmarks are congressional appropriations 
that are placed in spending bills at the request of a single member, usually for the benefit of the 
member’s particular district. (Lazarus, 2010). Whether called pork, or simply earmarks, it is clear 
that these changes in allocations of funding are significant and widespread in the defense budget.  
The defense budget receives three times as many earmarks as any other program in the 
U.S. budget (OMB, 2015). The Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations Act usually 
contains the most earmarks at the highest cost to taxpayers each year, and the FY 2015 bill did 
not break this tradition. While the number of earmarks in the bill decreased slightly, from 58 in 
FY 2014 to 56 in FY 2015, the cost of these earmarks skyrocketed. The $2.3 billion in FY 2015 
represents a 43.8% increase from the $1.6 billion in FY 2014, and constitutes 54.8% of the $4.2 
billion in earmarks contained in the 12 appropriations bills for FY 2015 (CAGW, 2015). 
It has long been known that states with seats on the defense committees tend to receive 
more defense funds (Rundquist, Lee, and Rhee 1996; Carsey, Rundquist, and Fox 1997; Carsey 
and Rundquist 1998), and that defense committee members are benefitted by steering defense 
funds toward their districts (Gross, 1972). Studies have shown that the number of military 
instillations in a district is a significant driver of defense earmarks (Lazarus, 2010), as well as 
links between defense earmarks and campaign contributions from defense Political Action 
Committees (PACs) (Rocca and Gordon, 2013). In short, distributive and partisan theories of 




There have been may attempts to curb earmarks, with varying levels of success. Allen 
Schick was probably correct when he said, “Earmarks survive periodic reform campaigns 
because the chief political value of serving on Appropriations is to bring home the bacon, not to 
guard the Treasury’’ (Schick, 2000). Earmark disclosure rules have been established in both the 
House and Senate to require MoC to put their names to any earmark they propose; however, 
rather than discouraging earmarks, this often has the effect of allowing the Member to advertise 
just how hard they are working for their constituents (Lynch, 2015).129   
The HAC-D and the SAC-D are the leaders in earmarks production and have proven 
reluctant to implement serious reforms. House and Senate attempts resulted in only a 7.1% drop 
in number and a 1.4% drop in value of earmarks from 2007-2010 (Doyle, 2011). In 2010, Senate 
Republicans voted to approve a self-imposed moratorium on all congressional earmarks for two 
years. Initially, the numbers plummeted but have subsequently started to creep up again. By 
coincidence (or not), the number of laws passed dropped significantly over the same period that 
earmarks declined. By 2015, earmarks had increased again to $4.2 billion but well below the 
high of $29 billion in 2006 (CAGW, 2015). 
                                                 
129 Earmark Disclosure Rules in the House: Member and Committee Requirements Megan S. Lynch Analyst on 






Figure III-15: Ear Marks 
Source: Citizens Against Government Waste 
 
Figure III-15 above shows that earmarks tend to follow, not lead, increases in defense 
spending. In other words, as greater funds are available for manipulation, opportunities for 
earmarks increase.130 This is but one way of graphically depicting the opportunistic nature of 
MoC and defense spending. The bottom line is that pork barrel projects influence electoral 
results (Crespin and Finocchiaro, 2013), and MoC take this very seriously, as do the other 
stakeholders in the defense budget process.  
                                                 
130 The other reason that earmarks lag defense spending is that most involve procurement dollars, and with its slow 





It has been said, “There is no 9th inning in defense budgets, because as soon as any 
decision is made, the next budget cycle will bring that decision back into question” (Jones, 
Candreva and DeVore, 2012, p.87). The defense budget is a constant work in progress, eternally 
pushed and pulled by competing internal and external influences. MoC take advantage of this 
complex process and the enormous pressure to pass defense spending legislation to make 
changes, both to programs of record and to introduce new spending (earmarks) which benefit 
themselves, their backers and their constituent voters.   
 The importance MoC place on the defense budget is evident in both the uniquely 
interwoven nature of the congressional and DoD defense budget processes and in the response by 
the voting public to significant changes in both direct spending and the ripple effects produced in 
state and local economies. Take for example, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). This was 
seen by many as a failure to find a successful overall budget compromise between the President 
and partisan interests in Congress. Between 2010, when the defense budget began to shrink until 
the implementation of BCA caps in 2013, congressional approval dropped by 16 points. 
However, by 2014, as the results of the BCA were tempered by congressional agreement to raise 
the BCA caps, their approval steadily improved. Bi-partisan actions to prevent the precipitous 
decline in defense (and domestic) spending forestalled the economic and security collapse 
predicted to by many defense advocates. The message to MoC was clear, defense spending is 
important, and the mitigation of rapid decreases can be as important to economic interests and 






IV. Defense Budget Stakeholders  
 
The main mark of modern governments is that we do not know who governs, de facto any more 
than de jure. We see the politician and not his backer; still less the backer of the backer; or, 
what is most important of all, the banker of the backer. 
– J.R.R. Tolkien131 
 
Political and economic factors often induce higher levels of defense spending than are 
necessary for national security (Mintz, 1985 and 1988; Mintz and Ward, 1989). In this chapter, I 
examine how political and economic factors are manipulated to address the individual and 
collective priorities of the many stakeholders in the defense budget process. The sheer scale of 
the defense budget makes it very attractive to a wide variety of political and industrial interests, 
but I will focus on three broad groups of stakeholders and their motivations: the defense industry 
and its supporting lobbies and PACs; the economic interests of individual states; and MoC.   
Specifically, I will examine the extensibility of the defense budget from the perspective 
of military spending and the impact the geographic dispersion of military bases and the defense 
industry has on state economies. I will investigate how interest groups, lobbies and PACs create 
salience for both overall increased spending and targeted programs within the budget. These 
activities have a direct impact upon the electoral and financial support of MoC and cannot be 
easily ignored by those seeking to maintain or advance their positions in Congress.       
 
A. Defense Industry PACs and Lobbyists  
It is easy to overlook that the defense industry serves three primary purposes to the U.S. 
government. First, it provides the means of defense in the way of weapons and munitions 
necessary to prosecute (or threaten) war. Second, it serves as an arm of foreign policy providing 
                                                 
131 From the Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien. 
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access to weapons for allies and developing nations so that they can both protect themselves and 
function as an interoperable part of the U.S. strategic defense community. Finally, it is a major 
employer and provider to the overall economic health of the individual states and the nation. All 
three of these are important to different interests, and a basic understanding of how they function 
and interact is essential to building a picture of the importance of the defense industry to MoC.   
Earlier in this paper, I made a comparison of scale between DoD and Walmart, but size is 
not the only meaningful way in which these mammoth organizations are similar. In many 
respects, DoD is the world’s largest retailer of security. Like Walmart, DoD operates through a 
symbiotic relationship with its wholesale partners, vying to obtain the best products at the lowest 
price possible. Squeeze the price too hard and the supplier folds, not enough and you pay too 
much.132 Walmart supports literally tens of thousands of suppliers, which are contracted to 
provide its retail outlets with everything from toilet paper to ammunition. Any decline by 
Walmart is reflected in the profits of its vast supply chain. The same is true of DoD. Changes in 
the defense budget reverberate through the thousands of large and small businesses that support 
and supply its needs.   
The idea of the Iron Triangle (Figure IV-1 below) has somewhat fallen from favor since 
scholars such as Mills and Lowi argued that congressional unresponsiveness to the will of the 
electorate was in part due to MoC being held hostage by the quid pro quo nature of the 
relationship between Congress, industry and the Pentagon (Mills, 1956; Lowi, 1969).       
                                                 




Figure III-16: Defense Iron Triangle 
 
It is not my purpose to champion the power of the Iron Triangle as an explanatory 
concept, but rather to establish that there is a significant relationship between the defense 
industry, DoD and MoC.133 As a strategic resource, the U.S. government has always maintained 
an active role in cultivating the indigenous defense industry. Unlike other sectors of the 
economy, section 2504 of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires SECDEF to submit an annual report to 
the HASC and SASC each year regarding technological and industrial capabilities of the national 
technology and industrial base. This “Annual Industrial Capabilities Report” is intended to 
ensure considerations for the protection and promotion of the U.S. defense industrial base are 
included in the annual defense submission.134 The President, Congress and DoD expend 
tremendous energy on strategic messaging to the Defense Industry (and vice versa), in 
recognition that the fortunes of each depend, to a large extent, on the others.135  
                                                 
133 The Iron Triangle is arguably too simple a representation of the complex nature of the relationship.  
134 Impacts of the DoD budget on the defense industrial base are required as part of the President’s Budget 
submission to Congress and are mandated by law as part of section 2504 Title 10 of the U.S. Code. 
135 Strategic messaging in this context is the attempt to communicate intentions through statements or action taken 
prior to significant legislation to give the target the opportunity to prepare and adapt to coming change.  
94 
 
The end of the cold war in the late 1980s brought many changes to the U.S. defense 
industry. Defense decreases began under President Bush, but accelerated under President 
Clinton. More than two million defense workers, military personnel and civil servants lost their 
jobs, over a hundred military facilities closed and hundreds of companies left the defense 
industry (Gholz and Sapolsky, 2000). In 1993, William Perry, Secretary of Defense during the 
Clinton administration, hosted what became known as the “defense last supper.”136 Perry brought 
together a gathering of defense industry Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to inform them that 
defense spending would soon decrease significantly and that they needed to consolidate and 
become more efficient in order to maintain the national defense industrial base.   
DoD would go to great lengths to support and promote defense industry consolidation as 
part of acquisition reform (Deutch, 2001), and industry overwhelmingly responded. The result 
was the largest merger and buyout of defense companies in U.S. history (see Figure IV-2 below). 
As defense companies scrambled to consume each other, share prices surged for the survivors. In 
a few years, hundreds of defense companies vanished. At the top of the defense corporate food 
pyramid, more than seventy companies merged into five mega-companies, and competition for 
defense contracts evaporated. High overhead costs increased and the willingness to negotiate 
fixed cost contracts ebbed.  
To soften the blow of consolidation, Defense Secretary Perry approved a major policy 
change (which was incorporated into the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)) 
to reimburse defense contractors for various types of merger expenses called "defense 
restructuring costs." The expressed intent was that by reimbursing defense companies for their 
restructuring costs, DoD would benefit from the increased efficiencies generated in future 
                                                 
136 Perry pointed out that the phrase “last supper” used to describe his meeting with executives was coined by then 
CEO of Martin Marietta Norm Augustine, who stood next to him at the gathering (Erwin, 2015). 
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defense acquisition contracts. The results would provide billions of dollars to select defense 
companies and their CEOs.  
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Acquisition and 
Technology April 15, 1997, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that DoD was 
unable to recover any actual lower prices due to the merger. One of the chief purposes of the 
restructuring funds was to provide aid to some 2.1 million displaced defense workers. However, 
while CEOs received million dollar bonuses at the government’s expense, only 10% of 
restructuring funds were dedicated to workers. Newly formed Lockheed Martin was eventually 
reimbursed over $850 million. 137  
                                                 




Figure III-17: Defense Industry Consolidation 
Source: 2002 Final Report on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry 
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Far from increasing efficiency, the consolidation and associated restructuring payments 
enforced a near monopoly on defense contracts. During a 2015 interview, former Secretary Perry 
admitted the result of his message to industry was the “unnecessary and undesirable 
consolidation of the defense industry, leading to less competition and higher overhead to defense 
contracts” (Erwin, 2015). Frank Kendall, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics summed up the experience of defense industry consolidation as,  
“With size comes power, and the department's experience with large defense contractors 
is that they are not hesitant to use this power for corporate advantage. The trend toward 
fewer and larger prime contractors has the potential to affect innovation, limit the supply 
base, pose entry barriers to small, medium and large businesses, and ultimately reduce 
competition, resulting in higher prices to be paid by the American taxpayer in order to 
support our war fighters.”138  
Attempts by Kendall and others to place legislative restraints upon future defense industry 
consolidation via the NDAA were rebuffed by Congress in 2015.  
Consolidation was not the only tool utilized to ease the burden of shrinking defense 
spending following the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
international arms market lost a major supplier. With the aid of Congress, U.S. Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Contracting (DCC)139 greatly expanded.   
Figure IV-3 below examines defense exports and is divided into three parts. The top 
section depicts the rise of the U.S. as the world’s largest exporter of military hardware and the 
                                                 
138 Defense News article, Kendall's Remarks Inject Uncertainty into M&A Market. By Andrew Clevenger, October 
4, 2015. 
139 U.S. defense companies selling directly to foreign consumers approved by the State Department.  
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increase in defense exports as a share of all U.S. exports.140 The second section shows how the 
U.S. defense export market has continued to grow and expand the gap over any other large-scale 
defense exporting nation. The third section describes the impact of reductions to the domestic 
U.S. defense budget and changes to defense export rules in 1993. These events combined to 
create the largest spike in defense exports since the height of the Vietnam War. In 1994-1995 as 
DoD and the State Department opened the aperture to countries allowed to buy (or receive) U.S. 
defense industry products, the defense industry expanded its market and its political influence.     
                                                 
140 The U.S. currently supplies one third of the world’s weapons exports. Even though the chart shows Russia with a 
greater share of its overall exports devoted to arms sales, the U.S. economy is so much larger than that of Russia that 




Figure III-18: Defense Exports 
Source: State Department World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers" (WMEAT)  
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Historically, FMS has accounted for the lion share of U.S. arms sales overseas. In the 
FMS process, DoD acts as the intermediary for a foreign country that desires to purchase U.S. 
military hardware. DoD helps identify the military need of the recipient and then recommends 
the hardware necessary to meet the defense requirements identified. The advantage to the 
customer is that DoD handles all interactions to obtain clearance for the materials, contract, 
payment, delivery and training. For DoD the advantage is that potential allies are provided with 
military gear and training which are interoperable with current U.S. equipment. From the 
perspective of government foreign policy, FMS allows more control over exactly what a 
potential ally can, and cannot, obtain. It creates greater dependencies, as the foreign nation must 
come back to the U.S. government to acquire more, or upgrade the equipment they purchase 
through FMS. It also builds more enduring training and cooperative relationships due to 
increased government-to-government and military-to-military engagement throughout the 
processes of requirement definition, contracting, delivery and training. Since many U.S. Allies 
could not pay the price for U.S. weapons, many FMS costs were simply absorbed by DoD. 




Figure III-19: FMS Agreements and Waived Costs 
Source: State Department World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
 
For the defense industry, FMS is a double-edged sword. It provides greater access to 
some foreign markets and puts the contracting onus on DoD, but since DoD bargains on behalf 
of the customer, it also constrains the freedom of industry to negotiation price and terms. In some 
cases, it creates barriers to competition, since the customer is more likely to choose a system the 
DoD has already selected, rather than seeking competing designs from other U.S. contractors. 
This is fine if you are the contractor who built the system in question but not if you are a 
competitor seeking to market your product. Because of these factors, the defense industry sought 
and received congressional support to expand Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). 
DCS sales have grown consistently since 1994 until by 2015 they accounted for 
approximately two-thirds of all U.S. arms exports (see Figure IV-5 below). Instead of involving 
DoD, DCS contracts require approval of the State Department and are conducted directly with a 
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foreign state. DCS contracts are favored by industry for a number of reasons. Once a market has 
been established through FMS in a particular country, DCS offers the opportunity for open 
negotiation for additional goods and services, not necessarily recommended or desired by DoD. 
Although technically limited to dealing with authorized countries, the actions taken in 1993 to 
open up markets for defense exports greatly reduced these restrictions, and the number of State 
Department requests for DCS clearance grew exponentially.141 U.S. arms exports climbed to the 
highest level since WWII, with some U.S. defense companies supplying over 70% of their 
production to overseas clients. 142   
 
 
Figure III-20: FMS vs Defense Exports 
Source: State Department World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
                                                 
141 A Comparison of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Versus Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, 2017. The fall of the Soviet Union make many former Soviet ally countries available for 
clearance to receive U.S. arms.  
142 State Department World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT).  
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 To create further incentives in the defense export market the U.S. expanded the Foreign 
Military Finance (FMF) program and created the Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program 
(DELG). The FMF program provides financing to foreign countries entering into FMS cases. In 
effect, the DoD provides a loan to the purchasing country. This program was established to 
provide a funding mechanism for DoD to purchase weapons on the behalf of foreign nations 
which did not have adequate domestic banking infrastructure or access to international banking. 
The amounts available for FMF are determined by the NDAA each year. Figure IV-6 below 
shows the expansion of the program between 1993 and 1998, as well as the amounts provided as 
grants or direct subsidy.   
 
 
Figure III-21: Foreign Military Financing 
Source: State Department World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
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 The DELG was a more controversial construct. It was established in 1996 as part of that 
year’s NDAA, and it operated much like the U.S. Import-Export Bank. It was designed 
specifically to provide credit for foreign nations that were considered too risky for commercial 
banks. The intent was to increase the market for U.S. defense industries to sell to countries that 
could not afford to purchase weapons any other way. It was slowly phased out after the 1990s, as 
the defense industry was able to procure business without the additional assistance.    
Three laws ostensibly govern all foreign defense exports. The Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) of 1976 is the primary law establishing procedures on sales and transfers of military 
equipment and related services. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 provides for the 
provision of economic and military assistance to foreign governments. The Export 
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 governs shipments of dual-use goods-technology and 
information with both military and civilian applications. Technically, the EAA lapsed in 1994, 
but it continues to be implemented under emergency powers of the President. The Bureau of 
Export Administration at the Commerce Department administers this law through the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR).143   
Each of these laws provides specific guidance and controls; however, since the early 
1990s most changes to defense export regulation has been accomplished through the NDAA. 
This has a number of advantages to the defense industry and to MoC. Rather than deal with 
politically touchy issues of foreign support or industry favoritism, lumping changes in with the 
large “must pass” NDAA prevents scrutiny of any one program too closely. It has proven a 
                                                 
143 Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
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remarkably successful process, as no NDAA has been defeated on grounds of foreign aid 
abuse.144     
Consolidation assistance payments and increased access and government financing for 
defense exports are not the only ways that Congress assists the defense industry. Corporate tax 
breaks and incentives have become an invaluable tool. Figure IV-7 below shows that even 
though the adjusted corporate tax rate for the top five defense companies was 35%, they in fact 
paid on average an effective rate of 16%.145 In fact, over this span of time Boeing actually 
managed an effective tax rate of -3.8%. Meaning that the U.S. government paid Boeing each 
year instead of collecting taxes.146 During the consolidation period of 1993-1997 defense was the 
lowest taxed industry in America at 11.8% while the average corporate tax rate for all industry 
was 21.7%.147 Despite record profits over the period in question, the defense industry is still the 
sixth lowest taxed U.S. industry (see figure IV-7 below).148 
                                                 
144 Congressional Record search of each year NDAA since 1990 showed no instance of foreign military assistance, 
FMF or DCS resulting in major amendment or delay.  
145 McIntyre, Gardner, Wilkins and Phillips. A Joint Project of Citizens for Tax Justice & the Institute on Taxation 
and Economic Policy November 2011. Review of FEC filings for 2008-2012 confirm the study finding.  
146 Usually in the form of tax credits to be applied against future earnings.  
147 Income Taxes in the 1990s. McIntyre and Nguyen Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, October 2000. 




Figure III-22: Defense Industry Tax Rate 




 The top defense firms also learned another important lesson from the struggles of the 
early 1990s. Those companies that diversified were better able to survive the feast and famine-
punctuated nature of the defense budget. Figure IV-8 below shows the split between defense and 
non-defense earnings of the top ten defense firms in 2015. With the exception of Raytheon 
(produces defense specific electronic system), L-3 Communications (produces defense specific 
electronic systems) and Huntington Ingles (the largest builder of warships), it is clear that the 
defense industry has learned that defense contracts and the R&D funding and subsidies which 
come with them can be usefully applied to commercial products as well.149   
 
Figure III-23: Top Defense Contractors 
Source: Defense News Top 100 Report 
 
 
                                                 
149 Huntington Ingalls is the sole builder of U.S. Navy Aircraft carriers, and has built approximately 70% of the ship 
hulls currently serving in the U.S. Navy.  
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All this maneuvering resulted in the U.S. defense industry becoming one of the most 
profitable and political industries in the world. Over the last 20 years, defense has consistently 
outperformed the S&P 500. Figure IV-9 below shows the average stock performance of the top 
five defense companies since 1981.150  
 
Figure III-24: Top 5 Defense Contractor Stock Performance vs Defense Budget 
Source: Standard and Poors.com 
 
 It quickly becomes obvious when looking at the above figure that stock prices do not 
always track with defense spending. In the Reagan defense buildup of the 1980s there was a 
                                                 
150 All of these companies existed prior to the consolidation in 1993-1997; however, all changed through merger or 
acquisition. For example, Lockheed Martin was Lockheed and Northrop Grumman was Northrop and Grumman 
respectively. The stock prices shown reflect the parent company during the time of evaluation.  
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great deal of competition from many companies, and the stock prices of even major companies 
remained rather low. During the period of consolidation, as the defense budget dropped, 
however, stock prices soared. This reflects the consolidation of companies, the extension of 
government subsidies and tax credits and the expansion of the defense export market. After the 
consolidation period ended in 1997, average stock prices regressed until the beginning of the 
War on Terror in 2001. Another significant dip is noticeable during the recession of 2008-2009 
reflecting the impact of diversification in commercial markets even as defense spending 
remained extremely high. It is interesting to note that even with the implementation of the 
Budget Control Act (BCA) spending caps in 2013, defense stocks continued to climb.   
The continued growth of defense company stocks in a time of apparent defense budget 
decline can be explained in a couple of ways. First, as noted previously, RDT&E and 
Procurement accounts are multi-year authorizations, meaning they pay out over several years, 
rather than in the year of execution. In particularly, their burn rates are typically back-loaded 
toward the end of the appropriation life. This provides a backlog of money that is executable 
several years after the appropriation is made and softens the blow of future dips in defense 
procurement. Second, the actual RDT&E and procurement appropriations have not suffered as 
much as the O&M appropriations. There are currently literally trillions of dollars in decades-long 
development programs currently in the Pentagon procurement pipeline, and these will provide a 
rich harvest for the top defense companies and their major subsidiaries for some time.151 
Investors and MoC are aware of these facts and respond accordingly.   
 One of the more visible measures of the health of the defense industry is the level of 
capital goods orders. Capital goods in the commercial sector are tangible assets such as 
                                                 
151 Ford class Aircraft Carrier (CVN), Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), F-35 and its derivatives, 
B-21 next generation stealth bomber, etc.  
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buildings, machinery, equipment, vehicles and tools that an organization uses to produce other 
goods or services.152 Defense capital goods are effectively all the machinery and equipment 
procured to provide defense, such as planes, warships, uniforms, and small arms. The measure of 
defense capital goods relates how much “stuff” DoD is purchasing from the defense industry. 
Figure IV-10 below shows that although there was a decline from the peak in 2009, procurement 
of defense capital goods has remained high and is in fact growing.  
 
Figure III-25: Defense Capital Goods Spending 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
 
 All of this leads to the conclusion that the U.S. defense industry is indeed healthy, and in 
fact, has always benefited from a great deal of congressional nurturing. If the defense industry 
and the defense budget were not important to MoC, then why have such measures been taken to 
ensure its profitability? These measures have gone well beyond ensuring the viability of the 
                                                 
152 Together with land and labor capital goods are considered the primary factors of production.  
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means of defense production, to encouraging the growth and proliferation of mega-companies 
with national reach and significant political influence.   
 Boeing, as the second largest defense company in the U.S., provides an informative 
example of the political strategy of the defense industry. On 15 July 1916, William Boeing 
established the Pacific Aero Products Co in Seattle Washington. Over the next one hundred 
years, it rose to become one of the largest producers of military and commercial aircraft in the 
world. Although well known for the B-17 and B-29 Bombers it designed in WWII and the Cold 
War B-52 Bomber (still flying today), Boeing’s share of the defense market increased 
significantly during the 1990s. In 1996, Rockwell Aerospace and Defense Co. was acquired, and 
in 1997 Boeing merged with McConnell Douglas in a $13 billion stock transaction to form the 
Boeing Company.   
 Boeing’s plan was simple, consolidate into a huge company and establish a footprint in as 
many states as possible. If this seems counter-intuitive to the “consolidation” idea, it is 
strategically brilliant. By consolidating horizontally and vertically (absorbing both competing 
companies and the means of production and distribution), Boeing was able to control the price of 
production through establishing a controlling interest in the companies that provided raw 
materials, components and the delivery of products. They also embarked on a practice of 
exponentially expanding the practice of subcontracting. In subcontracting, small parts of a large 
contract are bid to smaller companies. In theory, this allows a large company to avoid having to 
invest in technology or manufacturing equipment for the production of something they do not 
expect to need on other contracts. In practice, it also allows a company to sweeten a large 
contract bid by bringing more companies with interests in other states into the political mix of 
government contracting. For example, in my time at the Pentagon, my portfolio involved the 
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prime contractor Raytheon, but also over a hundred subcontractors spread across the country. In 
congressional committee testimony, the questions I was called to answer came not only from 
Florida’s 13th district (Raytheon division headquarters) but also from MoC representing states 
and districts where the subcontracting companies were located.  
These practices allowed Boeing to play state governments against each other for tax 
breaks. In 2013, Boeing received a $13.7 billion tax break for 16 years from Washington 
State.153 This constituted the largest state corporate tax break in history and was, in fact, an 
extension from the $3.2 billion tax break it had received previously in 2003. In addition, Boeing 
received a reported $4 billion in tax breaks from other states competing for production facility 
contracts.154 Couple this with the federal tax breaks identified in Figure IV-7 above and the 
success of Boeing’s tax strategy becomes clear.   
 Why is Boeing so successful at demanding and receiving tax breaks? Figure IV-11 below 
illustrates the point. Boeing has 148,000 employees spread across every state in the union. They 
provide political and charitable contributions to every state but Wyoming, and they claim to 
support over 1.5 million indirect jobs (support and subcontract).155 State politicians fight for job 
creation credit and the competition can be fierce. In 2001, when Boeing decided to move its 
corporate headquarters from Seattle Washington to Chicago, the city and the state of Illinois 
provided over $56 million in incentives, even though the move involved less than 500 
employees. In 2003, Kansas offered Boeing $500 million in bond financing to build part of its 
next airliner in the state and allowed Boeing to pay off $200 million in interest by collecting 
personal income taxes collected from its 7E7 workers.156  
                                                 
153 Seattle Times Article. Originally published November 12, 2013 at 6:00 pm Updated November 13, 2013 at 8:08.  
154 Goodjobsfirst.org Boeing Case Study 2017. http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/corporate-subsidy-watch/boeing. 
155 Data from Boeing company filings.  





Figure III-26: Boeing Coverage 
Source: Boeing Company Reports 2015 
 
Boeing did not wage this fight alone – they recruited the aid of interest groups and 
created a powerful Political Action Group (PAC) to advance their agenda. Business PACs in 
general generate the most money, but they also find ready government allies in the DoD. The 
ability to find high-level government allies is critical to interest group success (Baumgartner et 
al., 2009). The power of the status quo to resist change is considerable (Schattschneider, 1951; 
Lowi, 1969), but defense PACs sit in the unique position of being able to play both sides of the 
argument. They simultaneously seek to maintain DoD spending levels on specific programs 
while seeking to produce impetus to fund new initiatives. Defense issues tend to face 
competition for resources, rather than direct opposition from other PACs. It is hard to argue 
against security and protecting the lives of soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines, but it is easier to 
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argue for what constitutes a reasonable level of support. PACs win by bringing salience to a 
topic, real or not, that either threatens the safety of Americans or promises increased capability at 
a reduced cost.  
One example from my experience took place in 2011. The BCA was in play and defense 
budgets were expected to shrink. Raytheon was advocating aggressively to protect funding for its 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program, and it appeared to be headed for an 
inevitable loss. Unexpectedly, Raytheon proposed a new antenna technology that would cut 
production costs for the CEC system substantially, while reducing cooling and weight 
requirements for the platforms that hosted CEC.157 The catch was that to operationalize and 
produce this new antenna would require an upfront investment and subsequent increase to the 
program budget. The idea was that in the long run reductions in production costs to the program 
would more than pay for the initial investment. Calls came in from several influential MoC who 
were provided with briefs by the Raytheon PAC, and the CEO of Raytheon paid us a visit. 
Raytheon succeeded not only in protecting their program budget, but achieved an increase during 
a declining budget with the promise of future efficiencies. In retrospect, the technology for the 
new antenna had existed for some time, but it was not in the company’s interest to bring it 
forward until there was a threat of reduction to the contract. Why build something cheaper if you 
do not have to? In the end, the new antenna was procured, but the efficiencies in cost were 
somehow never fully realized. To make a Kingdon multiple streams analogy, Raytheon did not 
create a solution to a problem identified by government. They created a window of opportunity 
by harnessing the politics to support a solution (policy) they had held in reserve while waiting for 
a problem to emerge.  
                                                 
157 CEC is a system that fuses sensor data from multiple sources to create a composite track. It is composed of a set 
of electronic boxes and antenna assembly that are hosted in naval ships and aircraft.  
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It has long been supposed that PAC contributions from defense contractors influence vote 
outcomes (Fleisher, 1993), and the defense industry has not set idle. The Boeing PAC took shape 
during the period of consolidation and has been growing ever since (see Figure IV-12 below). 
PACs reward earmarks with campaign funds to MoC (Rocca and Gordon, 2012), and according 
to FEC filings, six of the top ten corporate PACs giving to federal candidates and committees in 
2015 were PACs of defense-related companies. In 2015, Boeing became the top defense lobby 
firm, spending nearly $22 million on lobby efforts (FEC, 2015). Overall, Boeing contributed to 
representatives in 49 states and 70% of all districts.  
 
Figure III-27: Boeing PAC 
Source: Boeing Company FEC Filings 
 
PACs disproportionately give money to members of defense committees (Mayer, 1991). 
Even in times when the congressional committee system is seen to have diminished authority 
(since rule changes in the 104th Congress), defense committees still matter to PACs. Overall, the 
HAC-D and HASC received more attention than the SAC-D and SASC, leading to the 
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supposition that more effort goes into districts with constituent interest and only strategically 
toward states with large defense interests. In 2015, Boeing’s Total Lobbying Expenditures were 
$21,921,000 on its own PAC efforts and an additional $3.1M on 16 lobbyist firms hired to work 
various issues without directly involving Boeing.158  
The Boeing PAC committee approach over the 2012-2016 election period depended on 
widespread coverage with the House and strategic targeting with the Senate. More money was 
devoted per senator, but more members of the House Defense Committees were covered. Boeing 
gave to every member of the HASC, and MoC on the HASC received an average of $1000 more 
per donation than those who were not. Boeing also contributed to every member of the HAC-D. 
Average donation to HAC-D was $5,000 more than the average House donation and $4,000 
more than to those on the HASC. Seventy-four percent of the SAC-D received donations, but the 
average for each member was $18,000 or $8,500 above average for other Senate donations. Only 
31% of the SASC received donations, but the average was $11,000 or $1,500 more than average 
for Senate. 
An example from my experience involved Congressman Charles William "Bill" Young 
(R-FL). Congressman Young served from 1971 until his death in 2013. As the chair of the HAC-
D, he was influential and received two extensions to the normal six-year chairperson’s term. His 
district contained Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems (a division of Raytheon Co). Raytheon 
was the lead contractor for most of the programs in my portfolio at the Pentagon, and 
Congressman Young was a fierce supporter of every program. As you might imagine, Raytheon 
was his top PAC contributor, and he obtained over $475M in earmarks for Raytheon from 2008-
2010 while I was at the Pentagon. According to FEC filings, Raytheon donated $102,400 
                                                 
158 Boeing FEC Filings. 
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($99,000 from their PAC) to Congressman Young. Boeing also donated $91,250 ($73,500 from 
their PAC) during the same period. These donations are not coincidental. MoC see the 
connection between defense spending and electoral support (financial and message advocacy).   
Despite polarization, the defense industry seems far more pragmatic than partisan. At 
least from the standpoint of PAC donations, the party in power tends to receive more investment 
(Carsey and Rundquist, 1999). Figure IV-13 below shows a comparison of Boeing PAC House 
contributions compared to average defense PAC House contributions per year. From 1994-2014 
each year is represented by four bars. The two bars on the left for each year show the percentage 
of Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives and the two bars on the right 
show the percentage of contributions made to Democrats and Republicans that year. In 2008 and 
2010 when the Democrats controlled the House, they received the majority of donations. 
Likewise, in all other years when the Republicans were dominant, they received the majority of 
contributions.  
The bottom line from the Boeing example is that, if you were a MoC with a seat on the 
HASC, your state had on average of 32 times more Boeing employees, benefited from three 
times as many indirect jobs, had three times more vendor purchases and received 13 times more 
charity investment from Boeing Co. These statistics tend to lead credence to the supposition that 
MoC from districts with heavy defense company representation tend to seek seats on defense 
committees, and having obtained those seats, are rewarded by companies like Boeing for their 
efforts. Boeing is far from unique, and the other top-tier defense companies share similar 
strategies in their approach to PACs and congressional interaction. I chose Boeing for this 
example specifically because it is not the largest defense contractor; and yet it still provides a 
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diverse program portfolio and an immense geographical and political presence. An examination 
of any other top-ten defense contractor would produce results very similar to those of Boeing. 
 
Figure III-28: All Defense and Boeing PAC Party Disbursements 
Source: Center for Responsible Politics 
 
Perhaps the single most important role of lobbyists, interest groups or PACs is simply to 
increase the salience of an issue. Lobbyists sponsor industry days and conferences as well as pay 
reps to promote candidates and associate candidates with the military. One question, which is 
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difficult to answer, is whether defense lobbyists influence greater defense spending (Predator 
approach), or whether greater defense spending attracts lobbyists who fight to divvy up the 
greater share of increased spending to their clients (Scavenger approach). To simplify the 
problem, if we were to treat registered lobbyists as an avatar for all interest group efforts we 
could look at how the increases in money provided to lobbies and the number of lobbyists 
compare with defense spending increases. If the number and spending on lobbies precedes 
growth in defense spending, we could hypothesize that lobbing efforts produce greater spending 
and that lobbyists are predators, actively influencing the behavior of defense spending. However 
if the number of lobbies and spending follows increases in defense spending, then we could 
assume that lobbyists are more opportunistic and scavenge on the bounty provided by other 
influences.   
Unfortunately, the data is limited for this comparison, since lobby registration numbers 
and spending were only made part of the public record after the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 
1995. Figure IV-14 below shows that lobby efforts tend to lag increases in defense spending by 
several years and decrease as defense spending decreases. Defense lobbies follows the money 
and grow, as there are more resources at play. Once established, the lobby tends to spend more 
money even as overall defense spending decreases as they compete for a piece of a shrinking pie. 
Eventually the funding falls off as diminishing opportunities result in lobbyists leaving the game.  
Although far from conclusive, these results do support the supposition that lobbyists and 
PACs tend toward reaction to circumstances, rather than driving policy. This would support the 
claim that MoC drive defense spending to meet their own interests and that the defense industry 





Figure III-29: Defense Lobby 
Source: Center for Responsible Politics 
B. Benefit to States 
Former Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neal, is reported to have once said, “All politics is 
local.” He later clarified this to mean that if you want to survive in politics, you can never forget 
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who elects you.159 Often overlooked is the role of the states as beneficiaries and thus major 
influencers of MoC in the pursuit of greater defense spending. Some scholars suggest that MoC 
are keenly aware of the impacts of defense spending to their state or district, even if the effect 
were somewhat muted to the country at large (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002 and 2009). Todd 
Sadler and Keith Hartley looked at profit margin among different businesses and determined that 
defense firms returned higher profit margins than non-defense related industries, thus providing 
greater economic stimulus on the state level. This in turn incentivized MoC to fight for greater 
general defense spending with the understanding that even if they could not control specific 
contracts, the geographic proximity of large defense companies or bases within their districts or 
states would mean potential increased tax revenue and potential job growth for their constituents 
(Sadler and Hartley, 1995).160 Other scholars have suggested that states with high levels of 
military spending are better off during economic downturns (Borch and Wallace, 2010). All of 
this implies that MoC understand that defense spending is important to the states and districts 
they represent, so it is important to them.  
Figure IV-15 below shows the top states for defense spending as a percentage of Gross 
State Product (GSP), total defense contracts, defense spending per person and military and 
civilian payroll. Not surprisingly, all of these states are represented on the HASC, SASC, HAC-
D and SAC-D. States depend on defense spending for economic growth (Brace, 1993), and with 
defense spending producing an average 2.5% of SDP for every state; this provides considerable 
economic impact. However, on a district level this impact can be even greater. Some districts 
                                                 
159 O’Neal, Tip, and Gary Hymel. All Politics is Local: And Other Rules of the Game (Avon: Adams Media 
Corporation, 1993), np. 
160 The type of defense spending desired by a particular MoC (Procurement, R & D, manpower or construction) 
depends upon the infrastructure (Defense related industry, R & D Universities or bases) located within the district or 
state.   
122 
 
have no military impact, but others depend overwhelmingly on defense spending, such as the 8th 
congressional district of VA where defense contracts and employment is nearly half the total 
economy.161  
 
Figure III-30: Top States for Defense Spending 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment 
 
There is a connection between state military population and defense contracts (Russet, 
1970). The states with the largest DoD population do receive the most attention, particularly 
from the House. This makes sense when you consider that as a portion of the total state 
population DoD workers (military and civilian) may only account for a small percentage, but in 
any given district it may be considerable. Figure IV-16 below shows the DoD population by 
state, and again it is not surprising that the six states not represented on any defense committees 
in 2015 were all well below the average for military population, as well as every defense 
economy category in Figure IV-15. In Figure IV-16 below, the states with associated red bars are 
                                                 
161 Virginia employment commission. 
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the top ten defense contract states, while those in grey are the six states not represented on any 
defense committee (Michigan, Wisconsin, Idaho, Oregon, North Dakota and Wyoming).    
 
 
Figure III-31: DoD Personnel by State 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Every member of the HASC and HAC for the 114th Congress came from a district 
containing either a top grossing defense contract county or a top military population county save 
one. The lone exception was District 14 Jackie Speier (D-CA). Her case is explained by 
redistricting. District 14 used to contain parts of Santa Clara County, which is the 3rd largest 
recipient in CA of defense procurement funds. In 2013, redistricting moved her district north and 
out of the counties receiving the bulk of defense spending, but she retained her seat on the 
HASC.  
The type of defense appropriation matters to districts and states. Figure IV-17 below 
shows the growth rate of the different appropriations discussed in Chapter III. Reduction in 
Procurement dollars affects defense contractors, MILCON impacts local construction, O&M is 
felt by suppliers of consumables, RDT&E by research universities and industry research & 
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development groups, and MILPERS by local retailers where military families shop. In other 
words, MILPERS, O&M and MILCON tend to be the greatest concern to local districts where 
military facilities are located, while Procurement and RDT&E are the biggest concern for those 
with large defense industries.162 These are simplistic examples, but they touch on the very real 
impact defense spending has on thousands of small and large businesses across America.  
Since BCA caps went into effect in 2013, the districts with large DoD populations have 
suffered the most. MILPERS and O&M have been reduced by four times as much as 
procurement (-2%) and twice as much as RDT&E (-4%), while MILCON has been slashed by 
over 35%. This fits with the expectations stated in Chapter III for which appropriations are the 
first to be cut, and why.   
 
Figure III-32: Defense Appropriation Type Growth 
Source: Defense Greenbook 2017 
 
                                                 
162 Reflecting congressional attention to industry funding stability concerns. Procurement and RDT&E are the only 
appropriations with requirements for congressional notification in case of reprograming resulting in termination.  
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By comparing the reductions seen in Figure IV-17 with the state-by-state analysis of 
appropriation distribution below in Figure IV-18, we can see where the impact of defense cuts hit 
first and hardest. We can also see graphically why some MoC are not incentivized to become 
members of defense committees. Those states with small percentages of appropriations and small 
DoD populations do not have much to gain from defense committee membership.    
 However, returning to Tip O’Neal’s comment that all politics is local helps us understand 
the logic for those states with small DoD footprints that do seek representation on defense 
committees. For example, a small overall state DoD population may prevent a senator from 
seeking a defense committee position, but it does not preclude a representative in the same state 
whose district has a large military population from seeking a seat. Similarly, a state with a small 
DoD footprint, like Montana, but one that has a large portion of its voting population represented 
by veterans or DoD retirees, may also see a reason to seek a seat. The bottom line is that through 





Figure III-33: State Spending By Appropriation Type 
Source: Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 A good representative case study for state defense spending is Missouri. It sits in the top 
ten or just outside in most categories of DoD spending impact except number of DoD personnel. 
However, it is far from the largest in any category. Defense spending makes up approximately 
3.7% of the GSP and defense is the 10th largest industry in the state (see Figure IV-19 below).163  
                                                 




Figure III-34: Defense as a Percentage of Missouri GSP 
Source: Missouri Economic and Information Research Center 
 
The concentration of defense spending is in St. Louis area where Boeing Defense, Space 
& Security division is headquartered.164 Most of the 43,000 DoD personnel are concentrated in 
congressional District 4, where two military bases are located.165 By appropriation type, Missouri 
is in the top 15 for every type except MILPERS. Missouri has a senator on the SASC and one on 
the SAC-D. It has two representatives on the HASC.   
 Figure IV-20 below shows the congressional districts of Missouri and the breakdown of 
defense spending. The circles around counties represent the top ten counties for DoD population, 
and the squares denote the top ten defense spending counties in the state. Looking at the figure it 
is apparent that Districts 4 and 6 contain most of the DoD population and are consequently the 
districts with representatives on the HASC. District 4, with Representative Vicky Hartzler (R-
                                                 
164 Boeing Defense, Space & Security is moving with about 50 employees to Washington D.C. in 2017. 
165 Army Ft. Leonard Wood and Whiteman Air Force base.  
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MO), has over half of the states DoD population and roughly a tenth of the total defense 
spending. The majority of the defense money in her district is in MILPERS, MILCON and 
O&M.166  
In 2011 when the BCA was enacted, it was clear that the most severe cuts would come in 
exactly the appropriations most important to MoC Hartzler. She was the only member of the 
Missouri delegation to make a public statement, and her response when asked about the defense 
budget was, “I was able to promote a strong defense budget when it could have been cut a lot 
more severely.” 167 In other words, she recognized that the cuts would affect her constituency and 
she tried to get ahead of the blame.  
                                                 
166 U.S. Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment. 
167 As quoted in the Hill online newsletter:  New Member of the Week: Rep. Hartzler sees God’s plan in politics 
By Ramsey Cox - 05/16/11 10:19 Am EDT. Hartzler helped organize an effort by 24 freshmen to ask the 







Figure III-35: Top Missouri Counties and Districts for Defense Spending 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment 
 
 Constituent concerns are not the only influence to Missouri MoC. Boeing accounts for  
$6.4 billion of the $10.6 billion in annual defense spending in the state and employs nearly 
15,000 workers. It makes $830 million in vendor purchases in the state supporting 27,000 
indirect jobs, and donates over $1.2 million to Missouri charities every year.168   
 Boeing is the also the major defense PAC donor to Missouri MoC and it has provided 
considerable support over the years. Rep Hartzler (D-4) has received $24,000 from Boeing since 
2010, as well as $30,000 from Northrop Grumman and $22,000 from Lockheed Martin. Rep Sam 
                                                 
168 Based on FEC filings. 
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Graves (D-6) has received $10,000 from Boeing and $10,000 Raytheon since 2014. Senator 
Claire McCaskill has received $79,000 from Boeing since 2008, while Senator Roy Blunt has 
pocketed $117,000 from Boeing since 1998. It is no surprise that Boeing has donated to every 
MoC in the state with a seat on a defense committee, as well as to the MoC from the St. Louis 
area where its defense division is based.   
 In Missouri, as in most states, defense spending is an important part of the political 
environment. This is not to say that MoC are bought by the defense industry. Rather, campaign 
funding, constituent service and policy agendas all coalesce to form a composite picture of 
influences, each having greater or lesser impact depending upon the situation. What is common 
in all cases is that defense spending matters to the states and to the MoC who represent them.  
 
C. MoC and Incumbency 
All of the discussion in the chapter boils down to how the individual MoC perceives 
defense spending to be personally beneficial. In determining why federal funds are distributed 
the way they are, no single theory (committee, party, or ideology) fully accounts for the behavior 
(Rundquist and Carsey, 2002), but some things are common. MoC must take care of their 
constituencies (Fenno, 1978) if they wish to stay in office, and defense spending affects a large 
range of constituents. We have discussed the defense industry and state economies, but there are 
also specific populations that are more sensitive to defense spending.   
Gallup polling consistently indicates that the U.S. military is the most trusted institution 
in America; however, that does not mean most voters support continuous defense spending 
increases. However, there are significant groups that tend to support defense. Whether motivated 
out of ideology or self-interest, MoC are aware of the DoD and veteran populations as a viable 
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voting bloc. DoD is the largest employer in the U.S., with 2.1 million full-time workers 
constituting approximately two and a half percent of the workforce. Even more important are the 
22 million veterans representing roughly 10% of the U.S. voting population, and who are 10-
12% more likely to vote than the average citizen.169 According to census data veterans tend to be 
white (78%), male (91%), older (50% are over 50) and married (53%). More often they are 
Republican (34%) vs. Democrat (29%) or Independent (33%), and they tend to be more 
conservative (46%) than liberal (14%) or moderate (40%). They also tend to support defense 
spending and consider defense matters as personally important.170  
Defense and Veterans Affairs (VA) are two separate parts of the discretionary budget 
(Budget Code 050 and 700 respectively), but they are closely related. As VA’s role is supporting 
the post military service population, some look at the VA budget as a mirror image of the DoD 
MILPERS budget. The higher the number of service members in DoD, the larger the MILPERS 
budget and the larger the pool of people potentially eligible for VA benefits. However, such a 
comparison has inherent errors. Even though they may appear tied, a great many factors drive 
VA costs. The VA’s primary responsibility is to provide job training, education and medical 
benefits to former service members, particularly those wounded in service. Figure IV-21 is a 
comparison of the DoD and VA budgets, and you can see that conflicts such as the Vietnam War 
certainly drive VA costs. DoD policy is to discharge wounded soldiers who cannot be returned to 
active duty, and when they are discharged their medical care is transferred to the VA. With large 
numbers of service members returning from Vietnam, the VA had to expand to accommodate the 
growing wounded population. After the war ended, VA costs eventually subsided since the draft 
was discarded and no other active large-scale conflict occurred until 2001. This slow rate of 
                                                 
169 U.S. Census reporting https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2012/tables.html. 
170 Gallop polling.  
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decrease was unaffected by the Reagan defense buildup in the 1980s, as the bulk of the budget 
increase was for procurement, rather than large scale increases in personnel. The slow growth in 
the VA budget during the 1990s was affected by the discharge of large numbers of service 
members during the post-Cold War defense drawdown, but the primary driver was the ageing 
veteran population from WWII, Korea and Vietnam. The rapid growth in the VA budget post 
September 11, 2001 was driven by large number of returning wounded soldiers, but also by 
vastly increased education benefits from the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 
2008.171 Typically, VA increases follow active combat and are lagged by several years. The lag 
was more pronounced in the current conflict due to a change in DoD policy to keep wounded 
soldiers on active duty much longer, instead of immediately transferring them to VA, and the 
large numbers of service members reaching their minimum enlistment commitment and taking 
advantage of educational benefits.172  
                                                 
171 Post -9/11 medical practices have resulted in the higher survival rate from wounds; however, this also produced 
higher numbers of wounded requiring VA care. Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance cost over $45 billion.  
172 DoD engaged in a policy of holding wounded and disabled soldiers on active duty as a show of good faith. This 




Figure III-36: DoD Budget vs VA Budget 
Source: VA and DoD Budget Records 
 
Perhaps the greatest single political factor in VA budget growth has simply been 
visibility. When there is focus on the defense budget and defense in general, there tends to be 
spill-over onto VA. The War on Terror put the focus on wounded soldiers, which led to visibility 
into VA problems with treatment times for all veterans. In consequence, with this increased 
congressional attention the VA budget expanded. Taken in this light, the VA budget can be seen 
as a collateral budget influenced by increased DoD growth, and hence another tool for MoC to 
reach a powerful voting group. The figures below will help to illustrate this point. 
Figure IV-21 describes veteran population by state. The dark blue bars show the top ten 
states for defense contracts and the grey bars show the states that have no representation on a 
defense committee.173 The top portion of the chart delineates the largest populations of veterans 
                                                 
173 I used the committee assignments of the last two congresses to make these charts. States on defense committees 
can change with each new Congress, but historically the six states in grey have been under underrepresented.  
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by state, and it is clear that the top defense contracting states are clustered among the states with 
the largest veteran populations. Veterans tend to work in defense or government more than the 
average population and they prefer to live in close proximity to military bases for easier access to 
VA facilities, just as defense contractors tend to locate near DoD facilities for greater access to 
their customers.174 The lower section of Figure IV-21 ranks the states by the percentage of the 
voting population made up by veterans. In this case, the top defense contracting states do not 
coincide with the states with the highest veteran percentage of voters. This is influenced by the 
fact that states with smaller populations tend to have fewer military bases and a smaller defense 
industry footprint.   
What is most interesting about these two charts is the story they tell about representation 
on defense committees. The senate committees (SAC-D and SASC) are composed of a greater 
share of the states with higher veteran percentage of the overall voting population, while the 
House committees are composed of more of the states with higher overall veteran populations. 
This makes sense when you consider that the Senate is more concerned with a statewide voting 
bloc, and the House with high local concentrations of a voting bloc within a particular district. 
This is borne out in that the districts represented MoC on the HASC and HAC-D tend to have the 
highest veteran populations in their respective states. The logic is intuitive, but it helps explain 
the political motivation for particular MoC to seek seats on defense committees.175 
 
                                                 
174 Retirees are a subset of veterans and do tend to live in close proximity to military bases since they have medical, 
exchange and commissary shopping privileges as part of their retirement benefits.  




Figure III-37: Veteran Population 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
 Figure IV-23 below expands the argument to include both veterans and DoD personnel. 
This chart is supportive of what we saw in Figure IV-22, in that the top defense spending states 
are clustered around the states with the largest veteran and DoD populations. It should be noted 
that although large DoD appropriations do tend to follow large DoD and veteran populations, 
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there are exceptions. Michigan, Wisconsin and Oregon are three of the states without 
representation on a defense committee. On the chart below we see that they have reasonably 
large DoD and veteran populations, but what is not shown on this chart is that they also have 
very small defense industry footprints that are two and a half times smaller than the average and 
each have less than 1% of GSP attributable to defense. It follows that the formula to determine 
the importance of defense to a particular MoC is reflected in a combination of a defense 
supportive electorate population and defense dependent industry.  
 
 
Figure III-38: DoD and Veteran Population 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
One significant measure of success for any MoC is incumbency. It has been shown that 
defense spending helps strengthen incumbents (Born, 1990; Levitt and Snyder, 1997; Schmit, 
2000; McDermott and Jones, 2003; Jones, 2010), and when the incumbent is strong, high-quality 
candidates do not run and money stays away (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Fowler and McClure, 
1990; Patterson and Monson 1999; McDermott and Jones 2003). I have argued that increased 
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defense spending is perceived176 by MoC to bolster individual and institutional congressional 
approval. It follows then that increased institutional and individual congressional approval 
should improve incumbency rates.   
Figure IV-24 below looks at a time series comparison of congressional approval rates and 
House of Representatives incumbency rates. The results support the conclusion that in most 
cases, the institutional approval rate of Congress does impact the incumbency rate, at least in the 
House. If this is true, then it is logical to assume that MoC would use defense spending as a lever 
to turn congressional approval in their favor in order to stay in office.  
 
Figure III-39 Incumbency and Congressional Approval 
Source: Gallop polling and CQ Voting and Elections Collection 
 
 
                                                 




In this chapter, we have looked at the impact of the defense process from the perspective 
of the primary stakeholders. The defense industry, state economies, constituents and MoC all 
benefit from defense spending. The real question then is not why MoC increase defense spending 
when their public approval drops, but why they are not always pushing for greater defense 
spending.  
 The answer of course lies in the limited nature of available funds, and the pressure for 
MoC to lower taxes while satisfying the non-defense priorities of constituents, such as 
infrastructure, education and healthcare. With the increase of mandatory spending and little 
chance of MoC taking the decidedly unpopular tact of increasing revenues through tax increases, 
the discretionary budget will continue to shrink as a function of the overall national budget. 
However, if anything this contraction only makes defense spending more important as an 
electoral shaping tool. There is no other single budget with so broad an impact.  
 The defense industry’s economic power and political capital executed through its PAC’s 
is considerable. The states recognize the durability and profitability of defense both as a direct 
employer and as the facilitator of indirect jobs. MoC benefit from the contributions of PACs and 
the constituent support generated by defense jobs and defense supportive populations such as 
DoD employees and veterans. All of these factors make the defense budget a powerful and useful 




V. Methods and Results  
 
In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can 
fail; without it nothing can succeed. 
– Abraham Lincoln177 
 
A. Introduction and Note on Time Series 
This project was conducted as a time series examination of the effects of congressional 
approval on defense spending between 1970 and 2015. As expected, the presence of war and 
significant shifts in economic health led to large fluctuations in defense spending; however, 
public opinion on the adequacy of overall defense spending and congressional approval ratings 
also acted to modulate changes in defense spending both during and between cycles of war and 
severe economic turbulence. It was also observed that the overall defense budget behavior 
conformed to leptokurtic expectations of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET).  
The particular time span was chosen due to the availability of data and the scarcity of 
scholarly work on defense spending over this period. It also allowed for the preclusion of wars of 
national survival (WWI or WWII), which would have skewed the results due to the nature and 
scale of those conflicts.178 Complete datasets were available or constructed for all variables of 
interest and could in all cases be verified by multiple sources.    
Budget data naturally lends itself to time series analysis, and the defense budget describes 
a particularly punctuated stochastic process whose future values are correlated to some degree 
                                                 
177 Lincoln reply in the first debate with Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Ottawa, Illinois (August 21, 1858); in Roy P. 
Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (1953), vol. 3, p. 27. 
178 Wars of survival operate differently than regional wars or interventions due to the level of impact war 
mobilization has upon the economy.  
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with past values. Since no budget as large as the U.S. defense budget is restarted from zero with 
each new iteration, the previous year’s budget provides a baseline which is either maintained or 
modified.179 Since budget data is ordered over time, it is not necessarily identically or 
independently distributed. As I was interested in obtaining accurate interpretations of significant 
relationships and predictions with continuous time ordered data, a time series model was chosen.    
The variables in this study (Table V-1 below) were selected to represent the primary 
drivers of the defense budget process. The variable of interest is congressional approval and the 
control variables of public opinion on the adequacy of defense spending, economic health and 
the presence of war, were selected as the result of a thorough literature review of past research, 
and represent the accepted major drivers of defense spending.  
 
Table V-1: Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 
B. Punctuation in Budgets 
Before delving into the model selection and results, I examine the punctuated nature of 
defense budgets. Baumgartner and Jones were the first to describe the defense budget as highly 
                                                 
179 Wildavsky (1992) rightly described that the defense budget is too large to start from scratch each year. However, 
this does not necessarily imply an incremental process, only one that manifests a relationship with its past values. 
However, the amount of change from year to year is dependent upon much more than simply its past state.   
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kurtotic and experiencing periodic punctuated shifts rather than incremental adjustments. They 
determined that this was a function of both external shocks and internal friction. As punctuation 
is expected to increase with the number of internal friction points, and the defense budget is 
uniquely subject to political, economic and environmental influences, they reasoned that the 
defense budget should show significant Kurtosis. This high kurtosis was expected to manifest 
itself as a leptokurtotic curve, displaying high central peaks and fat shoulders indicating more 
outcomes resulting outside of the normal distribution expected of an incremental process 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1999).    
However, Baumgartner and Jones looked at the entire defense budget from 1781 to 2015, 
and their analysis was dominated by the dramatic shifts resulting from three major wars of 
national survival in U.S. history: The Civil War, World War One (WWI), and World War Two 
(WWII).180 To determine if their theory held during the much smaller period of my investigation, 
I decided to run a series of tests to compare defense and other budgets under less than major war 
conditions.   
Figure V-1 below shows the overall punctuated characteristics of the defense budget 
during the full period of defense spending (left side) and the period under my investigation (right 
side). The period from 1970 -2015 is not as kurtotic as the full period of 1791–2015181 due to the 
absence of major wars of national survival; however, it still demonstrates a punctuated process. 
In the time series line charts in Figure V-1, I have labeled significant events corresponding to 
large punctuations.182 Of note are the large numbers of smaller punctuations between those 
                                                 
180 Jones et al. followed this up in 2014.  
181 Obtained from the Comparative Agendas Project. The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. 
Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 
and 0111611, and are distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. 
Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here." 
182 The Reagan defense buildup of the early 1980s, the first Gulf War in 1991, the Invasion of Iraq and the Budget 
Control Act of 2011 (budget enforcement began in 2013). 
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events. These represent the bends in the exponential path caused by localized policy dynamics 
such as the effect of congressional approval on spending, which Brian Jones, et al (2014) could 
not explain in their Disrupted Exponential Incrementalism Theory.183 The histograms show 
higher than normal central peaks and fat tails associated with a leptokurtic distribution, and the 
quantile probability (Q-Q) plots confirm the telltale crossing and re-crossing of the expected 
trend line (“s” curve) associated with this distribution. Defense is not the only budget to display 
punctuated characteristic, only the most severe. To compare this phenomenon, I looked at the 
punctuation patterns of eight other discretionary budgets.  
 
Figure V-1: Punctuation in Defense Spending 
Source: Comparative Agendas Project and DoD Greenbook 2017 
All discretionary spending bills should theoretically operate under similar constraints as 
defense spending, reacting to external shocks and internal friction. Opportunities for friction 
                                                 
183 Derivation of PET theory. 
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points are influenced by the size of each budget, its salience and extensibility.184 The size of each 
budget acts as an indicator of potential per capita influence in the state or district where it takes 
effect. Salience provides a measure of relative importance to the general electorate of the 
programs affected and thus the expected political pressure to pass its associated spending bill. 
Extensibility seeks to describe the degree to which the benefits of a particular budget can be 
stretched across multiple states and districts, thus attracting more congressional advocates. The 
defense budget scores highly in each of these areas.   
In sheer magnitude alone, no other discretionary budget approaches defense spending. 
Determinations of relative salience and extensibility of other budgets are debatable, and a 
definitive determination is beyond the scope of this paper. Fortunately, the intention here was 
simply to demonstrate that each budget describes a punctuated process and not to establish 
individual causality. A time series regression was undertaken to determine the comparative 
influence of congressional approval on budgets other than defense. 
The budgets chosen for analysis were not comprehensive, but were representative of 
budgets funded by the 12 appropriation bills considered by Congress each fiscal year.185 As 
expected, each budget displayed leptokurtic properties of varying intensity (see Figure V-2 
below). In no case did any of the budgets conform to continuous incremental (normal) 
distributions, although none displayed levels of punctuation as extreme as those of defense 
spending.  
                                                 
184 The larger, more impactful and important to the electorate a budget, the more legislators and entrepreneurs are 
interested in possible outcomes.  
185 For those budgets which receive both discretionary and mandatory funds, only the amounts provided by 




Figure V-2: Punctuation of Discretionary Budgets 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
 
Mandatory budgets were also examined. Medicare was the best example for comparison 
since it is comparable in size, salience and extensibility to the defense budget.186 Figure V-3 
below demonstrates that basic punctuated characteristics was present. The histogram and Q-Q 
plot exhibited the same leptokurtic characteristics as the defense budget even though it is not a 
budget facing appropriation changes each year. This seems to confirm that most, if not all, U.S. 
federal budgets tend to fall (for multiple reasons) outside simple incremental forecasts, even 
when the political and environmental forces acting upon them are quite different.187   
 
                                                 
186 Size was a measure of $ amount allocated per year. Salience was determined by an examination of Most 
Important Problem polling by Gallop over the period in question. Extensibility was determined by the degree of 
Medicare funding per state estimated by BEA over the time period.  
187 A more detailed examination of mandatory and discretionary budget behavior is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The intent here is limited to demonstrating that congressional approval affects defense spending and that 




Figure V-3: Medicare Budget Punctuation 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
 
C. Measuring Defense Spending 
The primary problem with operationalizing military budget change lay with the vast 
number of government and private sources which each calculate the defense budget slightly 
differently. With such vast sums of money, even small accounting discrepancies could have 
significant impact on the resultant data. The Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Treasury 
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Department, The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), the Government Printing Office (GPO), as well as academic projects such as the 
Correlates of War and the Comparative Agendas, all provide unique interpretations of defense 
budget data, including their own collection sources and deflator calculations.188  
 I compared the four most published data bases, and chose as the metric of interest their 
measures of annual defense Budget Authority (BA).189 BA is defined as the authority to incur 
legally binding obligations of the federal government resulting in immediate or future outlays.190 
BA is the most technically accurate measure of defense spending as it reflects the amount of 
money Congress intended to spend in any given year.191 The data bases examined were from 
DoD, OMB, CBO and Comparative Agendas Project.   
Each database contained discrepancies from the others based on three basic areas of 
disagreement.192 The first is the calculation of the total amount spent on defense. The U.S. 
budget is composed of budget functions and sub-functions. National Defense (budget function 
code 050) captures all elements of the budget which pertain to defense of the nation and includes 
military spending (sub-function 051), 193 atomic energy defense activities (sub-function 053) and 
defense-related activities of other federal agencies (sub-function-054).194 The military budget is 
                                                 
188 The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of 
National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and are distributed through the Department 
of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any 
responsibility for the analysis reported here. 
189 Calculated from online reference count and my literature review. 
190 Most Defense BA is provided by the Congress in the form of enacted appropriations (see earlier discussion of the 
defense budget process). 
191 The two competing choices were “outlays” or “Total Obligational Authority” (TOA). However, both outlay and 
TOA can include money from previous fiscal years or exclude money which is not executed in the current fiscal 
year, and therefore don’t necessarily reflect the intent of Congress in a given year.  
192 For example, beginning with the FY 1998 budget, the OMB worked with data that had been rounded to the 
millions of dollars, while the DoD data were derived from numbers rounded to the thousands (DoD 2017 Green 
Book). It matters when comparing 
193 051 includes Overseas Contingency Operation Funds (OCO). 
194 This includes national defense related activities of the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, 
Central intelligence Agency, and other agencies as required (Congressional Research Service 7-5700, 17 Mar 2017) 
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by far the largest part of the budget, but the other sub-functions add billions of dollars to the 
total. Adding to the confusion, some databases use the National Defense and DoD budget terms 
interchangeably, leaving the reader to guess if the sums listed include all sub-functions. I chose 
to utilize the National Defense Budget (sub-function-050) in my analysis, as it offers a more 
complete picture of the expanse of programs touched by defense spending, and thus available for 
manipulation by the congressional authorization and appropriation processes.195   
An even more perplexing issue is the choice of deflation index. When transforming 
budget data into constant dollars a multiplier is applied to account for inflation. This multiplier is 
determined by measuring prices from a fixed point in time, setting the base year equal to one, 
and then multiplying the index value of each year by one plus the annual rate of change of the 
next year. The problem is that the annual rate of change is measured differently by individual 
organizations and is then applied to different base years depending upon the organizations 
preference. When applied independently, or in conjunction, these non-standardized index 
practices can lead to significant variance in the transformed data.  
This problem was avoided by utilizing the DoD comptroller database. Published annually 
for over 30 years and containing complete datasets and detailed justifications for indexes and 
deflation calculations, it was the most transparent database available. The level of detail and the 
ability to validate each year’s data through cross reference with previous year’s documents was 
not available from any other source.196  
                                                 
195 These codes are explained in the DoD Comptroller 2017 Green Book. 
196 The DoD Green Book has been published by the office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) since 
1985 and contains a complete data set of military budget metrics from 1948 to the current year. It also contains 
detailed explanations of sources, rounding, indexes, deflation calculations, other relevant economic data and current 
(year of authorization) and constant year (inflation adjusted) figures.  
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The next issue was to determine whether to reference defense spending as constant 
dollars or as a percentage of Gross National Product (GDP). Contemporary studies utilize both 
approaches. Employing defense spending as a percentage of GDP captures the budget change as 
a percentage of the overall economy. The problem with this is that if the economy were to grow 
and defense spending stayed the same (dollar amount), the defense budget would appear to 
shrink, even though the actual dollar expenditure remained constant. Percent GDP is a preferred 
method by some authors as a way to show national priority for defense. This is similar to the way 
that NATO members are expected to spend two percent of their GDP on defense regardless of 
the threat, to demonstrate their commitment to the alliance (Goel and Saunoris, 2014; Barro and 
de Rugy, 2013; Heo and Bohte, 2012; Barro and Redlick, 2011; Heo, 2010; Pieroni, d’Agostino 
and Lorusso, 2008; Fordham and Walker, 2005). 197   
The second common approach utilizes “real growth” in the budget as determined by 
annual change in constant year inflation adjusted dollars. Real growth demonstrates actual 
buying power of the defense budget by accounting for inflation over time, and is purposely 
disconnected from GDP to show actual defense expenditures without regard for the size of the 
economy. The strength of this approach is that, by showing how much money Congress actually 
carves out and programs toward major defense programs, it can demonstrate what Congress 
actually determined to be politically or militarily necessary, regardless of other economic 
pressures or influences.198 For example, if the economy were to contract and the defense budget 
remained constant, a percentage GDP comparison would show a growth in defense spending, 
                                                 
197 In 2006, NATO member countries agreed to commit a minimum of two per cent of their Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) to spending on defense. This guideline served as an indicator of a country’s political will to contribute to the 
Alliance’s common defense effort (Riga Summit 29 November, 2006). 
198 Every budget decision is a political trade off, and the defense budget may rise or fall during a weakening 
economy based upon political rather than economic decisions. This distinction may not be seen when tied to GDP.  
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while a real growth comparison would show the defense budget as flat (Jones et al. 2014; 
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy, 2011; Fisher and Peters, 2010; Hall, 2009; Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005; Knopf, 1998; Bartels, 1991).199 We can conclude from this example that 
despite the appearance of growth, there was no intent on the part of Congress to add money to 
the defense budget.200   
After careful consideration and testing for serial correlation, I utilized the annual real 
growth in the defense budget.201 Statistically, this provided a stationary time series dependent 
variable with no unit root and no differencing required. Theoretically, comparing annual inflation 
adjusted BA allowed a more straightforward comparison of defense related buying power 
without involving a more complicated disentangling from non-defense related GDP inflation 
factors.202 In particular, I could better unpack the level of urgency with which Congress 
approached the defense budget on any given year. Rather than relying upon the size of the 
economy to determine defense spending commitments, I could use the dollar amounts applied to 




                                                 
199 Or even declining if inflation rates were high and dollar amounts remained constant.  
200 It could be argued that by not decreasing spending during an economic downturn Congress was showing 
commitment to the defense budget, but that is not the same as adding funds to the defense economy.  
201 Also known as program growth; is the amount of growth that does not come from inflation. It is year-to-year 
growth in constant dollars – usually expressed as a percentage, and is computed by dividing the constant dollars for 
one year by the constant dollars of the previous year, and subtracting one. Real growth always implies a relationship 
between two or more time periods. This variable is commonly used in evaluating the defense budget and it is 
transformed through annual differencing and the application of a deflation index to eliminate inflationary trends. 
202 GDP may increase/decrease from a variety of factors, indicating a shrinking or growth of defense spending, when 
actual buying power has not changed.   
203 See chapter 4 for discussion of political ramifications of appropriation types.  
204 Did they choose to increase procurement or manpower, or reduce operations and maintenance? Each decision has 
tradeoffs as well as political and military consequences.  
150 
 
D. Congressional Approval 
Gallup public polling data for the years 1970 - 2015 measured public approval of the 
performance of Congress.205 Gallup provided a nearly complete congressional approval datasets 
and the structure of their questions remained unaltered over the time span in question.206 No 
other dataset, or compilation of datasets, could meet the same standard of coverage and question 
stability.207 Three years were missing in the Gallup surveys (1984, 1985 and 1989). To fill in the 
gaps data from the years on either side was averaged and applied as the value for the year in 
question. There were numerous cases of multiple surveys conducted over the course of a single 
year, and in these instances, the average of those surveys was applied as a composite value for 
the entire year. The Gallup surveys allowed for a “yes,” “no” or “no opinion” response, and I 
operationalized the “yes” response to represent general public approval of Congress.208 The 







                                                 
205 Gallup Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job? 
206 A second database existed asking a question on Confidence in Congress: “Now I am going to read you a list of 
institutions in American society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one -- a great deal, 
quite a lot, some, very little or no opinion?” (Institutions were given in a random order and included Congress). This 
was rejected as it focused more on the stability of the institution, rather than on situational issues and the actions of 
current membership/leadership. 
207 In many cases the survey question changes over time. Gallup’s questions remained constant.  
208 The “No” option was discarded as it is simply the reciprocal of “Yes.” The “No Opinion” option was discarded 
since it reflected ambivalence to the question of congressional job performance and thus would be expected to be of 
less concern to MoC. I.e. there is no urgency to fix a problem the public does not care about.  
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E. Control Variables 
Public opinion on the appropriate level of defense spending was determined from Gallup 
polling during the years 1970–2015.209 Unlike congressional approval, there were a handful of 
databases available, and following the example of previous research, I compared the GSS and 
Gallop databases for completeness and appropriateness (Eichenberg and Stoll, 2003). In each 
case, the questions asked and data results were very similar. Both were also nearly continuous 
over the period in question, however the GSS database contained wider and more numerous 
gaps. In the Gallop data only three years where missing between 1970 and 1978. To answer this 
problem a placeholder variable was created by averaging the difference between the value the 
proceeding and following years. Both the Gallop and GSS survey provided three responses (too 
much spending, about right, and too little). The “too little” answer was used in the model to 
represented public opinion toward inadequate resourcing for defense. The status quo value 
(about right) was also rejected, as it did not reflect a preference for change in either direction, 
and the budget did not remain static over the period of investigation. The expectation was that 
strong and consistent public support for increased defense spending signals to MoC a relatively 
easy win with constituents can be made by increasing the defense budget.  
Unlike smaller scale military interventions, war is a primary driver of military spending. 
To establish the presence of war, a system of conditions must be satisfied. Although DoD does 
not publish a formal empirical qualification for war,210 it is commonly (anecdotally) defined by 
academics and military personnel as meeting all three of the following criteria: (1) Being of 
                                                 
209 Gallup Question: “There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should 
spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending too 
little, about the right amount, or too much?” 
210 U.S. Law of War Manual (2015) and 1956 FM 27-10 (Change No. 1 1976) 
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duration greater than 1 year; (2) deploying significant numbers of troops (greater than 10,000)211 
in direct combat operations; and (3) involving a direct threat to the United States. Humanitarian 
interventions, in all cases examined, failed to meet at least two out of three of these criteria and 
were not considered as war. The Cold War was a bit of a challenge, as its nature was very 
different than that of a classic ‘hot war.’ However, it did not meet all three criteria and was not 
included as a war in this analysis.212 I also consulted the Correlates of War (COW)213 Project 
data base which utilizes the Small and Singer classification of war.214 In all cases my 
classification and that of COW were in concurrence. Years where war was present were labeled 
as “1” and years where war was not present were labeled as “0.”   
War does not bring an instantaneous increase in defense spending. The defense budget 
maintains the military at a readiness level to engage in low level conflict, but it is not intended to 
be sufficient to fund the active prosecution of war. DoD operates under the expectation that 
budgets will ramp up to meet operational requirements in time of crisis.215 In anticipation of this 
I modeled both immediate (supplemental budgets) and lagged increases to defense spending.   
In most cases supplemental increases were retroactively included in defense spending 
totals for the year in question. However, where they were not I manually included them so that 
each year of the war reflected Congress’ intended funding level (in or out of budget cycle). The 
expectation was that the presence of war would force increases in defense spending; however, 
                                                 
211 10,000 soldiers is the low end of Division Strength in the U.S. Army. (https://www.army.mil/info/organization/) 
212 Regional conflicts such as Korea and Vietnam, which are considered part of the Cold War, would have been 
included, but they fell outside of the period of examination.  
213 Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010). 
214 Their overarching definition of war was: sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a 
minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities (later specified as 1,000 battle-related fatalities within a twelve-month 
period). (Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816–1980. Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage, 1982: 205-206.). 
215 This expectation is explicit in each services mobilization plans.  
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those increases would not necessarily continue to rise throughout the duration of the conflict, but 
rather will rise and fall in accordance to changing political, military and economic conditions.   
Overall economic health in this model was represented by measurements of annual 
change in Gross National Product (GDP) and unemployment. These datasets were draw from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and allow for continuous stable time series data. These metrics 
were commonly included in studies on defense spending (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014; 
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy, 2013; Barro and de Rugy, 2013; Whitten and Williams, 2011; 
Heo, 2010; Suzanna De Boef and Kellstedt, 2004; Fordham, 2002; Derouen and Heo, 2000; 
Carsey and Rundquist, 1999). GDP allows us to look at defense spending change as a function of 
the overall economic growth or contraction of the economy. If defense spending diminishes as 
GDP decreases and grows as it increases, it would represent government acknowledgment of the 
available pool of resources for defense expenditures. However, if defense spending increases 
during GDP decline it could indicate a military Keynesian attempt to stimulate the economy 
through government spending (Brace, 1993; Rundquist, 1999; Levitt and Snyder, 1997; Schmit, 
2000; Pieroni, d’Agostino and Lorusso, 2008). Similarly, when defense spending increases 
during times of increased unemployment it may indicate a desire for government to increase 
investment in the economy to spur job creation (Nakamura and Jon Steinsson, 2014; Whitten and 
Williams, 2011; Carsey and Rundquist, 1999). Both of these variables were needed in the model 
to account for variation due to economic effects, which cannot be ignored in any study of 
budgets. The expectation was that defense budgets would increase with growth in GDP as well 







F. Model Selection 
I adopted a Box Jenkins approach to model selection. I began with a preliminary analysis 
to ensure that the intended series described a time ordered, continuous, stationary and stochastic 
process. A series of Augmented Dickey Fuller tests were performed to determine if the process 
exhibited a unit root, and the results showed stationary variables appropriate for an ARIMA time 
series model. I then compared seven different AR (p), MA (q) and ARMA combinations. The 
estimates of these candidate models are shown in Table V-2 below. In determining the best fit, I 
looked at the significance of the coefficients from the ARMA models, the Autocorrelation 
Functions (ACF), and the Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) of the residuals from the 
models. I evaluated the candidate models using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s 
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and Ljung Box portmanteau tests for serial correlation. 
The final model had to be sufficient (no serial correlation in the residuals) and parsimonious. The 
AR (1) model below provided both the best fit and the most parsimonious option.   
𝒚𝒕 =  𝜶0 +  ∑ 𝝓𝒑𝒚𝒕−𝒑 
𝒑
𝒊=𝟏







Table V-2: Candidate Models 
 
 
After selecting the dynamic model for annual real growth in defense spending, I used a 
general to specific modeling strategy to build the final model. I began with a large number of 
lags of the independent variables and parsed the model down based on t-tests and portmanteau 
tests. Again, the final model was chosen based on sufficiency and parsimony. Theoretically, it 
was expected that public opinion would require some degree of lag to allow for the timing of the 
defense budgeting cycle. This lag was calculated to be on the order of one to three years,216 
representing the optimum and latest time at which a significant change could be reasonably 
introduced to the defense planning cycle.217 A series of models were formulated to test the 
                                                 
216 See section on Defense Budget Process in the theory section for details.  
217 This precludes the use of a supplemental budget request, which could be introduced at any time after the normal 
budget, but is normally reserved for war or other significant event. Although supplemental requests were utilized 
early in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, these processes were subsumed by Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) 
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effects of public opinion, war and economic variables alone and in conjunction. In the full AR 
(1) model below 𝛿𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the coefficients for control variables and 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the 
control variables: 
yt = α0 + 𝝓𝟏yt-1 + β0xt + β1xt-1 + 𝜸𝟎𝒛𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒛𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝒊𝒕𝑪𝒊𝒕 +εt
G. Results 
The results of the time series modeling as noted in Table V-3 below were as expected. 
The three hypotheses stated in this paper were confirmed by the results of the time series 
modeling. Hypothesis one stated that negative approval rates of Congress were inversely related 
to military budget growth. In all models, public confidence in Congress had a statistically 
significant and inverse impact on the annual change in military spending (as confidence in 
Congress fell, defense spending rose). Significantly, these effects were most pronounced with a 
lag of only one year, and had an immediate effect upon the next year defense budget, even 
though this was well within the 18 month to two-year planning cycle of the defense budget. In 
other words, congressional concerns were injected inside the normal planning process, requiring 
adjustment to the pentagon budget proposal. This effect was evident even in the absence of 
significant economic or military events.  
Hypothesis two stated that public opinion on the level of military spending was positively 
related to military budget growth. The model confirmed that public opinion on military spending 
was both statistically significant and had a positive effect on annual budget growth. These results 
were most pronounced with a lag of two years, which corresponded to the normal 18-month to 
two-year military budget planning cycle. This indicated an acknowledgement of electorate 
                                                 
included in the normal budget process. Where OCO or supplemental funds were employed, they are included in 
annual real growth of the defense budget (DV). Money that was reprogrammed or transferred between programs is 
not included as it does not represent new funds, but simply the repurposing of funds already budgeted.  
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concerns, however without the demonstrated necessity of breaking the budgeting cycle in 
response to those concerns. Put simply, congressional input could be incorporated into the 
Pentagon budget plan without significant disruption in the normal planning and budget cycle.  
The third hypothesis stated that the strength of the U.S. economy is positively related to 
military budget growth. The models demonstrated that defense spending showed greater and 
more sustained growth when the economy was strong, as measured by GDP growth. Although 
unemployment did not show statistical significance in the model, it was very close (p value of 
.08). In every case, it demonstrated a positive relationship, as evidenced by the growth of defense 
spending as the rate of unemployment increased. This was keeping with the expectation that 
government spending (particularly defense spending) increases with higher unemployment rates.  
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Table V-3: Model Results 
 
 
In order to determine if congressional approval had any influence on other discretionary 
budgets a new set of time series models were created. The results in Table V-4 below indicate 
that the defense budget was the only budget with a causal relationship to congressional approval. 
This would coincide with expectations that the defense budget is viewed as a unique tool by 
Congress for reacting to negative public opinion.218 As the largest single discretionary budget, 
                                                 
218 This not intended to be a definitive test but rather to demonstrate the unique nature of the defense budget with 
regard to congressional approval. 
159 
 
with the greatest extensibility and salience to the electorate, manipulation of the defense budget 
is a relatively easy way to provide economic and security benefits to the widest number of 
constituents.  
 
Table V-4: Effect of Congressional Approval on Non-Defense Budgets 
 
 
The evidence strongly indicates that negative approval rates of Congress significantly 
affect defense spending levels, even when accounting for the presence of war, general public 
opinion on spending sufficiency, and economic health. It is also clear that U.S. federal budgets in 
general, and the defense budget in particular, display punctuated highly kurtotic characteristics 
indicating the presence of a dynamic and non-incremental budgeting process even in the absence 
of major wars. These findings provide evidence that congressional approval is a significant 
driver in defense spending fluctuations and are in accordance with expectations drawn from PET 





H. Alternative Explanations 
What about other factors that influence defense spending? The length of the time series 
for annual real growth in defense spending places a limit on the number of variables that could 
be included in the model. Despite this, I took great pains to consider a wide variety of control 
variables. Political variables including partisan control of Congress (percentage of seats in House 
and Senate), incumbency, and congressional polarization were rejected due to lack of statistical 
significance in the model. Lobbyist variables for total number of military lobbyists and total 
amount spent by lobbyists were promising;219 however, since data was only publically available 
from 1998,220 there were insufficient observations for inclusion in the time series.   
Military combat casualties and total number of troops deployed in combat also contained 
very few observations (1970 – 1973, 1991 and 2002 – 2015) and were difficult to utilize within a 
time series analysis. It would be expected that the larger the number of troops employed, the 
greater the pressure on the budget, particularly if these increases were to overall troop numbers 
and not just a function of deploying current troops from CONUS to a theatre of operations.221 
Figure V-4 below shows rough time series graph comparisons of the available data. There 
appears to be some potential for correlation between the number of troops deployed (as 
expected) with a one-year lag on when the defense budget catches up to the increased cost.222 
Budget spikes occur one year after significant increases in troop numbers. Casualty rates do not 
                                                 
219 One would expect that the resources of lobbyists (information and funding) would be relevant.   
220 Lobbying Disclosure Act PUBLIC LAW 104-65-DEC. 19, 1995 was passed by the 104th Congress in December 
of 1995, but did not take effect until Dec of 1997. 
221 This was the case during the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. USA and USMC end strength grew by 
approximately 100,000 and 30,000 respectively (DoD Manpower Data Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
and U.S. Department of Defense).   
222 As discussed in the theory section of this paper, manpower increases result in approximately $1.2B per 10,000 
new personnel (Clark, 2003), mostly in the form of high burn rate MILPERS and O&M funds.   
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show the same correlation, which is to be expected unless there were a subsequent need to 
procure replacement equipment personnel.223  
Although these results deserve further study, they do not in themselves influence the 
overall results, as the war variable accounts for increases in overall defense spending during time 
of active combat operations when deployed forces and casualties can be expected to be greatest. 
Consequently, congressional approval is highest during the period with the highest casualty rates 
and only begins to fall as casualty rates fall. This seems counter intuitive, but could be due to 
rally “round the flag” effects during the height of fighting, or other factors. Unfortunately, 
definitive answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
 
Figure V-4: Deployed Troops and Casualties vs. Defense Spending 
Source: DoD Casualty Analysis System (DCAS) and DoD Greenbook 2017 
 
                                                 
223 An example of this was the emergency procurement of up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV) and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Armored Vehicles was a $10B program 
executed in FY2007-2009. However, the cost of this program was absorbed into the Overseas Contingency 
Operation funding for those years and thus did not register as significant bump in the overall budget. The details of 
these types of budget maneuvers are beyond the scope of this paper, but are worthy of further study. Casualties also 
incur long term medical and compensation expenses, but these are typically shifted to the Veterans Administration 
which has its own budget line (Not included in the DoD budget).  
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Other economic and public opinion variables were examined. Inflation and changes in the 
federal deficit were tested but found to be statistically insignificant during the time period under 
examination. The “Most Important Problem”224 variable, derived from public polling of what the 
sample population believed were the most pressing problems facing the country at the time, was 
likewise tested. However, it exhibited repeated traits of a unit root, which could not be rendered 
stationary, and was discarded.225   
Each of the above variables holds promise for future studies, but for concerns with 
parsimony, sufficiency of data and over-fitting, they were not included in the final model. This 
does not exclude their potential significance; however, in keeping with the theoretical 
proposition of this paper, the final model provides meaningful and significant results without 












                                                 
224 Obtained from the Comparative Agendas Project and is derived from a composite of public opinion polls asking 
what each person considered was the most important problem facing the country. The poll taker then ranked a list of 
prepared alternatives with included defense. The database gives a ratio of how important people felt defense was and 
how that feeling changed over time.   
225 MIP is an interesting variable that should be examined in more detail in follow on work; however, it is somewhat 





First, learn the meaning of what you say, and then speak. 
– Epictetus 
 
A. Defense spending as a tool for MoC 
This dissertation establishes that MoC often utilize defense spending as a political lever 
to mitigate the effects of poor approval ratings. The literature indicates that congressional 
approval influences incumbency, and my time series analysis confirms a causal relationship 
between congressional approval and defense spending. Additionally, I find support for 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Disrupted Exponential Incrementalism Theory by 
demonstrating that congressional approval can act as a localized policy dynamic resulting in 
punctuated defense spending both during and in the absence of war or significant economic 
turmoil.   
 As it constitutes the majority of discretionary spending and consumes more of the U.S. 
budget than any single expenditure, other than social security, the enormous scale of defense 
spending is difficult to overemphasize. The sheer scope and complexity of the budget, as well as 
the opaqueness of defense accounting, lends itself toward political manipulation. It is telling that 
since the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 required every government agency to complete an 
audit of their financial practices by 1993, DoD is the only agency still not in compliance.226 The 
2010 NDAA established another audit deadline of 30 September 2017 for DoD to accomplish 
this requirement. True to form, DoD is billions over budget in government contracts with 
                                                 




industry contractors to implement accurate accounting processes, with little success.227 This does 
not necessarily imply that DoD is improperly disposing of its allocations, but it does make it 
difficult to prove precisely what it does with them. With over 1.4 million active duty, 1.1 million 
reserve and 861,000 civilian employees, a budget over $600 billion dollars, and questionable 
accounting, the DoD budget provides an environment ripe for exploitation.  
The extensibility of defense economic impact to industry and the states is without 
question. Millions of DoD and defense industry employees live, shop and pay taxes in every 
state in America. Defense industries contract for billions of dollars in goods and services from 
non-defense companies and sub-contractors (Procurement appropriations). Military pay and 
bonuses (MILPERS) increase state tax and retail profits. DoD facilities spend billions in 
administrative support, supplies and service contracts in the communities where they are located 
(O&M), as well as contracting with local construction companies for facility and infrastructure 
construction and improvement (MILCON). Universities and defense industry think tanks also 
receive billions from DoD for studies on everything from artificial intelligence to zoology 
(RDT&E).228 It is not difficult to follow the money trail to every state and congressional district.  
Defense and defense spending are also ubiquitously salient to the electorate. It is difficult 
to look at a news feed or read a newspaper without encountering an article about national 
security. The world is a dangerous place, and DoD is seen by many as the barrier between terror 
and the average citizen. From 1947 to the current day, Gallup has surveyed what people believe 
to be the most important problems in America, and in all those years, defense has consistently 
made the list of top concerns (although usually trailing the economy).229 In 1993, Gallup first 
                                                 
227 Scot J. Paltrow and Kelly Carr, “ How the Pentagon’s payroll quagmire traps America’s soldiers,” Reuters, 9 July, 
2013, http://www.reuters.com/investigates/pentagon/#article/part1.  
228 DoD maintains a veterinary and animal studies mission component.  
229 Comparative Agendas Project. 
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asked the question, “Do you feel that it's important for the United States to be number one in the 
world militarily, or that being number one is not that important, as long as the U.S. is among the 
leading military powers?” Not surprisingly, an average of 64% of people over the years have felt 
that it is important or very important that the U.S. maintain the most powerful military in the 
world.230 Although 55% of people surveyed in 2016 believe that the U.S. should cut federal 
government spending; only 22% thought that should include defense spending.231 As of 2017, 
37% of Americans feel that we spend too little on defense, these are the highest numbers since 
2001 (41%) and 1981 (51%), which in both cases were followed by large increases in defense 
spending.232 This indicates that public opinion generally stays supportive of defense spending. 
Even when factoring partisan differences, with Republicans typically favoring defense 
spending more than Democrats, politicians have historically proved largely bi-partisan in support 
for the defense budget. Perhaps this is because according to polling in 2016, public confidence in 
the military stood at 73%, while at the same time Congress registered only 9%. In fact, the 
military has always scored higher than Congress in polling for public trust. Why would MoC not 
want to be seen as supporting increased spending for an institution that is significantly more 
popular with the electorate than they are?   
All of this leads to the inevitable conclusion that defense spending is very important to 
MoC. If we couple this with the results of time series testing which demonstrates conclusively 
that defense spending reacts to congressional approval, and is affected when other budgets 
(discretionary or mandatory) are not, then it follows that MoC seek to utilize defense spending as 
a lever to shift public approval. This does not imply that congressional approval is the only 
                                                 
230 Gallup Jeff Jones, Lydia Saad  February 3-7, 2016 
231 Gallup Jeff Jones, Lydia Saad  February 1-5, 2017 




causal influence to defense spending, but it does provide strong evidence that it is at least one 
important consideration. It also aids in explaining why defense spending is punctuated in times 
of military or economic conflict and as well as those of relative peace and prosperity. 
B. Next Steps 
Although this dissertation has accomplished its stated goals of establishing a causal 
relationship between defense spending and congressional approval, there was never any claim 
for this to be the final word on the subject. It is clearly only the first step in reopening a fresh 
investigation into the causal factors influencing U.S. defense spending. The next of many steps 
to follow must be to continue the expansion of data collection. The greater the quantity of data 
points, the stronger the time series analysis becomes. This is frustrating, as it requires patience, 
but when dealing with an annual budget, there is no alternative to waiting for time to pass. In the 
interim, there are a number of other avenues to pursue.  
Although I chose a time series approach as a valid and logical method for examining 
defense spending, it is not the only approach available. Other statistical methods could be used to 
fill gaps where insufficient data is available for a full time series analysis. Variations on OLS 
could allow a closer inspection of variables with brief duration datasets such as casualties, troop 
numbers and political contributions (PACs, etc.). This would allow for refinements to the general 
model and the potential development of new theoretical foundations to guide future research. 
Additionally, every federal budget should be examined in the model over the time span in 
question; to see if congressional approval has any impact. The nine budgets chosen for 
comparison in this paper were representative, but not exhaustive. Although unlikely, it is 
important to determine if there are any other budgets with similar (albeit smaller scale) reactions.  
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Although measures of polarization were not significant in the model, they are important 
in determining the voting tendencies of the electorate. Logically, polarization has bearing to 
congressional approval. For example, with both houses in control of one party we would expect 
to see congressional approval rise in that party and a drop in the other.233 Similarly, if the 
Republican electorate were overall more supportive of defense spending, then why do Democrats 
continue to generally support increased spending as well? One assumption might be that 
democrats are courting not only their core constituency, but also the independent voter, and 
therefore might take a more moderate approach than supported by more core liberal voters. In 
this study, I was not able to devote time to operationalizing these effects, and it might prove 
beneficial to look at the district and state ideological demographics in comparison with MoC 
votes on defense appropriations. The intent would be empirically testing the proclivity of a 
particular MoC, and Congress as a whole, to support greater or lesser defense expenditures. In 
other words, based upon electorate ideological leaning and district or state economic 
dependencies, can we predict which MoC would be most likely to view defense spending as tied 
to both individual and institutional positive congressional approval?   
To support this approach, more data is required in almost every category of investigation. 
In order to determine defense industry and state economic pressure on MoC, it would be 
necessary to dig down to the district level for every MoC and examine in detail the nature of 
political contributions (from whom and what ties each has to defense or defense supporting 
industry). I was able to do this for the Missouri example, but every state should be similarly 
examined. The example I used of Boeing was instructive, but this also should be expanded to at 
least the top ten companies to see to what extent they impact state economies and political 
                                                 
233 These partisan shifts may balance each other, but their impact to congressional approval and defense in unproven. 
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contributions. I was able to examine in detail the defense committees of the HASC, SASC, 
HAC-D and SAC-D, for the 114th and 115th Congress, but this needs to extend to include as 
many Congresses as data allows. The goal would be the creation of a theoretical model for 
defense committee membership based on the conditions that prompt a MoC to seek a seat on a 
defense committee and which committees they perceive as best serving their purpose.  
These are only the first few steps in what promises to be a long journey. However, they 
do provide the beginnings of a fresh approach to shed new empirical light on the causal factors 
and underlying conditions contributing to strong punctuations in defense spending. Far from 
being a requiem to the study of defense spending and budgets, this dissertation is a call to action 
of sorts. If interest in political science can again be focused on the defense budget, greater insight 

















I close this dissertation with a quote from the same speech with which it began. In 
describing, what he feared was the growing institutionalization of defense spending, President 
Eisenhower stated,  
“The total influence -- economic, political, and even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every 
State house, and every office of the Federal government. Only an alert and 
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and 
military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and 
liberty may prosper together.234  
I include this passage out of respect for the fearsome political inertia driving the 
enormous cultural and economic force that is the U.S. defense budget. I feel a debt of culpability, 
having played a small role in the process as a service member, to become an academic warder of 
its effects. Of course, as Oscar Wilde observed, “The truth is rarely pure and never simple.”235 
Only a concerted multi-disciplined inquiry by academic and policy practitioners alike can lead to 
a true understanding of the defense budget process and its appropriate place in American politics.  
Eisenhower placed the onus for controlling defense spending on a watchful and informed 
electorate. However, with complex issues such as defense and national security some entity must 
provide clarity into the motivations of government and the dangers of blindly following the 
established norm of ever greater spending on defense. If the media’s role is to inform, who 
educates them? It is a charge that academia must accept, and one to which I hope to contribute.   
 
                                                 
234 Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960, p. 1035- 1040. 
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